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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
In the recent 50 years, most of the European countries reduced the number of local public 
administrations by amalgamating the local settlements in larger municipal units. The main purpose of 
these amalgamations was to increase cost-efficiency in provision of the public services. At the same 
time, the administrative units at the upper tiers of the local public administration (regions) grew in 
dimensions in many countries, with the purpose of generating bigger economies of scale and also to 
become more competitive nationally and internationally. 
Most of the European countries having similar size and population as Moldova adopted one-tier systems 
of local public administration (Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, Slovenia, but also 
Bulgaria and Finland), with Belgium being a notable exception. However, the two-tier system is 
numerically predominant in the EU-27, including some small countries that have adopted this model: 
Czech Rep., Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovakia. For the bigger countries the three tiers model 
(either federal or regional) is common: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom. We have 
studied deeper five countries (not only from EU) with some experience in implementing administrative-
territorial reforms in the recent 20 years.  
In Czech Republic the sub-national government is organized in two tiers. Estonia is based on a one-tier 
model to which it switched in 1993, with the existing 15 counties not being a tier of the local public 
administration but rather a lower level of the central government. Georgia is a typical example where 
geography and geopolitics create significant constraints affecting administrative-territorial division of 
the country and forcing the country to maintain a highly centralized multi-tier system of local 
government. In 2009 Latvia moved from a two-tier to one-tier system of local public administration. 
Macedonia firstly went through a territorial fragmentation and in 2005 underwent a territorial 
amalgamation and presently has a one-tier local public administration system.  
In comparison with other countries similar in territory and size Moldova is not an extreme case of 
territorial fragmentation. However, conducted analysis has shown that in Moldova there is a large room 
to reduce the operational costs at both levels – municipal and raion - of the current administrative-
territorial system. Achieving a certain improvement is possible even without any significant reform, by 
simply enforcing more efficiently the legal provision regarding the population threshold that a rural 
community has to meet in order to become a primaria (1500 inhabitants). Presently the general 
operational costs of the local public administration expressed in MDL per resident in rural communes 
with less than 1500 inhabitants are 2.5 times bigger than in those having more than 5000. At the district 
level differences in efficiency are remarkable as well: data show that in the three smallest districts of 
Moldova (Basarabeasca, Soldanesti, Dubasari) the average per resident operational expenditures are 2.6 
times higher than in the three largest districts (Hancesti, Cahul, Orhei).  
In order to increase the efficiency of the local public administration, this study has proposed three 
models or reorganizing the country’s territory: a single-tier model, a two-tier model and a model based 
on the inter-municipal cooperation. The latter is not actually a model of administrative-territorial 
organization, but rather a (short-term) alternative to a reorganization.  
The single-tier model requires abolishing the raions’ level and entrusting municipalities with providing a 
significant amount of public services and a much higher level of fiscal autonomy; it thus requires 
amalgamation of the small communities into larger municipalities, from 900 in present to 111. Map 11 
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shows the proposed division of the territory, whit mode details in the Annex 1. The economic 
simulations based on the proposed one-tier model shows a three-fold reduction of operational costs. 
However, such a model requires exceptional political will and determination and public communication 
abilities from the central government, because a significant reduction in number of municipalities is set 
to engender social dissatisfaction and political tensions between different levels of government.  
Under the two-tier model we propose abolishing the current system of raions and transforming the 
Development Regions in administrative regions, while naming them ‘raions’ in order to stick to 
Constitutional provisions. This will reduce the operational costs at the second level by about 5-6 times, 
while not having any significant impact on the quality of the services, provided that municipalities are 
entrusted with more important competences. Having a larger size is important for these regional units 
to effectively engage in international cooperation and to have an impact on regional economic 
development. Existence of the region-level public administration allows for a milder reduction in 
number of municipalities, from 900 to 289, which will render savings of about 40-45% at the first level of 
public administration. Map 14 illustrated the proposed model, with more details in Annex 2. A two-tier 
model will meet less resistance from the concerned public authorities of municipal level, but much more 
resistance from the raion authorities which will lose their jobs under such a model. 
Both models can incorporate inter-municipal cooperation as an intrinsic feature, which should be 
encouraged in any case. At the same time, the inter-municipal cooperation can be applied as a separate 
option, if the government considers that no political conditions are met for a significant administrative-
territorial reorganization of the country. However, it should be clear that the inter-municipal 
cooperation is not a permanent substitute for the amalgamation which is an economic imperative. Also, 
the inter-municipal cooperation involves many complex aspects related to coordination and budgetary 
adjustments. 
At the same time, the existing statistical data and economic research suggests that – if current system of 
local public finance remains in place – amalgamation of the municipalities and districts would not result 
in significant increase in own revenues. Significant changes will be necessary to the local finance system, 
including adopting bigger and predictable shares accruing to local public authorities from the shared 
state revenues. 
The most feasible scenario of implementation of either the one-tier or two-tiers model would be to 
implement the mandatory legal requirement of 1500 inhabitants for a settlement to become a rural 
primaria before elections in 2011, to proceed with the a voluntary phase between local general 
elections in 2011 and 2015 (with encouraging financial bonuses), after which a mandatory 
amalgamation takes place after general local elections in 2015. 
It should be mentioned that with no regard to the chosen model of administrative-territorial 
reorganization, there is a set of no-regret measures which have to be implemented in any case in order 
to increase the efficiency of the local public authorities. These measures include: streamlined 
procedures of civil petitioning, wider use of e-services at regional and local level, wider use of electronic 
technologies as a means to streamline communication between different levels of the government; and 
more advanced budgeting procedures at local level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
STUDY RATIONALE  
As a country located at geopolitical crossroads and being under many cultural and ideological influences, 
the Republic of Moldova has had a very tumultuous history, which reflected, inter alia, onto its fluid 
administrative-territorial organization.  
Obviously, even in countries with mature and stable democratic systems the administrative-territorial 
divisions do not remain rigid in time, but are often adjusted depending on new priorities, needs and 
available resources
1
. However, in these countries the changes in administrative-territorial structure 
often closely follow the principles of economic logic and geographic regionalization, and not only 
political/electoral bargains. As for countries like Moldova, which do not have a long-standing tradition of 
self-administration, changes in administrative-territorial divisions and of regional policies in general are 
not needs-driven, and often are a consequence of geopolitical changes or of some landmark domestic 
political processes. 
With local public administration in Moldova historically being under a ‘constant revolution’, this 
administrative level is currently weak and with no palpable influence on the efficiency of public services 
provision, quality of life and economic development of the administered territories. Presently the 
Moldovan local public administration is influenced by both European models and principles and by 
Soviet vestiges, with the latter seemingly having a bigger influence on it. One of the negative effects of 
these long lasting reforms has been the decline in trust of the population in local public administration 
and, by extension, in the state per se. It is thus highly necessary to take an objective look – enrooted 
mainly in economics and geography – at the current administrative-territorial system and to assess to 
what extent it responds to citizens’ needs at local/regional level and to wider national interests of 
economic development, consolidation of democracy and respect of human rights. 
WHAT IS  AN ‘OPTIMAL ’  ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION? 
As European experience shows, there is no ‘optimal’ size of the municipality/region or ‘best’ 
administrative structure that would have universal application
2
. When starting the research we did not 
have any prior belief that either Romanian or French or Scandinavian or any other administrative-
territorial model is best suitable for Moldova, even though for comparative purposes we are going to 
consider mainly the experience of countries which are relatively similar to Moldova in geographic and 
demographic terms and with recent experience in administrative-territorial reform. However, we did 
not base our approach either on political preferences or ideological biases.  
We started from the assumption that the purpose of any administrative-territorial reform is to establish 
territorial unit capable of delivering high quality services to residents while seeking to preserve local 
democracy. In this respect, we tried to formulate conditions the system should respond to and we 
estimated how different models would meet these conditions in Moldova’s case. At the same time, we 
have not approached this as a mathematical problem of optimization, as it involves not only resources, 
but also political economy considerations based on stakeholders’ interests and preferences and based 
on values, such as human rights, gender equality and social inclusion, which are not always easy to 
                                                          
1
 Council of European Municipalities and Regions, 2009. 
2
 Swianiewicz (ed.), 2010. 
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quantify. Not least important, as Moldova is an ethnically complex society, the administrative-territorial 
division has to take into account the ethnicity factor. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
There are several basic questions that the study answers: 
• Is the current administrative-territorial structure responsive to the local, regional and national 
development priorities in the Republic of Moldova? Is fragmentation really a problem in 
Moldova? Would territorial consolidation be a solution? 
• What are the main shortcomings of the current administrative-territorial structure? Here first 
and second level territorial administrative units  are analyzed according to a set of criteria (size 
of administered territory, number of population, local public finances, revenues per capita) and 
their cost-efficiency is assessed; 
• How to best integrate territorial units (cities, towns, villages) in how many administrative units 
at how many levels? Which are possible models here? 
• Which should be the administrative and financial interactions between these territorial units? 
What additional mechanisms and tools may be necessary for effective provision of public 
services (inter-communal/inter-municipal cooperation models, associations and networks of 
public services)? 
• Based on thorough risks-assessment, how to properly reform the current system: either reform 
it gradually or rather put in place a qualitatively different one? 
To address these questions, the study is structured in three core chapters.  
In the first chapter we present the most relevant European experience in administrative-territorial 
reform. For this, we look more closely to five selected countries which have certain similarities with 
Moldova: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia and Macedonia.  
In the second chapter we analyze the evolution and the current situation of the administrative-
territorial structure of Moldova. We mainly look at economic efficiency of the system, by conducting 
cost-efficiency analysis of the first and second level administrative-territorial units. We further analyze 
how municipalities’ size affects democratic participation (by means of voters turnout in local elections) 
and satisfaction of citizens on services provided by local public administration.  
In the third chapter we propose three models to improve the administrative-territorial organization of 
the country. The first one is a single-tier model which renders high economic gains, but is likely to 
encounter resistance from the local stakeholders, with an almost eight-fold cut in the number of 
municipalities. The second model is a two-tier model which is less strict in terms of reducing the number 
of first tier administrative units, but it proposes a significant change when it comes to second-level 
administrative units. The third option is not a proper model but rather a short-term alternative based on 
the inter-municipal cooperation.   
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1. APPROACHES TO TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION:  A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
The purpose of the analysis performed in this chapter is twofold. Firstly, certain general conclusions will 
be drawn from solutions to territorial fragmentation problems that various European countries applied. 
Secondly, individual country cases will be examined later on, including Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Latvia, and Macedonia (see Map 1). 
MAP 1.  REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND THE COUNTRIES SELECTED AS CASE STUDIES 
 
Source: see the ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
The methodology used for researching the relevant country cases is analytical and comparative. The 
case studies involve identification of similarities and differences, factors influencing the success or 
failure of territorial reforms and potential challenges that might delay the reform process. The analysis 
aims to tackle the following aspects that are related to all stages of any policy process: policy 
formulation, consultation and consensus building; decision-making; stages of policy implementation; 
and assessment of the outcome. Especially the analysis will try to find out whether the goals of the 
territorial reforms in these five countries were achieved, what were the negative side-effects and what 
kind approaches were used to fix them. 
64 | P a g e  
MAI N TRE N DS IN  TE RRI TO RIAL  G OV E RNA NC E  I N  EUR OPE A N C OUNTRIE S  
Since 1960s’, the general trend in European countries was to amalgamate settlements in larger 
municipalities. Almost every Western and Northern European country reduced the number of local 
governments during the second half of the twentieth century.
3
 As shown in Table 1, a large group of 
developed European countries opted for regrouping their towns and villages under common larger local 
governments. In most cases, this was not a one-off process as the number of municipalities decreased 
gradually over the last 50 years.
4
 In some countries this process was driven by economic forces, seeking 
to increase efficiency in public services delivery by directing resources to public investments rather than 
to supporting low-capacity administrations in tiny municipalities. In others this was a result of central 
government-led reforms. Another group of countries, for various reasons, maintained the status quo 
and did not have any significant territorial reforms. The smallest group of countries, some of which are 
in the bottom of the list,
5
 even though encouraged fragmentation, usually favored cooperation among 
local governments for services provision within larger areas. 
TABLE 1.  CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITIES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Country Number of municipalities in 
the past (year in parentheses) 
Number of 
municipalities, 2009 
Change, % 
Denmark (1950) 1387 98 -93 
Lithuania (1990) 581 60 -90 
Sweden (1950) 2281 290 -87 
Greece (1950) 5774 1034 -82 
United Kingdom (1950) 2028 435 -79 
Latvia (1990) 570 118 -79 
Belgium (1950) 2669 589 -78 
Netherlands (1950) 1015 443 -56 
Germany (1950) 25930 12229 -53 
Norway (1950) 744 431 -42 
Austria (1950) 3999 2357 -41 
Finland (1950) 547 348 -36 
Spain (1950) 9214 8111 -12 
Switzerland (1950) 3097 2758 -11 
Estonia (1990) 254 227 -11 
France (1945) 38814 36682 -5 
Poland (1988) 2399 2418 1 
Hungary (1980) 3122 3153 1 
Portugal (1974) 304 308 1 
Italy (1950) 7781 8100 4 
Romania (1998) 2948 3176 8 
Moldova 
(Transnistria 
included) 
(1988) 881 980 11 
Czech Rep. (1990) 4104 6248 52 
Note: Moldovan Government was not able to influence the number of municipalities in the Transnistria breakaway region; 
Sources: World Bank, 2003; Dexia, 2009/2010 edition; 
The most studies that focus on problems of size and efficiency of local governments use municipalities’ 
population as primary units for analysis.
6
 This is mainly due to the unavoidable link between local 
                                                          
3
 Fox and Gurley, 2006. 
4
 For newly emerging democracies, 1990 is usually taken as a reference year. 
5
 Basically, the most extreme cases of territorial fragmentation are France, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. 
6
 For a theoretical discussion on this issue see: Swianiewicz, 2002, in Swianiewicz (ed.), 2002.  
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governments income (and hence, the number of taxable residents) and the per resident costs for 
services delivery compared to other municipalities. The surface area of a municipality and density - both 
of population and of residential settlements - also influences local governments efficiency (the costs of 
services delivery increases with distance), but not to the extent that population does. Depending on 
traditions, geographical conditions, political interests and other important factors, the average 
population size of a local government in EU-27 countries range from 1510 (Cyprus) to over 150 
thousands inhabitants in the UK (see Figure 1). The average municipal area also varies greatly, from 5 
km
2 
in Malta to 1552 km
2 
in Sweden (Figure 2). An average EU-27 municipality amounts to 5530 
inhabitants,
7
 which is slightly above the often mentioned optimal size (5000 inhabitants) that provides 
grounds for obtaining efficiency at reduced costs. 
F IGURE 1.  AVERAGE DEMOGRAPHIC SIZE OF THE MUNICIPALITIES IN THE EU-27,  2009 
 
Source: Dexia, EU sub-national governments: 2008 key figures, 2009/2010 edition; 
                                                          
7
 Assuming that all 91316 municipalities in EU27 countries (2008) were used for calculations. 
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F IGURE 2.  AVERAGE MUNICIPAL AREA IN THE EU-27, KM2,  2009 
 
Source: Dexia, EU sub-national governments: 2008 key figures, 2009/2010 edition; 
Where municipalities are entrusted with providing of a significant amount of public services (usually in 
smaller countries, with Finland being a notable exception – see Table 2), a one-tier system was 
consolidated. The most of the EU-27 countries recognized the need for upper levels of local governance, 
which usually provide services that would otherwise not be available at the municipality level. Thus, 
eleven countries have a two-tier system of local government while in larger countries, some of them 
with a federal or quasi-federal structure, there is also a third, regional level that in some cases 
corresponds to federal states. Over the last twenty years, the general trend in the EU countries 
regarding upper levels of governance was to strengthen, reorganize or recreate the regional level while 
simultaneously expanding regional governments’ competencies. 
TABLE 2.  MODELS OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE EU-27,  SITUATION AS OF YEAR 2009 
Model Countries 
One tier Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Luxemburg, Malta, Slovenia 
Two tiers Austria, Czech Rep., Denmark, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland,  Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Sweden 
Three tiers Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, United 
Kingdom 
Source: authors’ classification; 
Understandably, finding out whether the general European trends in territorial governance are 
applicable in a particular country would need an in-depth look into country cases. Even in different 
places within the same country the factors encouraging or discouraging consolidation could be very 
different and circumstantial particularly to every area. This is another lesson that has to be considered 
when proposing new models for administrative-territorial division in Moldova. 
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SE LEC TE D C O UNTRY  C ASE ST UDIE S  
Solutions to territorial fragmentation problems are always country-specific and recipes from outside 
may be hard to implement even in apparently similar environments. Such geographic, economic and 
political factors as country’s size/shape, relief/elevation, ethnic structure, economic profile having been 
developed in the post-war period (agricultural, industrial or service-oriented), and structure of national 
settlement system always have an impact on its administrative-territorial division. However, a close 
examination of territorial reform experiences in other countries may well at least highlight the possible 
problems and typical mistakes to be avoided. For the best comparative purpose, five countries from the 
CEE/FSU region were selected (Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia and Macedonia). These 
countries fit the purpose of this study as they: 
• Share certain similarities with Moldova (being that size of territory and population of the 
country or of its sub-national territorial units; common historical patterns of local government 
reforms; similar design of power-sharing arrangements between central and local governments; 
alike administrative cultures, etc.); 
• Faced territorial reforms during the last two decades, i.e. recent enough to be relevant and to 
provide useful lessons for Moldova; 
• Cover the entire range of local governance models including a one-tier system (Estonia, 
Macedonia, Latvia), a two or a multi-tiers system (Czech Republic, Georgia), as well as the 
experience of inter-communal cooperation among the tiny municipalities (Czech Republic); 
• Include many examples from the post-Soviet space (Estonia, Georgia, Latvia) to which Moldova 
itself belongs; 
• Experienced some alternative models of administrative-territorial organization, like inter-
communal cooperation (Czech Republic) or re-fragmentation (Macedonia), aside from the 
traditional territorial consolidation (i.e. increasing the size of sub-national administrative-
territorial units – in Estonia, Latvia and Georgia); 
• Include both bottom-up and top-down solutions used when approaching territorial 
amalgamation of sub-national units. 
AT THE SAME TIME, THESE COUNTRIES DIFFER IN MANY ASPECTS,  AS SHOWN BY A SNAPSHOT COMPAIRISON OF THE MAIN LOCAL 
MAIN LOCAL GOVERNANCE INDICATORS PROVIDED IN 
Table 3. Georgia and Macedonia feature the lowest share of local governments expenditure in GDP and 
in total public expenditure, which is an indicator proxying the level of decentralization. Estonia and 
Latvia are closer to the EU average indicators, both in terms of municipalities’ size and local 
governments expenditure. Czech Republic has the most fragmented territorial organization, and in this 
respect it is very resemblant to Moldova. It should be noted though, that the number of municipalities 
in the Czech Republic decreased twice since 1950, while in Moldova it slightly increased. The most 
striking feature, however, is that the problems related to Moldova’s territorial fragmentation are 
amplified by a high percentage of rural population, meaning that an increased number of citizens are 
exposed to the poor quality of services in rural areas. 
 
TABLE 3.  GEOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF  THE SELECTED COUNTRIES,  YEAR 2009, IF NOT OTHERWISE INDICATED 
  Czech Republic Estonia Georgia Latvia Macedonia Moldova (excludes Transnistria, if 
not otherwise indicated) 
Total population, million persons 10.2 1.4 4.4 2.3 2.0 4.1* 
Total area, thousand km2 78.9 45.2 69.7 64.6 25.7 33.8* 
Population density, inh./km2 132.2 31.1 65.1 37.1 77.8 121.9* 
Territory’s shape Elongated Fragmented Elongated Elongated Round Elongated* 
Elevation (m) Average 450 57 1233 89 819 143* 
Range  1556 318 5085 312 2713 428* 
Share of dominant nation, % 90 69 84 59 64 76 
No. of municipalities 6,248 227 69 118 85 901 (+79)** 
Share of towns among 1st tier units, % 9 15 100 65 40 6 
Average size of municipalities, inh. 1,600 6,100 45,000 19,000 25,150 2,850 
No. of second level local governments 14 - 12 - - 34 
Urban population, % 73.5 69.1 51.5 67.8 68.9 46.3 
Economic profile Engineering and 
electronic industry 
Energetic and 
chemical industry 
Services and 
agriculture 
Manufacturi
ng industry 
Services 
and industry 
Industry and agriculture 
GDP per capita, USD, PPP, year 2008  24,093 17,908 4,757 17,110 9,154 2,842 
Total public 
expenditure, year 
2005 
 million USD 54,663 4,563 3,216 5,756 1,966 1,116 
% of GDP 44.1 33.2 24.9 36.0 34.0 37.0 
Local governments 
public expenditure, 
year 2005 
 million USD 14,768 1,136 772 1,513 98 301 
% of GDP 11.9 8.3 6.0 9.5 1.7 10.0 
% of total 27.0 24.9 2.4 26.3 4.9 27.0 
Note: * - Transnistrian region included; ** +79 municipalities and 5 raions refer to the breakaway Transnistrian region;  
Source: UCLG 2008; IMF World Economic Outlook Database; Czech Statistical Office, Statistics Estonia, National Statistics Office of Georgia, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, State Statistical Office 
of Macedonia, National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova and authors’ estimates; 
CZECH REPUBLIC  
COU NTR Y ’S  SOC I O-E C O NOMIC  A ND GE O GR AP HI C  PR OFILE  
The Czech Republic has a relatively high-fragmented relief, which to some extent influenced its 
administrative-territorial division (Map 2). High-level industry (engineering and electronic) and services 
were being developed in the post-war period that facilitated concentration of population in cities. Czech 
Republic fares a relatively high urbanization rate (71%), which caused that settlement system to be 
based on urban settlements (593 cities). However, due to high fragmentation of administrative-
territorial division, just about 9% of the 1st tier units – municipalities – are organized around cities and 
towns. 
MAP 2.  ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  ADMI NI ST RATIVE-TE RRIT ORI AL DIV I SI ON AN D RE FORMS  
Czech Republic has one of the most fragmented administrative-territorial systems in the EU. With an 
average municipality population size of about 1,600 inhabitants, an average area of 13 square 
kilometers, and with nearly 80% of local governments having less than one thousand dwellers, it has 
very close resemblances to the French territorial system.  
During the communist regime a series of successive forced amalgamation reforms took place, reducing 
the number of municipalities by three times from about 11,500 in 1950 to about 6,250 in present. Since 
independence, however, local democracy values were understood as the right of any tiny settlement to 
have a local government and the number of municipalities increased again (see Figure 3) a process fairly 
labeled as ‘spontaneous fragmentation’.
8
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F IGURE 3.  EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITIES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1950–2007 
 
Source: based on Michal Illner, ‘The Voluntary Union of Municipalites: Bottom-up Territorial Consolidation in the Czech 
Republic?’ in Swianiewicz Pawel ed., “Territorial consolidation reforms in Europe”, OSI/LGI, Budapest, 2010. 
As there were not clear criteria for splitting up, such as the minimum population, for example, this 
resulted in an increasing number of municipalities with 50-500 inhabitants, which represent about 60% 
out of the total number of municipalities (see Table 4). The result of the increasing fragmentation was 
limited revenues in local budgets and, subsequently, a higher dependence on transfers from the state 
budget. As amalgamation was ruled out, being collectively seen as reminiscence of the totalitarian 
regime, there was a pressure on local and central government to identify alternative solutions. 
TABLE 4.  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN CZECH REPUBLIC BY NUMBER OF INHABITANTS  
 Number of inhabitants No. of municipalities % of total municipalities Population, % 
below 199 1,561 24.98 1.8 
200-499 1,991 31.86 6.2 
500-999 1,330 21.28 8.9 
1,000-1,999 700 11.20 9.3 
2,000-4,999 392 6.27 11.3 
5,000-9,999 142 2.27 9.2 
10,000-19,999 70 1.12 9.4 
20,000-49,999 42 0.67 11.9 
50,000-99,999 15 0.24 10.1 
over 100,000 6 0.10 21.8 
Total 6,249 100.00 100.0 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Czech Statistical Office, 2009; 
The attempts to stop or at least stabilize the fragmentation process proved to be unsuccessful as the 
municipalities put forward the arguments of local autonomy and of forced top-down amalgamations 
under the communist regime. It was only the minimum threshold of 1000 inhabitants for newly created 
municipalities, established in 2000, that interrupted the fragmentation process. A set of measures 
aiming at diminishing the effects of the extreme fragmentation also were implemented: 
20 | P a g e  
• Voluntary consolidation of municipalities was legally encouraged, but this did not result in 
significant mergers. A centrally-designed amalgamation process is nearly impossible as the 
Czech Constitution provides strong guarantees for local autonomy. An alternative solution 
applied was gradually increasing per-capita tax allocations as the size of municipality increased. 
However, not many local governments got impressed about this incentive, most probably 
because smaller municipalities, which should be a primary target for mergers, do not normally 
have extensive tax bases. Evidence suggests that mergers would not result in significant increase 
in own revenues of merging the smallest municipalities, which explains why the incentive did 
not yield any results;
9
 
• Both top-down and bottom-up inter-municipal cooperation was favored for joint services 
delivery (see next section); 
• In a centrally-designed process, municipalities that have limited capabilities for providing 
certain/specific types of services entrusted their delivery to larger urban municipalities. 
The second major aspect of the territorial reform in the early 1990s’ was the abolishment of the second-
tier of local governance. With the regional level being seen as an instrument of the former Communist 
Party control, one of the first measures of the newly established power after 1989 was to dissolve 
regional institutions.
10
 The remaining ‘district offices’ were subordinated to the central government and 
took on also regional responsibilities.  
Although the 1993 Czech Constitution establishes a two-tier system of local government, the provisions 
on the regional level have been ignored until 1997 when a constitutional amendment creating 14 
regions (kraje), including Prague as capital city, was adopted. There were two types of pressures 
regarding creating of a higher level of local government. The first one, of functional nature, indicated the 
need for a regional level that would support the weak municipalities, would increase decentralization by 
undertaking some tasks from the central government deconcentrated offices and would presumably 
help the central government in amalgamating smaller municipalities. The second pressure was of 
external nature and came from the EU which used conditionality levers to influence the recreation of 
the regional level in compliance to its regional policy. However, the amendment became effective 
towards the end of 2000 only, when the first elections for regional councils were held. 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FU NC TIONAL  DESIG N OF THE  LPA 
The 1990 Municipalities Act established a one-tier system of local government, where municipalities 
have to carry on both own self-government tasks and transferred responsibilities on behalf of the state. 
With certain alterations throughout the last two decades, this system still stays in place. In terms of 
competencies, all municipalities exercise a unique set of own responsibilities that has to be funded from 
their own revenues – elementary schools, kindergartens, gas and electricity supply, waste management, 
public transport and local roads, social housing, theatres, libraries and museums, leisure facilities, water, 
street lighting, firemen, cemeteries etc. As regards transferred (state administration) responsibilities, 
depending on criteria like population size and centrality, all municipalities are currently divided into 
three distinct categories: 
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• Type I – includes about 93% of municipalities whose jurisdiction is limited to their own 
administrative territory and subsequently to own responsibilities (see above) and occasionally to 
basic transferred responsibilities (e.g. emergency management);  
• Type II – 388 of administrative districts of municipalities with authorized municipal office (as of 
1
st
 January 2010)
11
; and, 
• Type III – 205 administrative districts of municipalities with extended powers.
12
 
One should note that the types II and III should be perceived as services provision districts for 
surrounding areas rather than a higher level of governance. A general picture of the distribution of own 
and transferred responsibilities (the terms used in Czech legislation are independent jurisdiction and 
assigned jurisdiction) of municipalities is provided in Table 5. The classification by the three 
abovementioned types is not rigid and it has no strict hierarchy i.e. there is not an exclusive list of basic 
assigned competencies that would be applicable to absolutely all municipalities. The same function in 
some areas could be discharged by a type II administrative district, while in others – by type III district 
with extended powers. Typical assigned functions for the latter two types are: management of school 
budgets, payment of social benefits, social protection, trade licenses, building permits, physical 
planning, population registration and identity cards, driving licenses, vehicle registration and traffic 
offences, forestry administration, waste management, environmental issues. 
TABLE 5.  THE ASSIGNMENT OF INDEPENDENT COMPETENCIES AND DELEGATED POWERS IN CZECH REPUBLIC, 2006 
 Before 2000 reform After 2000 reform 
municipality admin. district municipality region 
Health  
General Hospitals  
Primary health care  
 
 
I 
 
D 
 
 
 
I 
 
I 
Education  
Upper-secondary education  
Primary and lower-secondary education  
 
 
I 
 
D 
 
 
I 
 
I 
Welfare, policing and emergency services  
Social benefits  
Social care services, care for the elderly and disabled  
Public housing, public rented housing and supported 
flats for disadvantaged persons  
Law enforcement and emergency services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
 
D 
 
 
I 
 
D 
I 
 
 
 
I 
 
 
 
 
I 
Roads  
Secondary roads  
Local roads  
Public road transport services, regional level  
Public road services, local level  
 
 
I 
 
D 
 
D 
D 
 
 
I 
I 
I 
 
I 
 
I 
Water and energy  
Water supply and waste water treatment  
Gas supply and heating  
  
D 
D 
 
I 
I 
 
Note: I- independent competencies, D – delegated powers; 
Source: adapted from Hemmings, 2006; 
The 1997 constitutional amendment regarding creating the regional level of governance did not have 
any provisions on functions of the future regions. Although new municipalities and regions were in place 
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since 2000, regional competencies became fully effective after 2002, when district offices subordinated 
to the central government were abolished and their competencies transferred either to regions or to 
the 205 type III administrative districts of municipalities with extended powers. As one can see from the 
Table 5, which contains the most important competencies only (in terms of local governments 
spending), regions undertook a limited scope of functions. The most of competencies previously 
delegated by the state became own competencies of municipalities. The idea that the recreation of the 
regional level is due to EU pressure is partially true, as the current regions do not have the same limits as 
statistical regions designed within the EU NUTS system. 
However one can definitely say that the 2000 reform significantly increased the level of decentralization 
and allowed for a greater autonomy, both at the local and regional level as the most of previously 
deconcentrated functions became independent competencies of both local and regional governments. 
Since inter-communal cooperation had been legally allowed since 1990, this alternative to territorial 
consolidation became very popular and was extensively used as in the most of cases small municipalities 
alone did not have enough economic and organizational capacity to efficiently provide public services. 
The high density of the network of villages and small towns also favored this process because a smaller 
distance decreases delivery costs. Basically, by law, voluntary unions of municipalities could be 
established in almost any area of own responsibilities. The last version of the law mentions, among 
others, education, health, water supply and sewage, waste collection and disposal, tourism as possible 
areas of cooperation. Several municipalities can associate and create a new union or either join or leave 
already existing unions, by signing its constitutive agreement. Unions are legal persons with own 
regulations, property and budget. A municipality is allowed to join different type of unions, say, it could 
be in one small union for tourism purposes and in another one for water supply. Approximate data 
indicate that about 70% of municipalities are involved in voluntary unions.
13
 Although inter-municipal 
cooperation provides an alternative to territorial amalgamation, it seems to be only an intermediary 
viable (for some areas) solution to the fragmentation problem. It is, therefore, expected, that the 
communities of municipalities (types II and III) would play a greater role in the future. 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FIN ANCI AL DE SIG N OF  THE LPA 
The biggest part of municipalities' revenue side in Czech Republic belongs to the shared revenues which 
come from the allotted share of national taxes. In the regions this share is around 20%, though this 
average varies significantly in the case of a specific town in a specific year, depending on other sources 
of municipal revenues such as capital income.
14
 
Municipalities have little discretion in influencing local revenues. Their only direct possibility is to 
operate with changes in the coefficient defining the basic tax rate for some buildings and land, which is 
a base for the real estate tax. This tax is a part of own revenues and represent less than 5% of tax 
revenues of municipalities, approximately 2.5% of total revenues. 
Local charges for service delivery can also be influenced by local governments. But as the previous 
described tax its proportion in local revenues is a very small.  
The decisive criteria for distribution of shared taxes among municipalities are number of inhabitants. 
The shared revenues quota in tax revenues is 80%. From one point of view, this is a stabilizing factor 
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ensuring a comparable revenue base for municipalities throughout the Czech Republic. From the other, 
it does not take into account local economic efficiency and related expenses.  
The municipality classifications by size categories, with significantly graded coefficients give rise to 
questions regarding the equity between local administrations. The named coefficients affect the level of 
tax revenues along with the number of inhabitants. The bigger number of population gives a higher level 
of revenues. In order to monitor the way of awarding the coefficients the system is permanently 
monitored by all involved parties. 
Most of the tax revenue is collected via a formula-based allocation of personal income tax, corporate 
income tax and value-added tax. As described above, for municipalities, the allocation is a per-capita 
payment based on population size. The allocation is 20.59% of the base. When the regions were first 
established the tax allocation was initially 3.1% of the tax base but was raised to 8.92% in 2005 (with 
offsetting cuts in grants). The regional funding formula combines population size with several other 
criteria including land area, size of road network and the number of school pupils. In municipalities, a 
small share of the total tax allocation is based on local incomes of the self employed and the employed. 
In addition, there is some leeway for local revenue through real-estate taxes (though within statutory 
limits) and fees. In contrast, the regions have no revenue linked to their tax base, nor any revenues from 
local fees.
15
 
Czech sub-national governments initiate a lot of public investment. Some arises from obligations to 
fulfill the own competencies, in particular local roads, water services and energy supply. Other 
investment activity is of a more voluntary nature (i.e. it is not related to legally assigned responsibilities). 
Development projects, such as technology parks, are common among the regions and larger 
municipalities. Such investment projects are initiated by sub-national government and this decentralized 
process is important when, for instance, assessing R&D policy. The projects often involve co-operation 
and close ties between the local authority, the business community and local institutions, such as 
universities. For example, a municipality might set up a subsidized company to build a technology park, 
get further financial backing from investors and involve the local university to help raise the 
attractiveness of the park to high-tech companies. This is an example of cooperation between 
municipalities for performing local services delivery. 
The equalization mechanisms used in Czech Republic is a combination between revenue equalization 
and equalization of expenditures.  
On revenue side the equalization scheme is based on per capita allocations. The new tax allocation 
system for municipalities used the distribution of revenues in 1999 (that was based on the previous 
multi-dimensional formula).  
Changes to the municipalities’ tax allocation formula in 2001 introduced some incentives for municipal 
mergers, though more by consequence than design. The revised formula was based on the existing tax 
allocation and this implied giving progressively larger per-capita payments with increasing municipality 
size.  
Local governments also receive earmarked grants which are generally the grants that filled the gap 
between the appropriated expenditures and estimated revenues. Grants for current expenditures are 
                                                           
15
 Hemmings, 2006. 
24 | P a g e  
formula based while capital grants are allocated using a more case-by-case approach. A grant is 
provided to cover the cost of providing central-government services (including those transferred to the 
regions and municipalities following the dissolution of the districts), but unlike most other grants it is 
not earmarked. Since 2005, the central government grant for teachers’ wages and some other education 
grants no longer pass through the municipalities accountings books. As result by far the largest grants to 
municipalities are for providing the various forms of municipal social assistance. 
The local authorities in Czech Republic have a free hand in borrowing but under the well described rules 
and clear sanctions for breach of obligations. The annual budgets have to be balanced. Not often is it 
possible to cover the budget deficit with own revenues that is why the local administration could use 
credits from private banks. Bank credit is used by many municipalities, some large municipalities issue 
bonds and or take institutional loans, notably from the European Investment Bank, which is becoming 
more important (particularly for regional authorities). Funding opportunities via EU co-financed projects 
is also set to become more important. The money for revenue side could be also raised through sales of 
assets and flows from off-budget accounts.
16
. 
ESTONIA  
COU NTR Y ’S  SOC I O-E C O NOMIC  A ND GE O GR AP HI C  PR OFILE  
In Estonia, the impact of physiographic conditions on the country’s territorial organization is dual: on the 
one hand there are no major barriers in relief; on the other hand there are two big and many small 
islands which create two ‘natural’ regions (Map 3). Estonia meets relatively poor conditions for 
agriculture development. While in Soviet Union, the industrial sector (energetic and chemical ones) was 
being mainly developed. The Soviet planning system required creation and maintaining of relatively 
small administrative units, easier to control on the one hand and closer to people on the other. The 
relatively high urbanization rate (about 70%) caused that settlement system to be based on urban 
settlements (47 towns). Presently, about 15% of Estonian 1
st
 tier units – municipalities – are organized 
around towns. 
                                                           
16
 Hemmings, 2006. 
25 | P a g e  
MAP 3.  ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF ESTONIA  
 
 
Source: see the ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  ADMI NI ST RATIVE-TE RRIT ORI AL DIV I SI ON AN D RE FORMS  
Estonia was the first country from the former Eastern bloc to adopt a local self-government law in 1989. 
Until 1993 it had a transitory two-tier system of local governance but the first signs of preference for a 
one-tier system showed up in the mentioned local self-government Act of 1989. The 1990s were not 
very successful in terms of territorial consolidation. Typically for those times, the aspiration of citizens 
for a greater local autonomy was going against the creation of larger local governments. Another barrier 
for potential mergers was the legal framework. Before 1995, when an administrative-territorial law was 
passed, any amalgamation of municipalities had to be approved by the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu). 
Even with the new provisions, until 1998, eventual mergers could become effective when local elections 
took place only. The problem that appeared was that whether two municipalities wanted to form a 
larger local government, the mandate of the local councils had to be interrupted. This was seen as an 
infringement of the constitutional provision that established a fixed three-year term for elected local 
councils.  
In order to strengthen and encourage scarce territorial consolidation initiatives, an amendment to 
Constitution was passed in 2003. It extended the mandate of the councils to a four year term, but also 
stated that “The period of authority of a council may be shortened by an Act due to a merger or division 
of local governments or the inability of the council to act.” (§ 156). This encouraged more mergers than 
during 1990s’; however the total number of municipalities did not register a significant decrease – from 
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255 in 1993 to 227
17
 in 2010. That is why it is often said that Estonia had rather a recreation of the pre-
Soviet times local governments than a genuine extensive territorial reform. Nevertheless, switching to a 
one-tier system since 1993 is still considered as the most significant reform of local government in 
Estonia in the last twenty years.
18
 The Constitution designates rural municipalities and towns as the 
main units of local government (§ 155) but also allows other possible forms. This hypothetically allows 
for an intermediate level of local government, should the Estonian elites consider it necessary.  
As of 1 January 2010, the administrative division of Estonia included 15 counties, 227 administrative 
units with local governments, including 33 cities, 193 rural municipalities and 14 cities without municipal 
status.
19
 The Estonian system does not have features of an extreme fragmentation. The average 
population of Estonian municipalities is about 5904 inhabitants, which is quite close to the general 
European average. However, as shown in Table 6, there are a large number of municipalities (about 
80%) that have less than 5,000 inhabitants wile about 37% of municipalities have less than 1,500 
residents. One quarter of the total population of Estonia resides within such kind of under-5,000 local 
governments. The 15 counties are not a second level of local government but rather a lower level of the 
central government and are meant to ensure the link between the local and central authorities. 
TABLE 6.  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN ESTONIA BY NUMBER OF INHABITANTS,  AS OF 2009 
Number of inhabitants Number of municipalities % of total population 
<500 7 0.15 
501-1,500 77 6.16 
1,501-3,000 69 10.45 
3,001-5,000 29 8.45 
5,001-10,000 30 14.75 
10,001-20,000 9 9.57 
20,001-50,000 3 8.12 
50,001-100,000 1 4.94 
100,001-200,000 1 7.67 
>200,001 1 29.74 
Total 227 100% 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Local Administrative Units of Eurostat as of 1 January 2009; 
The fragmentation is more evident for rural municipalities, which have an average of 2,500 residents. 
However, given the absence of the second level of governance, municipalities benefited from an 
extended local autonomy for a long time. Thus, they were entrusted with greater competencies than 
local governments in other countries from the post-Soviet space. As many local governments are quite 
strong, and population density is quite low, this makes it difficult to provide convincing arguments of 
scale economies that would encourage existing municipalities to amalgamate. 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FU NC TIONAL  DESIG N OF THE  LPA 
As rural municipalities and towns were quite weak to undertake significant responsibilities, a temporary 
two-tier system was accepted for the 1989-1993 period. The second level had 15 counties (rajoon) and 
six cities, including Tallinn, which had both responsibilities of first and second level. During 1989-1993, 
all former village and town soviets received the status of the local self-government unit from the 
Supreme Council. To obtain this status, settlements had to prepare a socio-economic development plan 
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and local statutes and to submit them to a parliamentary committee for administrative reform, which 
assessed their conformity with previously established requirements. 
One of the explanations of the relative success of the Estonian local autonomy may well be the early 
strong self-government provisions of the 1992 Constitution. Thus, the XIV Chapter, “Local Government”, 
offers guarantees for: (i) independent local budget and the right to levy, collect taxes and impose duties 
(§ 157); (ii) state-delegated responsibilities that shall be funded from the state budget (§ 154); (iii) 
mergers (§ 156) and local referendums for changing the boundaries of a municipality (§ 158); (iv) the 
right to form unions and joint agencies with other local governments (§ 159); (v) elected local councils (§ 
156). Estonia also was among the first FSU countries to ratify the European Charter of Local Self-
government in 1994. 
In terms of responsibilities, the main principle is that municipalities have extensive competencies on 
local matters, unless the law specifically assigns them to other authorities. That means that even if the 
law does not specifically give a certain competency to the local government, but also does not assign it 
to a central government authority, it is considered a local matter. Some other additional functions can 
be delegated based on mutual agreement and in this case, according to the Local Government Law, a 
contract between an authorized state body and a specific council has to be signed. 
According to the Local Government Law, local governments have the functions of organization, in the 
rural municipality or city, of social assistance and services, welfare services for the elderly, youth work, 
housing and utilities, water and sewerage supply, provision of public services and amenities, physical 
planning, public transportation within the rural municipality or city, and the maintenance of rural 
municipality roads and city streets unless such functions are assigned by law to other persons. 
Local governments are also responsible for organization and maintenance of the following institutions, 
under the condition that they are in municipality’s ownership: pre-school child care institutions, basic, 
secondary and vocational schools, libraries, community centers, museums, sports facilities, shelters, 
social care homes, health care institutions and other local facilities.  
The administration of the 15 counties is a territorial extension of the central government. In broad 
terms, they represent the state interests at the regional level and supervise the activity of local 
governments. One could identify five specific functions of county administrations: 
• coordination of the activity of regional offices of ministries and other central government 
agencies; 
• regional development and spatial planning; 
• oversight of the local governments’ acts; 
• coordination of emergency situations; 
• coordination of tourism, sport and leisure activities among the surrounding municipalities. 
Large infrastructure projects, motorways, maintenance of public order and rescue services, general 
state policy in education, industry and commerce, labor, represent the responsibility of the state. 
Both Constitution and legislation allows local governments to form unions and joint agencies for a 
collaborative services delivery. Although there are a number of best practices in this respect, inter-
municipal cooperation did not become a large scale phenomenon, one of the reasons being the legal 
obstacles for local governments to become shareholders in joint commercial legal persons. The 
alternative is that some services with larger catchment areas could be entrusted to a single local 
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government that acts on behalf of the others. The advantage of rationality in this case could well be 
overshadowed by the negative effects of the monopoly over a service that the legal owner has.  
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FIN ANCI AL DE SIG N OF  THE LPA 
In Estonia incomes from taxes accounted for more than 45% and from transfers for 35% of total sub-
national revenues in 2004.
20
 The fiscal autonomy of local governments in Estonia has somewhat 
declined compared to the year 1999. Nevertheless, the fiscal autonomy of local governments in Estonia 
is broader than in many EU countries. Sub-national tax revenues in Estonia are divided into three parts: 
• taxes shared with central government where the split between the central and local 
governments is set in legislation, and central government sets both the tax rate and base 
(personal income tax); 
• taxes shared with central government where the split between the central and local 
governments is set in legislation and the tax rate is set by local governments within given limits 
(land tax); 
• local taxes imposed by local councils in accordance with the law. 
In Estonia the personal income tax sharing rate has been set mainly by the level of expenditure needs of 
Tallinn, in order to prevent huge transfers of resources. Consequently, if municipalities are given new 
functions, the tax sharing rate or the amount of support fund should be increased. This rule is described 
in the theory and well applied in Estonia.   
The Local Taxes Act allows local councils to impose following local taxes:  
• sales tax,  
• boat tax, 
• advertising tax,  
• motor vehicle tax,  
• animal tax, 
• entertainment tax,  
• road and street closure tax, and 
• parking tax.  
However, some of these taxes have never been used by any of the local governments and the share of 
local taxes in total sub-national revenues is only marginal (0.7% in 2004). 
Rural municipality and city governments are the tax authorities for local taxes within their administrative 
territories which organize the collection of local taxes. A council and a regional office of the Tax Board 
may enter into an agreement for the collection of sales tax pursuant to which the regional office of the 
Tax Board undertakes to collect such taxes. These agreements should be agreed with the central body of 
the Tax Board. All administration cost for performing the agreement provisions are covered from the 
rural municipality or city budget. 
Local governments are independent in their budget formation. At the moment, only the audit 
committee of the municipal council carries out controls on the local budget in every local government 
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unit. Central government monitoring of local government action is carried out to a small extent
21
. The 
central government plans to increase state monitoring of the municipal level by introducing obligatory 
independent audits on local budgets, and increasing the county governor’s range of control over the 
municipalities of a county. 
There are several reasons for the low level of local taxes. The administration of local taxes is 
complicated and expensive, while tax evasions are difficult to control. The initiative of local governments 
to levy local taxes is also considerably obstructed by the fact that increased own revenues will 
immediately reduce the amount of allocations paid to local authorities through the State Support Fund. 
In Estonia local governments get support from the State Support Fund. The named fund is created 
within the state budget and aims to balance excessive differences in the revenue side of the local 
authorities’ budgets. Its resources are used for providing assistance via earmarked allocations. As in case 
of the Czech Republic these allocations are for specific purposes.  
The size of the State Support Fund depends on signed agreements between the authorized 
representatives of the municipalities and the central government.   
The equalization mechanism is linear. The general grant to municipalities is calculated according to the 
following formula
22
: 
Tn = (m × ak - an) 0.9 × cn, where 
Tn – the total general grant to the municipality; 
m - coefficient of the equalization; 
ak – the average revenue (state taxes and fees on natural resources) per capita of all 
municipalities, in Estonian kroons; 
an – the revenue (state taxes and fees on natural resources) per capita received by the 
municipality, in the current year, in Estonian kroons; 
cn – the number of inhabitants in the municipality. 
The equalization coefficient "m" is derived from the size of the support fund and indicates the amount 
of per capita income from state taxes and fees on natural resources that can be redirected to a 
municipal budget compared to the average to provide resources from the subsidy fund.  
Almost 95% of rural municipalities and towns receive allocations from the state budget. The Tallinn and 
its surrounding rural municipalities, municipalities from Ida Viru county are local authorities which do 
not need support from the support fund. Their revenues are created by high proportion of the personal 
income tax, fees for the special use of water and fees for mining natural resources. 
There are two type of transfers paid from the Support Fund: targeted and general. In 2004 the Support 
Fund
23
 accounted for 73% of all transfers to local governments. The share of targeted allocations 
(conditional transfers) was 26%. The share of conditional transfers has decreased.  
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The process of increasing the local governments’ autonomy increased as well the importance of the 
Support Fund. However, this has led to a situation where those local governments that are not entitled 
to get support from the State Support Fund have to cover more and more expenditures from their own 
revenues. The number of this kind of governments was 17 in 2003 and they constituted 7% of sub-
national governments. 
The rules for supporting local governments from the State Support Fund made smaller towns to be more 
dependant of its financial resources. The larger rural municipalities (with more than 3000 inhabitants) 
have more fiscal autonomy and do not depend on so many allocations from State Support Fund. 
The local governments are entitled to use borrow mechanisms for rising additional revenues or to cover 
the temporary budget deficit. Also the borrowing is often used for carry out investment plans. All these 
actions should be a part of the municipality or city development plan approved by local administration. 
Local governments may freely choose where to get a loan from. No special terms have been set by 
central government. The central government in a few cases has the right to help local governments by 
providing additional loans.  
The most used borrowing instruments are loans for current expenditures financing and for investment 
projects.   
The arrangements for borrowing are established by the Rural Municipality and City Budgets Act. The 
named document points out that all debt created as a result of un-repaid loans, debt instrument issued 
and other obligations created by them shall not exceed 75% of the total proposed budget revenue side 
for the approved budget period. In accordance with the same Act, the total amount of repayable loans, 
loan interest and expenditure for redemption of debt instruments shall not exceed, in any coming 
budgetary year, 20% of the proposed budget revenue for the budgetary year during which the loans are 
taken and debt instruments are issued. 
The above-mentioned restrictions do not apply to loans for which a state guarantee has been given. In 
such cases the process is monitored by the central government. The security for a loan taken by a rural 
municipality or city hall usually is a municipal immobile asset or a building. This procedure starts with 
approval of the official rural municipality or city council resolution which needs to be presented to 
county governor within three days of the entry into force. It is obligatory to present a copy of the loan 
agreement to the Ministry of Finance, within thirty days of the date on which the contract entered into 
force.  
In Estonia, the borrowing capacity of smaller municipalities is also lower than that of larger ones, which 
also decreases their autonomy. The average debt burden of local governments has not changed very 
much during the last years
24
, but the variations within groups of local governments are quite big. It 
should also be noted that on average the debt burden of rural municipalities is remarkably lower than 
that of towns. 
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GEORGIA  
COU NTR Y ’S  SOC I O-E C O NOMIC  A ND GE O GR AP HI C  PR OFILE  
Highly fragmented relief in Georgia creates significant constraints limiting the possibilities for 
administrative-territorial divisions (Map 4). Also, the ethnic structure and political problems highly 
affects administrative-territorial division. Due to limitations of natural conditions the historically formed 
territorial structures are heavily to change that is why pre-soviet, soviet and post-soviet territorial units 
do not differ too much. While in Soviet Union services and agriculture were being developed in Georgia, 
but due to medium urbanization rate (53%) and fragmented relief national settlement system is less 
urbanized and weaker controlled by towns (in total there are 55 towns and 48 urban type settlements 
(Rus. поселок городского типа)). All of the 1st tier units seem to be controlled by an urban settlement 
(town or urban type settlement), however, due to particular features of the last administrative-
territorial reform, great majority of them have significant proportion of rural population and actually 
represent rural municipalities (as translated from Georgian in English). Thus, the share of urban 
population in the rural municipalities varies between 0% in Kodori gorge of Abkhazia and 3% in the 
municipality of Khulo on the one hand and 63% in the municipality of Borjomi on the other
25
. 
MAP 4.  ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF GEORGIA  
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  ADMI NI ST RATIVE-TE RRIT ORI AL DIV I SI ON AN D RE FORMS  
During the 1990s’ Georgia had the experience of a higly centralised multi-tier system of local 
government. Due to internal conflicts, centralization was then seen as the only tool for preventing 
state’s disintegration. Although the first Law on Local Government had been passed early in 1991, a 
somewhat more stable administrative-territorial system dates back in 1994, including nine regions with 
centrally appointed governors, 65 districts, 48 cities and towns and about a thousand rural settlements.  
As opposed to other countries, the 1995 Georgian constitution does not define the administrative-
territorial organization of the country. According to Article 2, para. (3), “The territorial state structure of 
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Georgia shall be determined by a Constitutional Law on the basis of the principle of circumscription of 
authorization after the complete restoration of the jurisdiction of Georgia over the whole territory of the 
country.” This avoids a situation where necessary reforms are delayed by constitutional provisions but 
does not prevent the choice of the government of a less successful local government system. 
The 1997 Local Government Law established two tiers of local governance where the first tier comprised 
of 1,033 villages, amalgamated villages, towns and cities, and 65 upper level districts (raions). Right 
before the 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’ Georgia had a four-tier system
26
 if one considers the autonomous 
republics that in some cases have their own internal territorial organization.  
The first large scale territorial reform started in 2005 when the Parliament passed a new Local 
Government Law. On the lower level it authorized amalgamation of the 1033 municipalities into 64 
larger local governments (agglomerations of rural and urban settlements) mainly based on former 
raions. Also, five larger cities, including Tbilisi, were granted special status. It seems that decision on 
creating municipalities on the basis of raions was based on the assumptions that the reform will take 
less time and will not generate heated debates.
27
 Also, there was no need to search for sophisticated 
amalgamation criteria in this case. 
On the upper level the 12 regions in the post-2005 reform period cannot be considered as intermediate 
levels of local governance as they do not have an elected council and the regional governors are 
appointed by the President. The two autonomous regions could be considered as an additional level of 
local government; however this level is characteristic for their respective boundaries only and does not 
apply to the whole country. As one can see in Table 7, there are only two municipalities that have less 
than 5,000 inhabitants. If one excludes from calculations Tbilisi and larger cities with special status, the 
average population of municipalities is about 44,000 inhabitants. This is quite close to the situation in 
Denmark, Lithuania and Ireland, which are situated in top-five EU countries by average population of 
municipalities. However the geographic realities in Georgia (highly mountainous terrain and poor road 
connections) create problems for a qualitative and efficient delivery of public services within such large 
local governments. 
TABLE 7.  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN GEORGIA BY NUMBER OF INHABITANTS (2009)* 
Number of inhabitants Number of municipalities % of total population 
<5,000 2 0.15 
5,001-10,000 5 0.87 
10,001-20,000 5 1.61 
20,001-50,000 32 25.1 
50,001-100,000 17 26.74 
100,001-200,000 6 19.6 
>200,001 1 25.93 
Total 68 100.00 
Note: *- No data for Java municipality provided. Municipalities of Autonomous Republics of Adjara and Abkhazia are not 
included in the calculations; 
Source: authors’ calculations based on National Statistics Office of Georgia information as of 1 January 2009; 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FU NC TIONAL  DESIG N OF THE  LPA 
Although it is quite early to draw data-based conclusions on the territorial reform, one would probably 
expect larger municipalities in Georgia to have an increased capacity to efficiently provide public 
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services. However, dispite the radical change in number and boundaries of municiplaities, this was not 
followed by a greater decentralization of state functions and finances. The 1990s’ centralising 
tendencies stemming from the internal conflicts and the 2008 war still remain actual. The fact that the 
European charter of the local self-government was ratified by the Georgian Parliament by the end of 
2004 only also influenced the functional design of local-central power distribution. 
The 2005 reform established three groups of responsabilites for local governments: competencies under 
exclusive, delegated and voluntary authority of the municipalities. However this did not bring much 
change in the scope of functions of the local governments. It should be mentioned that some 
competencies are not really exclusive, as they involve a great deal of central government involvement. 
The centralized approach to drafting local budgets and collecting local taxes are relevant examples. The 
exclusive competencies listed under Article 16 of the 2005 Organic Law of Georgia on Local Self-
Government could be divided in service-type and functional competencies (as in Table 8) where the 
latter currently leaves room for a greater involvement of the central government, either through 
ministries or its regional administrations.  
TABLE 8.  EXCLUSIVE POWERS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING UNITS IN GEORGIA 
Competencies in public sevices Functional competencies 
• establishment of pre-school educational 
institutions, approval of their statute; 
• maintenance, construction and 
development of the local roads; 
• determining vehicle parking lots, planning 
of streets cleaning and lightening, water 
supply, drainage and sewage system, 
planning and implementation of collection 
of solid waste, maintenance of cemeteries; 
• performance of social-cultural activities 
and support to the activities of the 
relevant objects (archives, libraries, 
museums, educational and children 
institutions, etc.,) of local importance; 
• issuance of building permits, supervision 
over the underway constructions; 
• regulation of local passenger 
transportation; 
• regulation of outdoor trade; 
• regulation of placement of outdoor 
advertisements; 
• setting housing and communal service 
tariffs and service rules;  
• management of forest and water 
resources of local importance; 
• spatial - territorial arrangement of the 
municipality; 
• municipal fire safety; 
• traffic planning on the territory of the 
municipality except international and 
national roads. 
• management and disposal of the 
property under the ownership of the 
municipality; 
• management and disposal of the 
land resources under the ownership 
of the municipality; 
• reviewing, approving of municipal 
budget;  
• introduction of local taxes and fees, 
definition of their rates within the 
limits envisaged by the law; 
• collection of local fees; 
• land planning and zoning (planting, 
recreational, industrial, commercial 
and other special zones); 
• approval of priorities of municipal 
social-economic development; 
• informing population on possible 
health risks; 
• mobilizing resources in the fields of 
health and social protection/ social 
welfare  
• regulation of the issues in regard to 
organizing meetings, rallies, 
demonstrations; 
• local purchases; 
• giving names and numbers to streets 
and squares. 
Source: adapted from the Organic Law of Georgia on Local Self-Government, 16 December 2005;  
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According to the same law, delegation of responsibilities shall be allowed on the basis of an agreement 
that has to be accompanied by the transfer of commensurate material and financial resources. 
Exercising of the delegated competencies is supervised by a state authority authorized by law or by 
agreement. 
Responsibilities under voluntary jurisdiction regard possible own initiatives on creation and 
development of social, cultural and educational infrastructure not belonging to the exclusive group of 
competencies. 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FIN ANCI AL DE SIG N OF  THE LPA 
The local governments in Georgia have several sources of revenue that are granted by the law. The Tax 
Code of Georgia establishes the tax base and the tax rates ceiling. The local governments can set each of 
them within the provision of the law. Also, the Law on Local Fees defines the ceiling of local fees. The 
decision about the number of the taxes and its level should be taken via the Local Council decision of the 
respective raion.
28
  
The raion level serves as a distribution center for the shared revenues. All shared taxes first go to the 
raion and then are distributed to budgets according to the normative acts approved by the local council 
of the raion. The raion’s executive body presents a proposal (and the representative body approves it) 
on the allocation of shared taxes to subordinated local self-government bodies, which is the subject to 
the Local Council’s approval. 
Other revenue sources of local governments are: 
• transfers,  
• revenues from the privatization of state property,  
• revenues from selling non-agricultural state land—of which 40% stays in local government, 50% 
goes to the state, 7%to the Land Management Ministry, and 3% to the Ministry of Urbanization 
and Construction, and  
• loans. 
The vast majority of small local self-government units has no own revenues, and their only source of 
income are subsidies from the districts’ budgets. The largest part of local budgets’ spending come from 
Tbilisi and the four other big cities (up to 78%) while the other 993 units possessed only 22% of the 
share in total local government spending
29
. 
The revenues from local own sources usually are very small proportion in total. The property tax and tax 
on gambling, the taxes which represent the own revenues, were the biggest portion only in the budgets 
of the Tbilisi city.  
The minimal level of the payroll tax in the local budgets is explained by the shortcomings in the 
legislation. The named tax is paid in the budget of local government were the job is located not at the 
residence of taxpayer. This regulation favors large cities with many commuters from surrounding 
municipalities. 
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A low level of revenues from own sources is also related to the numerous tax exemptions granted by the 
central government
30
. This situation totally exempt natural persons from paying this tax and the 
collected property tax is almost entirely the business property tax. Such legal provisions lead to regional 
fiscal disparities (considerable taxes from businesses may be levied mostly in big cities, but not in 
smaller towns or villages in the countryside), and also weaken local accountability of elected 
governments (since most voters are not local taxpayers). 
The grants received by the local governments in Georgia could be: 
• An equalization grant, which is distributed on a formula basis. This type of grants gives some 
priorities to small and rural governments, and to mountainous regions. The size of the grant is 
very small and cannot play a powerful equalizing role. 
• Targeted transfers, which are foreseen for investment projects. 
The changes in the share the payroll tax approved in 2008 further centralized the fiscal system in 
Georgia. This tax became main source for budget revenue. To compensate the local budgets losses an 
additional grant transfer has been approved. Nevertheless, the losses were bigger than the promised 
compensations. In the same time three-fifths of this additional transfer was in form of targeted grants 
for investments. 
As a result the 2008 fiscal reform worsen the financial situation of the local governments by minimizing 
the revenue side and by interfering in local budgets’ spending decision. 
In 2008 year the Ministry of Finance prepared a new equalization formula, based on coverage of the 
budget deficit, amount being updated by a coefficient foreseen from the objective statistical data.   
Anyway the formula has some shortcomings: 
• It does not consider the differences between small and big local public authorities; 
• The grant level depends on historical expenditures trend and is not oriented to territory 
development; 
• The formula restricts local public authority within named expenses or policy developed centrally 
by the Central Government. 
Targeted transfers are allocated based on central government decision which supports more or less its 
own interest, without taking into consideration the local public authority real necessities.  
There are three types of loans available to local self-governments: 
• from a commercial bank,  
• from the state or raion budget, or  
• from the municipal development fund. 
The President of Georgia approves the access to loans from the commercial bank. The Department of 
Territorial Budgets of the Ministry of Finance reviews the loan’s justification and the raion’s debt 
capacity. The loan period is three to six months. The short-term loan is explained by the management of 
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cash flow rules. The loan could be accessed only by the raion level. Such tough conditions are dictated 
by necessities to avoid the national currency devaluation.  
The loans paid from state or raion budgets are also short-term loans and require a special agreement 
between the Ministry of Finance and the (mayor.  
The majority of these loans are used to cover the current expenditures such as salaries of personnel in 
earmarked sectors. 
Another possibility to fulfill the budget revenue side is investment support from the Municipal 
Development Fund, which was established in 1997 with financial support from the Municipal 
Development and Decentralization Project of the World Bank. Initially, the right to use the Fund’s 
money belonged to a limited number of municipalities at the raion level.  
The Fund
31
 legal requirements provide access to the funds for all government bodies within the 
following conditions:  
(1) No budget deficit is allowed during the previous budget year;  
(2) Loan repayment costs, including loan service, principal payment, should not exceed 25% of 
revenues gained through activities implemented in the last year budget;  
(3) The expected revenue from the proposed investment can be used during the calculation of the 
loan service payment;  
(4) The total amount of the loan, including the proposed loan and liabilities (including salaries and 
other loans), should not exceed 40% of revenues gained through current activities (excluding 
transfers). 
LATVIA  
COU NTR Y ’S  SOC I O-E C O NOMIC  A ND GE O GR AP HI C  PR OFILE   
More or less flat relief without major barriers in Latvia does not present an obstacle for administrative-
territorial division of the country (Map 5). There are relatively poor conditions for agriculture 
development. While in Soviet Union manufacturing industry (engineering and chemical ones) was being 
developed in Latvia that facilitated urbanization in the country. Soviet planning system required creation 
and maintaining of relatively small administrative units, easier to control on the one hand and closer to 
people on the other. Relatively high urbanization rate (about 70%) caused the settlement system to be 
based on urban settlements (77 towns). About 65% of Latvian 1st tier units (novads) are presently 
organized around towns at present. 
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MAP 5.  ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF LATVIA  
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  ADMI NI ST RATIVE-TE RRIT ORI AL DIV I SI ON AN D RE FORMS  
Immediately after restauring independence Latvia had two levels of local government. The first level 
municipalities are commonly known as republican cities, towns (pilseta), villages (pagasts) and various 
amalgamations of the latter two (novadi). The second tier districts were previously known as raions, a 
reminiscence of the Soviet era. The 1922 Latvian Constitution does not have provisions on the main 
principles of local government. 
After a few non-systematic attempts to encourage territorial consolidation, a 1997 ammendment to the 
Self-Government Law provided the obligation for municiplaities with weak infrastructure to conclude 
cooperation agreements with other local governments in order to be able to fulfill their obligations. 
Although many municipalities fell into this cathegory, the provision has not been closely observed. On 
21 October 1998 the Latvian Parliament (Saeima) adopted the Law on Administrative-Territorial Reform. 
It addresses the issues of purpose, schedule, process, financial stimulations and institutional 
coordination of the reform.  
In broad terms, the planned process was to offer financial bonuses to municipalities involved in 
voluntary amalgamations until 31 December 2003 – a grant of 1-5% of the total annual budgets of 
amalgamated local authorities. The new municipality could receive 5% if the amalgamation took place in 
2000, 4% - if in 2001-2002, 3% - in 2003 under the condition that the consolidated budgets do not 
exceed five million Lats. Those that exceed five million Lats would get 2% of their budgets. The money 
could be used for infrastructure investments like rural roads, telecommunications and internet access. 
The second stage provides for an administrative (i.e. forced) amalgamation from 1 January to 30 
November 2004, followed by local general elections in 2005. There were also provisions on association 
of local governments. Only 26 amalgamations took place by the beginning of 2005 as the reform ran into 
a strong opposition from the local elites and changing governments. 
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In 2005 and 2007, a series of amendments were operated to the Law on Administrative-Territorial 
Reform. In general, it was a gradual move from the voluntary to the compulsory model of 
amalgamation, but the main change regarded the decision to abolish the raions and to have a single-tier 
model of local governance. Abolishment of the district level is considered a significant improvement as 
raions were functionally, economically and politically weak, and were too small to play a significant role 
in regional development.
32
  
A change in the financial stimulation scheme for the amalgamating settlements also occurred. According 
to the new regulations, a payment of 200,000 Lats (about USD 359,000) for development of municipality 
infrastructure shall be authorized to: 
• every territorial unit (city and parish) included in a new local government that has been 
established by 31 January 2009 as a result of amalgamating territorial local governments;  
• every such city, parish and novad which in 2007 took a decision to establish a new local 
government and the commencement of the operations after the 2009 local government 
elections. 
As planned, amalgamations could occur only after a thorough case-by-case research was done in order 
to find out what is the attitude of the population regarding the reform, what would be the social and 
economic implications of eventual mergers and to formulate the tasks and conditions that should be 
met for a certain amalgamation to take place. The main changes in the administrative-territorial design 
before and after the June 2009 local government elections are reflected in Table 9. The number of local 
governments decreased by five times and the absolute majority of municipalities now have over 5,000 
inhabitants. 
TABLE 9.  THE MAIN CHANGES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF LATVIA 
Before reform, prior to July 2009  After reform, since July, 2009  
Two levels 
26 district governments (rajons) 
525 local governments: 
- 7 republican cities 
- 50 towns 
- 424 rural municipalities (pagasts) 
- 41 reformed municipalities (novads) 
72% of local governments have less than 2,000 
inhabitants 
One level 
118 local governments: 
- 9 republican cities 
- 109 municipalities (novads)  
About 69% of municipalities have over 5,000 
inhabitants 
Source: adjusted from: Vilka, 2009; 
By law, the following criteria had to be taken into account when an amalgamation was decided: 
• a long-term and balanced development of the county territory is ensured; 
• the infrastructure required for the performance of the tasks of a local government exists; 
• the size of the territory; 
• the number of permanent residents of the territory; 
• the density of permanent residents in the territory; 
• the accessibility of the services provided by the local government; 
• the economic, geographical and historical unity of the territorial local governments comprising 
the municipality; and 
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• optimal establishment of the territory of the local government has been ensured, taking into 
account the interests of the neighbouring local governments.
33
 
In terms of municipalities’ size, the resulting picture is presented in Table 10. The average population of 
municipality, if one excludes Riga, is about 19,000 inhabitants, which is similar to Poland, Belgium and 
Finland. There are 37 municipalities with a population below 5,000 which represent about 6% out of the 
total population of Latvia. 
TABLE 10. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN LATVIA BY NUMBER OF INHABITANTS (2010) 
Number of 
inhabitants 
Number of municipalities % of total population 
<3,000 11 1.16 
3,001-5,000 26 4.62 
5,001-10,000 40 13.44 
10,001-20,000 17 11.08 
20,001-50,000 19 24.55 
50,001-100,000 3 9.11 
100,001-200,000 1 4.62 
>200,001 1 31.42 
Total 118 100.00% 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Statistics Office of Latvia information as of 1 January 2010 
The main lessons that can be drawn from the Latvian administrative-territorial reforms are: 
• voluntary amalgamations are good as soon as they offer time for choosing the optimal 
amalgamation possibilities, but if they are not accompanied by a compulsory process, the 
territorial reform could last longer than a country could afford; 
• financial bonuses are not enough to encourage territorial consolidation; the mechanism should 
be clearly outlined in regulations and should be sustainable so the newly elected governments 
do not deny commitments of the previous government; 
• the chosen criteria for amalgamations should not leave room for interpretations and possible 
exceptions should be clearly outlined. 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FU NC TIONAL  DESIG N OF THE  LPA 
Obviously, it is not yet clear if the reform will be successful in long-run, as it is still in progress and the 
financial crisis generated some delays in implementation of complementary reforms. At this stage one 
can say that the larger municipalities have more possibilities for concentration of financial resources and 
have a wider scope of levers to foster locale economic development, as they have acquired more own 
competencies as a result of implementation of a single tier system of local governance.  
In broad terms, Latvian local governments have a wide scope of functions. Similarly to Estonia, local 
authorities may voluntarily carry out their initiatives with respect to any matter if it is not within the 
competence of another public authority. They have autonomous and state delegated functions.    
As provided by law, the autonomous functions of local governments are as follows: 
• water supply and sewerage; supply of heat; management of municipal waste; collection, 
conducting and purification of waste water; 
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• building, reconstruction and maintenance of streets, roads and public squares; lighting of streets 
and other public spaces; parks, public squares and green zones; control of collection and 
removal of waste; flood control; cemeteries; 
• public use of forests and waters; 
• primary, general secondary and extracurricular education; continuing education for teaching 
staff 
• organizational and financial assistance to cultural institutions and events, support for the 
preservation of cultural monuments; 
• ensure access to health care; 
• social care (poor families, socially vulnerable persons, orphans, elderly homes, homeless); 
• protection of the personal and property rights and interests of a child; 
• assistance to residents in resolving issues regarding housing; 
• permits and licences for commercial activity; 
• public order; civil defence measures 
• land use and territorial development; buildings; 
• civil status document registrations; 
• collect and provide information necessary for State statistics; 
• public transport organization; 
• organise local elections; 
By law, central government institutions do not have the right to assign to local governments the 
performance of functions and tasks without providing adequate financing. While performing functions 
delegated by state, local governments are not entitled to have an independent policy. In this case they 
implement a state policy laid out in official regulations and guidelines. 
In carrying out their functions local governments shall have the right, among others, to introduce local 
fees and determine their magnitude, decide on tax rates and relief from paying taxes and to invest their 
own resources. But in general, the level of local financial autonomy is not high. 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FIN ANCI AL DE SIG N OF  THE LPA 
The Latvian legal framework foresees the following sources of local governments’ revenues
34
: 
• share from the state taxes: 
o 71.6% of the personal income tax; 
o 100% of the real estate tax; 
• share from the state duties; 
• duties imposed by local governments; 
• grants and earmarked grants allocated from the state budget; 
• grants from the local government financial equalization fund; 
• service delivery fees. 
The local governments have the right to impose taxes, but the tax bases and tax rates are set for all 
major taxes by the central government. Their revenue also is created from own revenues. Own local 
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revenue is composed of fees and duties that the local governments are collecting from public service 
delivery. 
The list of public services should be approved by regulations issued by the respective republican city or 
rural authority, town’s municipal council.  
Local governments may impose duties on the following activities: 
• official documents issued by the urban or rural municipal council; 
• organization of entertainment in public places; 
• accommodation of holiday-makers or tourists; 
• commercial activities in public places; 
• the keeping of animals, wild or domestic; 
• driving through special protection zones; 
• placing advertisements, posters or announcements in public places, containing visual 
commercial information; 
• keeping boats, motor-boats or yachts; 
• use of municipal symbols for commercial purposes. 
Local governments have the right to collect state duties for issuing special permits (licenses) to engage 
in specific types of businesses. These duties are paid to local government budgets also. Nevertheless, 
local governments have limited possibilities to raise their own taxes. Own taxes, as were presented in 
the list above are considered as state taxes. By the definition the local governments have right only to 
collect state taxes at the established rates and have no right to give tax exemption. 
Along with named revenues the local governments receive grants and earmarked grants from the state 
budget for the delegated functions established by the Law “On Local Governments” and under other 
specific laws which regulate the activity of the local governments.  
The last administrative reform in Latvia was oriented towards increasing tax autonomy too. The bigger 
autonomy is expected to increase the local governments’ accountability, improve efficiency of public 
expenditure decision process and minimize the imbalance between responsibilities and available 
funding. 
The Equalization Fund plays the role of bridging the needs and fiscal capacities of the local governments. 
Its resources come from the local governments’ compulsory payments and from the state budget 
transfers. Local governments’ contribution consists of revenues from real estate tax and the local 
government share of the personal income tax
35
. The amount of transfers from the State Budget is a 
political issue negotiated between the Ministry of Finance and Union of Local and Regional 
Governments. 
The current formula includes the calculation of local governments estimated revenues and 
determination of financial needs. The Law on Equalization of Local Government Finance
36
 stipulates that 
local government revenue estimations are forecasted based on actual personal income tax collections 
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from the year prior to the budget preparation year and on the real estate tax forecasted in accordance 
with the official data of the State Land Service using the cadastral value of the properties located on the 
local government territory. The formula has not changed since the year 1998. The equalization fund 
implements two forms of equalization: revenue equalization and expenditure needs equalization which 
represent a mix of horizontal and vertical inter-governmental relations.  
This equalization approach is a propitious one because there are too many differences on revenue 
availabilities across the local governments from one hand and various demands arising from local 
governments’ profile, including demographic problems, on another one.  
Until 1996 local governments were allowed to take loans from the domestic and foreign capital markets. 
This freedom led to accumulation of debts affecting the consolidated budget. As a result, Ministry of 
Finance took a closer scrutiny on these processes. 
Presently, the local authorities can borrow only with permission of the Ministry of Finance within the 
approved ceilings in the State Budget. Another important conditionality is that loan could be awarded 
only for a short term period for coverage of the current budget spending needs. By these provisions 
central government try to control annual debt level of the local governments. 
Another institution responsible for borrowing procedures is the Local Governments Borrowings and 
Guarantees Board. The local government has no right to borrow without permission from this Board. If 
local government wants to borrow from other source of financing than the State Treasury, special 
permission from the Minister of Finance is requested as well. 
MACEDONIA  
COU NTR Y ’S  SOC I O-E C O NOMIC  A ND GE O GR AP HI C  PR OFILE  
Relatively high fragmented relief influences administrative-territorial division of Macedonia, which is 
based on mountain valleys (Map 6). Ethnic structure with high percentage of Albanians (25%) also 
influences administrative division, this group being mainly concentrated in north-western and western 
parts of the country. Totally, Macedonians are minor in about 17% of the municipalities
37
. Services and 
industry were being developed in the post-war period. Despite the relatively high level urbanization 
(67%), the role of towns (34 in total) in settlement system is relatively small because about half of urban 
population is concentrated in the capital city. About 40% of the 1st tier units (Mac. општини) are 
coordinated by towns. 
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MAP 6.  ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF MACEDONIA  
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  ADMI NI ST RATIVE-TE RRIT ORI AL DIV I SI ON AN D RE FORMS  
The 1991 Macedonian Constitution has quite specific provisions on local self-government. Thus, it 
provides in the Article 114 that municipalities are units of local self-government as well as the possibility 
to establish forms of neighborhood self-government. Also, it sets the rule that the local self-government 
law should be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of members of Parliament. 
These provisions are determined by political representation of the two main ethnic groups – 
Macedonians and Albanians. According to the Article 116, the territorial division of the country and the 
area administered by each municipality are defined by law. 
Macedonia redesigned its administrative-territorial division in 1995 and in 2004. After adopting in 1995 
the Law on Territorial Division of the Republic of Macedonia and Determining the Territory of 
Municipalities, the number of local governments increased from 30 to 123. Since the 2005 elections, 
under the new Law on Territorial Organization the 123 municipalities were consolidated in 84 local 
governments. The main difference between the two reforms is that the first one was based on natural 
traditions, while the second one – on functional effectiveness. The 1995 reform was meant to bring the 
decision-making closer to citizens, while the one from 2004 – to increase the capacity of local 
governments.
38 
Although for the last reform experts recommended a smaller number of municipalities, 
based on criteria like connectivity, cohesion of territory, economic potential and geographical location, 
the final number was a result of a bargain between political-ethnic factions.
39
  
Although does not provide any criteria for amalgamations, the 2003 Law on Territorial Organization sets 
quite clear criteria for creating a city. In the sense of the law, a city is a populated place that: “has over 
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3,000 inhabitants; has a developed structure of activities and over 51% of the employees are employed 
outside the primary activities; has a constructed urban physiognomy with zones for housing, economy, 
recreation and public green space, square, constructed system of streets and communal agencies and 
represents a functional center of the populated places in the vicinity.” A village, in the sense of the same 
law, is “a populated place with a sole functional meaning in which one activity predominates, whereas 
the ground has an agrarian physiognomy and function.”
40
 Some criteria, however, could be identified in 
the Law on Local Self-Government. Thus, according to the Article 15 of this Law, “The territory for which 
a unit of local self-government is established shall represent a natural and geographical whole, an 
economically integrated space with a developed network of communications between towns and 
villages, and the seat as its gravitational center.”
41
 
Macedonia was never considered an extreme case of territorial fragmentation. Nevertheless, the last 
territorial reform shows a trend towards further increasing the size of municipalities. This is explained by 
the fact that after the decentralization process that started in 2002, the 123 municipalities acquired 
more responsibilities and smaller local governments did not have enough capacity to cope with new 
functions. As shown in Table 11, the decrease in number of municipalities after the 2004 reform is 
mostly on the account of small municipalities whose number has decreased significantly. The average 
population of a municipality increased from about 16,000 in 1995 to about 24,000 in 2004, which places 
Macedonia close to Belgium and Latvia, after the recent territorial reform.  
A particularly interesting feature that characterizes the multi-ethnic Macedonian system is the sub-
municipal self-government in form of neighborhoods. They could be delegated some competencies that 
they exercise on behalf of the municipalities and have their own elected decision-making institutions. 
To sum up, although the administrative-territorial design after the 2004 favors either Macedonian or 
Albanian ethnic communities (in terms of share of ethnic groups in population of municipalities located 
in areas densely populated by ethnic Macedonians or ethnic Albanians), a collateral result has been 
increasing the administrative and financial capacity of local governments.  
TABLE 11. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MACEDONIA BY NUMBER OF INHABITANTS AFTER TWO ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL REFORMS  
 after 1995 reform after 2004 reform 
no. of local 
governments 
% of total 
population 
no. of local 
governments 
% of total 
population 
<3,000 27 2.71 3 0.33 
3,001-5,000 20 4.04 13 2.53 
5,001-10,000 26 9.82 16 5.93 
10,001-20,000 25 17.93 21 15.27 
20,001-50,000 13 21.01 17 26.49 
50,001-100,000 11 38.53 13 44.23 
>100,001 1 5.96 1 5.22 
Total 123 100.00% 84 100.00% 
Source: authors’ calculations based on data of 1994 and 2002 censuses: www.statoid.com, the capital city Skopje is not 
included; 
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AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FU NC TIONAL  DESIG N OF THE  LPA 
As in other examined countries, Macedonian municipalities have a general competence in all local 
matters. They also can perform any activity of local interest within their territory that does not fall under 
competence of state authorities. Quite unusually, functions of local governments are described in detail 
in the 1991 Constitution. According to the Article 115, urban planning, communal activities, culture, 
sport, social security and child care, preschool education, primary education, basic health care and other 
fields determined by law are all considered responsibility of local governments. The local government 
reform of 2002 further extended the responsibilities of municipalities. Among 35 areas of primary 
jurisdiction listed in the 2002 Law on Local Self-Government, the most important are: 
• adopt development programs and town plans; 
• approve budget and annual accounts; 
• regulate and ensure functioning an development of utility services, (purification and distribution 
of water, steam and hot water production and supply, town and suburb commuter transport, 
cleaning of towns and villages, maintaining rubbish dumps, organizing, maintenance and 
utilization of markets, parks, greens, recreational and other public areas, public parking lots, 
street lighting, regulation and maintenance of cemeteries and burials, etc), as well as 
organizational, financial and other conditions for their implementation; 
• regulate and ensure the use of business premises under its management, set fees for use of 
business premises and supervise the use of business premises; 
• regulate and ensure performance of tasks related to construction, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction, maintenance, protection, use, development and management of local and non 
categorized roads and streets in towns and villages; 
• found institutions and organizations in the fields of primary education, culture, primary health 
care, physical education, sport, child and social protection and tourism, monitor and ensure 
their functioning; 
• organize activities related to protection of cultural values of significance for the municipality, 
encourage development of cultural and artistic amateurism and establish conditions for work of 
museums, libraries and other cultural institutions which it founded; 
• organize protection from natural and other serious disasters and fire protection and ensure 
conditions for elimination, i.e., alleviation of their consequences; 
• adopt principles of protection, utilization and cultivation of agricultural land and ensure their 
implementation, define erosion areas, organize use of pastures and decide on change of their 
use; 
• organize and encourage tourism development on its territory and determine visitors’ tax; 
• manage development and promotion of catering, arts and crafts and trade, set working hours, 
locations where particular business activities may be conducted and other requirements for 
their work; 
Municipalities are declared autonomous in the execution of their constitutionally and legally determined 
spheres of competence. Supervision of their legality only is permitted by central government 
authorities, meaning the oversight of opportunity of locally decided measures is not allowed. Certain 
state administration tasks may be delegated to local governments under condition of adequate 
financing. 
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Before the 2002 local government reform, municipalities did not have instruments to influence local 
economic development. They had limited revenues and the rates of local fees and taxes were defined 
centrally. Under the new system, they can control local property, associate with other governments for 
services provision, raise their own taxes and fees, and borrow financial resources for development 
projects. 
AN ALYSI S  OF THE  FIN ANCI AL DE SIG N OF  THE LPA 
A new territorial organization was approved in August 2004, which reduced the number of sub-national 
governments from 123 to 84 municipalities and the city of Skopje (partitioned in 10 additional 
municipalities). The Law of Financing of Local Self Governments (LFLSG) enacted in September 2004, 
regulates the sources of financing of municipalities, and establishes the gradual implementation of the 
decentralization process.  
The degree of fiscal decentralization has been increasing since 2005. Since the first phase of the 
decentralization process started in June 2005, the share of municipalities’ spending in general 
government spending gradually increased and reached around 13% in 2008
42
. 
The legal framework establish delegated or shared responsibilities in specific areas (urban and rural 
planning, environmental protection, local economic development, communal services, culture, sports 
and recreation, education, social welfare, health care, firefighting and protection and rescuing activities 
in case of natural disasters or wars). Still, the law leaves it up to subsequent legislation to determine the 
exact role of municipalities in each area.  
According to the Law of Financing of Local Self Governments (LFLSG), municipalities have several own 
revenue sources. Article 4 of the LFLSG refers to eight different sources:  
• local taxes,  
• local fees,  
• local charges,  
• revenues from ownership,  
• donations,  
• fines,  
• self-contribution, and others.  
Source revenues account for about 4% of general government revenues, slightly increasing their share 
since 2005
43
. The most significant sources are property taxes, communal fees for use of public space, 
and construction permit fees.  
Own source revenues of municipalities are complemented by shared taxes, collected by the central 
government. Municipalities receive 3% of the private income tax (PIT) from the salaries of natural 
persons in the municipalities where they are declared to live (100% of the PIT of the natural persons 
performing craft activities, registered in the territory of a municipality). They also receive 3% of the VAT 
revenues collected in the previous fiscal year according to a distribution formula, based on population 
(60% weight), surface area (27%) and number of settlements within a municipality (13%).  
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The central government is using revenue sharing for equalization. Alongside with this method of 
equalization the municipalities also receive earmarked transfers. The amounts of these transfers—for 
education, culture, and social welfare—are determined in separate decision documents prepared by the 
line ministries and adopted by the central government, mainly based on historical costs.  
Capital grants based on programs, again defined by the central government, are used for financing 
investment projects. When municipalities graduate to the second phase of the decentralization process, 
the earmarked transfers are to be converted into block grants, granting municipalities more spending 
discretion. 
The system of unconditional transfers does not provide adequate equalization. Local governments have 
limited incentives to increase the shared taxes. Revenues from PIT are very low; coupled with a 3% 
sharing rate, this makes it difficult to correct vertical imbalances. The criteria for the allocation of funds 
from the VAT revenue transfer reflect expenditure needs only in an approximated way.  
International experts
44
 proposed to redefine the formula, by including criteria that better capture 
differences in the ability to provide given standards of public services and revenue raising capacity.  
The local legal framework allows municipalities to borrow long term for investment and short term for 
cash-flow management
45
. However, the law explicitly mentions the limitations on the outstanding debt 
stock and debt service for long-term borrowing, as well as on the amounts to be borrowed on a short-
term basis. Other safeguards require that borrowing should be in (1) local currency, (2) from the 
domestic capital market, and (3) according to a stable or declining annual repayment schedule.  
The municipalities are allowed to proceed for a foreign borrowing after a Municipal Council issued a 
decision and Parliament approved a separate law on this sense. All these procedures increase control 
and transparency of the borrowing process.
 
Municipal borrowings are allowed only after municipalities 
report continuously to the Ministry of Finance on their financial position and no arrears are incurred 
during the last 24 months.  
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2. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL 
STRUCTURE IN REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA  
EVOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE IN MOLDOVA  
Administrative-territorial organization represents the spatial reflection of relationship between citizens 
organized in local communities and state. Among other factors, it is a result of the balance between the 
willingness of how often (where, at what distance) a citizen is disposed to travel in order to use the 
functions provided by public administration and the desire of central power to control citizen’s life. This 
fundamental relationship gives birth to three basic types of state structure: federal, unitary and 
regional
46
. 
Federal structure is based on the autonomist-ethnocratic model, which presumes regional 
differentiation by historical, ethnical and cultural criteria. A federal system presumes existence of 
political-administrative unites enjoying large autonomy, with own local governments. The basic principle 
consists in sharing central authority with the federal states level. 
Unitary state structure usually follows the liberal-democratic model, which promotes regional 
organization on unitary criteria. The region plays the role of delegated authority in its relationship with 
state; the state does not transfer its functions to regions, but the authority needed to exercise these 
functions at the regional level. In such a way it is a tool to implement unitary public policies.  
Regional structure, being based on the model of regional autonomies, is in the middle between the two 
abovementioned models.  
The liberal-democratic model seems to be the most difficult to follow. Entities created on ethnical and 
cultural identities are hardly changeable without the will of their population. The reason is that they  are 
more or less constant over centuries, and adverse reactions can be easily anticipated. At the same time, 
liberal-democratic (political-economic) model is not based on differences in culture; it just represents an 
instrument for implementation of public policies. If the policy changes its basic principles, it involves 
changing of all its tools, including administrative-territorial organization. 
Each public policy has its reflection in space. The power of spatial impact of a policy is directly 
proportional to financial investments and duration. But if policy principles can be changed more or less 
easily, spatial structures represent very inert constructions, which cannot be removed along with 
previous governments. 
Historically speaking the Republic of Moldova traditionally applied two modalities of the country’s 
administrative-territorial organization which may be labeled as regional and raional
47
. The Middle Age 
Moldovan Principality was divided in ţinuturi (lands) and ocoale (boroughs). Under the rule of the 
Imperial Russia between 1812 and 1917, Moldova was initially an autonomous region (till 1873) and 
afterwards a губерния (province) (1873-1917) divided in eight уезды (counties). As part of inter-war 
Romania, Moldovan territory was structured following the Romanian model in ten judeţe (counties) 
which further were composed of plase (parishes) and comune (communes). After the WWII Moldova 
became part of the USSR and therefore the Soviet model of territorial organization was implemented: 
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the country was divided in raioane (districts) and soviete săteşti (village councils). The number of 
districts fluctuated, starting from 60 in 1945 to 46 (1950), 35 (1959) (organized in four districts (округ) 
Bălţi, Chişinău, Tiraspol and Cahul), 18 (1963), 26 (1964), 31 (1966), 33 (1972), 40 (1981)
48
.  
The regional structure was characteristic to the pre-Soviet period. The Soviet power attempted to 
maintain regional structures, but the raion was considered the prior organizational unit – smaller than 
county with less population and easier to control.  
During the years of Soviet rule, political, economic and administrative decisions were creating, modeling 
and modifying the configuration of geographic space. Industrialization and collectivization represented 
the main vectors, which accompanied these decisions. Administrative units were formed from local 
communities constituted on the basis of historical affinities, resulted from complementarity of natural 
potential and traditional economy, and of cultural and spiritual heritage. Administrative centers of the 
new entities developed hypertrophically as a result of migratory growth; industrial (mono-industrial) 
towns appeared. In rural areas, collectivization undercut traditional social and production systems, 
facilitating migration to big cities. These are the phenomena whose consequences, spatial and 
psychological, are difficult to be removed. There were created new macro-spatial dependencies 
between settlements, new zones of influence and polarized areas, artificially amplified in many cases, by 
changing the administrative statute of certain settlements. These changes were strongly supported by 
the state according to the principles of centralized planned economy. Contrary to natural evolution of 
this space, they were able to completely change the configuration of Moldova’s geographic space. The 
transition period brought, first of all, a lack of external financial resources which was mandatory to 
maintain the old centralized structures. Changes in the economic thought from Marxist/communist to 
neoliberal lead to a crisis in the administrative-territorial organization. New realities (political, economic, 
and administrative) do not comply with the logic of space organization. 
In the transition period Republic of Moldova had three administrative-territorial reforms: 
• 1994: In 1994 there were legally approved changes in the soviet system of administrative 
organization, but with no essential changes of territorial structures. The first autonomous 
territorial unit (Gagauzia) was created; it included three districts (dolay) which are still part of 
the internal division of the Gagauzian region. The Soviet model in the rest of administrative-
territorial units had been maintained largely unaltered. Thus, by 1998 the country’s territory 
was divided in 38 raioane (districts), including five in the breakaway Transnistrian region. 
• 1998: The 30 districts placed on the right bank of the Nistru river were amalgamated in 9 judeţe 
(counties), to which later the tenth was added. The territorial reorganization in 1999 was 
accompanied by a significant administrative reform, resulting in a new division of competences 
and resources, following closely the Romanian model. 
• 2001/2003: In December 2001 the Communists, newly elected power, adopted the new 
administrative-territorial reform, which took effect after the local elections in 2003.  As result of 
the latter reform, the country actually restored a quasi-Soviet model of territorial division, while 
local autonomy was significantly reduced. 
Approaching to European standards and adopting the European Charter of Local Self-Administration 
Moldova returned to the pre-Soviet administrative-territorial structures (in 1998). The hope was that 
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larger counties (equivalent to NUTS III) would bring additional benefits and would diminish some 
problems caused by smaller dimensions of the districts (equivalent to NUTS IV). In order to promote 
self-administration even the minimal population size of communes was increased to 2,500 inhabitants.  
But the reform faced two important problems. The first one is based on the fact that in most cases 
decentralization of functions was not followed by their adequate funding. Also, instead of a real 
decentralization of functions down to municipalities, many public services were grouped in new 
‘capitals’ of counties or even kept in the towns that formerly served as raion centers. Thus, instead of 
benefiting from the reform, citizens from local communities had to travel longer distances in order to 
obtain a certificate, or to benefit from a social assistance aid.  
The second problem was the discrepancy between the settlement system mostly created during the 
soviet period, based on the districts pattern, and the logic of the new county pattern. Main cause of the 
failure of the last administrative-territorial reform consists in the fact that geographical space is much 
more inert than political-administrative decisions. Government did not have enough political will for 
completion of the started process, the context of the reform was compromised, because changes that 
followed were rather formal than essential
49
.  
Taking in consideration the above-mentioned problems, the Communist Party initiated and promoted 
the new reform claiming two main reasons: authorities should be closer to the citizen and the number 
of local government officials should be diminished. Abuse of power by local authorities and long 
distance to them were mentioned among other arguments in order to justify this reform
50
. These 
arguments seem to be extremely fragile: proximity of authorities and long distance to them were not on 
the list amongst the most urgent problems mentioned by questioned people for the previous year
51
; 
legal instruments are more appropriate for solving the abuse of power problem. Also, increasing 
number of both 1
st
 and 2
nd
 tier units would have doubtfully reduce the number of officials. Nonetheless, 
the new Government, sworn in 2001, provided quite easy citizens with convincing arguments for 
reintroducing, from 2003, the old, districts-based administrative-territorial system.  
Geographic regionalization has had no sizable impact on the recent changes in territorial-administrative 
division of the country that has not considered economic, geographical, cultural, historical and other 
factors. To some extent the nodal-functional aspects have been built in the territorial-administrative 
divisions, but in a fairly superficial manner. As result, nowadays regional development in Moldova 
suffers too much from the over-emphasized process of economic and political polarization, excessive 
fragmentation of the country territory and no real economic power and administrative leverages at local 
level. It is obvious, that the current administrative-territorial organization system, created for the 
objectives of centralized planned economy, contradicts new realities. Its further keeping will only 
increase dysfunctions in economic policy and settlements system. In order to properly respond to actual 
challenges, larger units should be created. This will increase the capacity of local communities and 
administrative units to attract additional funds and will make them less dependent from governmental 
subsidies. 
IS MOLDOVA TERRITORIALLY TOO FRAGMENTED? 
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Territorial fragmentation is usually pointed out as one of the key barriers to a qualitative 
decentralization of the public services provision. However, limited comparative evidence could be 
employed to empirically prove the need for territorial consolidation both at lowest and highest tiers of 
local governance, mainly due to severe data constrains and limited comparability between various 
countries. 
Despite the long lasting trend in most countries towards increasing the size of municipalities (with few 
notable exceptions examined in the previous chapter), seemingly driven by requirements of economic 
modernization, Moldova’s current (2010) administrative-territorial design still carries certain 
resemblances of a quasi-Soviet model.
52
 As Moldova has learned after the 1999-2003 amalgamation 
exercise, consolidation reforms bear significant political costs and the choice for the current 
administrative-territorial status quo is rather a product of social pressure than of economic rationality. 
In comparison with other countries similar in territory, size and starting points (see the previous 
chapter) Moldova is not an extreme case of territorial fragmentation. However, it has two frequently 
mentioned drawbacks. The first one may be labeled as ‘the exception that proves the rule’. It is common 
practice to establish a minimum number of residents for a given settlement to become a municipality, 
because it is reasonably assumed that municipalities have to be large enough to minimize average 
operational costs. A minimum of 1,000 inhabitants is often mentioned, while in Moldova the law on 
administrative-territorial structure provides the threshold of 1,500 inhabitants. The financial resources 
for operational costs are also addressed by law. Thus, a primăria (mayoralty) “is set up if, as a rule, it has 
a population size of at least 1,500 inhabitants and has sufficient financial means to maintain the mayor’s 
office personnel and social sector institutions.”
53
 The next paragraph in the law on administrative-
territorial structure, however, allows for exceptions to the general rule stating that: “In some 
exceptional cases, the Parliament may establish through an organic law the set up of an independent 
administrative-territorial unit with a population size smaller than the one stipulated in paragraph 
(2)...”
54
 As one can see in Table 12, 237 out of 902 municipalities (i.e. about 27%) are ‘exceptional cases’, 
most of which are the result of political resistance to territorial consolidation. From a comparative 
perspective, this type of exceptions exists in many countries, subject to specific circumstances (e.g. 
ethnic factors, historical and cultural traditions, geographic location (remoteness from other 
settlements, islands), etc.) but they should presumably be within acceptable limits so that the deviation 
does not involve a significant share of public sector expenditure. As Map 7 shows, a significant part of 
‘exceptional cases’ in Moldova are geographically rather close or even adjacent, and could be merged 
even today without any changes to the law. 
 
TABLE 12. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MOLDOVA BY NUMBER OF INHABITANTS (2008)* 
Number of inhabitants Number of municipalities 
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urban/ towns rural total 
<1,500 1 236 237 
1,501-3,000 3 358 361 
3,001-5,000 6 182 194 
5,001-10,000 11 62 73 
10,001-20,000 22 4 26 
20,001-50,000 9 - 9 
50,001-100,000 - - - 
100,001-200,000 1 - 1 
>200,001 1 - 1 
total 54 842 902 
Note: *- excluding municipalities from Transnistria; 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Small Areas Deprivation Index Database 2008; 
The second aspect is the prevailing number of small municipalities, with up to 5,000 inhabitants. 
Although there is no ‘magic’ optimal number, as there is no common optimal size of a municipality, this 
threshold is often pointed in many studies on territorial fragmentation as one that offers better 
growth/development perspectives to a municipality
55
.  
Normally the notion of an optimal size of a municipality would involve a balance between opportunities 
for democratic development and public participation and a cost-efficient size of the local government. 
Thus, in deciding whether amalgamation is a solution to the territorial fragmentation in Moldova, the 
analysis on whether it would or not result in positive economic benefits should be accompanied with 
measuring quality of democratic participation and checking whether local democracy indicators falls 
dramatically as municipalities’ size increases. In other words, the analysis will attempt to address the 
question whether there is a significant cost of maintaining small local governments and if it is worth 
paying, by assessing size economies (of public services provision) and democratic participation 
dimensions. This analysis will be done in the next sections. 
The analysis is focused primarily on rural municipalities. Besides the dominant numbers (rural 
municipalities represent about 93% of total) possible merger decisions of rural municipalities followed 
by broadening their competencies would have a crucial impact on necessity and magnitude of 
interventions on the intermediate tier of local government (districts).  
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MAP 7.  D ISTRIBUTION OF  THE RESIDENT VILLAGES UNDER 1500 INHABITANTS  
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
Apart from certain exceptions of towns having less than 5,000 inhabitants, some of which stemming 
from town status offered to some settlements that were created around processing plants (see Table 
13), most of the towns are situated in the 5,000-20,000 range. These are in most cases district centers 
that operate as service providing hubs for residents of surrounding rural settlements (mostly retail 
agricultural markets and services that would not be otherwise available in rural settlements). The 
preliminary hypothesis is that particular towns could be subject of territorial consolidation only if other 
settlements are situated in their immediate proximity (within 1-2 km distance). The assumption is that 
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distribution costs of capital-intense public services (e.g. water supply, sewage systems and garbage 
management), which are better developed in towns than in rural settlements, depend heavily on 
population density, and they rise with increased distance from source.
56
  
The answer on whether the size of the second tier is too small or too large or whether this level is 
needed at all depends very much on the decisions in other sectors of the local government reform, e.g. 
the amount of functions assigned to the first tier. The main rationale behind the analysis of the optimal 
structure for the second tier (or if it is needed at all) is based on the subsidiary principle, i.e. 
‘expenditure responsibilities should only be assigned to a higher level of government if it can be 
demonstrated that it can carry out the function more efficiently than the lower level’.
57
 
From the other hand, the optimal size of the intermediate local government depends on the extent to 
which the first level units are amalgamated. For example, a drastic reduction of number of 
municipalities within a territory of a district from 24 to eight, (assuming the same powers are retained 
for local governments and the second tier territorial units have an optimal size today) would presumably 
result in a reduced workload for the district administration and would normally need to be extended in 
size. For these very reasons, the second tier level is closely examined in the third chapter, where 
advantages and disadvantages of different administrative-territorial models are examined. 
WHAT SERVICES DO MOLDOVAN LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES PROVIDE? 
The Constitution recognizes the principle of local government and states that all local issues shall be 
resolved and managed by local authorities, which shall operate independently pursuant to law. 
Responsibilities for providing local government services in the legislative framework of the Republic of 
Moldova are stipulated in two laws: the Law on Administrative Decentralization and the Law on Local 
Public Finance. In both documents, responsibilities are divided separately between subjects of the local 
administration. Each level of public administration has own and delegated functions. 
The basic functions of local government include the organization of social services, welfare services for 
the elderly, housing and utilities, the water supply and sewerage, the provision of public services, 
physical planning, public transport, and the maintenance of local roads and streets. In an international 
comparison, the level of administrative decentralization in Moldova looks quite well, if using the share 
of sub-national government spending in GDP as a proxy for the level of decentralization (Figure 4). 
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F IGURE 4.  TOTAL AND SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN THE CEE AND SELECTED EU-15  COUNTRIES,  AS % OF  GDP 
 
Source: IMF databases and authors’ calculations; 
However, the high share of expenditures of the sub-national government in GDP is mainly explained by 
the fact that the main area of expenditures of local public authorities is education, and, in relative 
terms, Moldova spends unusually much on education (9% of the GDP in 2009, for an OECD average of 4-
5%).All other public services falling under the responsibility of the local public authorities in Moldova are 
under-funded and traditionally managed poorly. It is explained by high control from the central 
government on determining the public expenditure necessary for delivering specific public services. And, 
it creates little capacity at the local government level to operate as independent and autonomous body. 
Notwithstanding the legislative and constitutional provisions that recognize the autonomy of local 
government, the reform strategy will remain confined to a statement of principles unless local 
government institutions are strengthened and appropriately structured.  
The Moldovan tax system has been relatively stable since 1998. The share of local government revenues 
in general government revenues has been below 30% during recent years. Personal income tax is 24% of 
local government total revenues. Amongst taxes, land tax forms quite a small share – 3%. Revenue from 
local taxes represents only 3% of the local budget. All in all, the share of local taxes, own revenues and 
shared revenues is very small in most of the local public administration budgets, with exception of big 
municipalities such as Chișinău and Bălți. Local public administration depends a lot on transfers from the 
state budget (58% including Chisinau and Balit, and 70% excluding these two municipalities), making 
them financially weak in performing their responsibilities. 
Local government expenditure made up about 24% of general government consolidated expenditure in 
recent years. Most of local government expenditures have been made in education – about 60% of total 
local budgets expenditures. Administration costs (7% of total local budget) and social protection (10%) 
are the next the most big costs in the local budgets. 
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TABLE 13. CONSOLIDATED LOCAL BUDGETS EVOLUTION BY FUNCTIONS,  AS% OF GDP  AND OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES, 2006-2009, 
EXECUTED BUDGET 
  
Functions  
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Share 
in 
GDP 
Share 
in total 
Share 
in 
GDP 
Share 
in total 
Share 
in 
GDP 
Share 
in total 
Share 
in 
GDP 
Share 
in total 
Total expenditures 11.31 100.0 10.53 100.0 10.22 100.0 10.88 100.0 
1. General services 0.75 6.6 0.71 6.8 0.74 7.3 0.74 6.8 
2. National defense 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 
3. Public order 0.35 3.1 0.38 3.6 0.32 3.2 0.40 3.7 
4. Education 5.23 46.2 5.24 49.7 5.43 53.1 6.51 59.9 
5. Culture, art, sport and youth 
activities 
0.59 5.2 0.50 4.8 0.53 5.2 0.52 4.8 
6. Healthcare 0.19 1.7 0.17 1.6 0.24 2.3 0.12 1.1 
7. Social welfare 0.46 4.1 0.88 8.3 1.03 10.1 0.88 8.1 
8. Agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.14 1.2 0.15 1.4 0.15 1.5 0.02 0.2 
9. Environmental protection   0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
10. Industry and construction 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.2 
11. Transport and communication 0.32 2.8 0.41 3.9 0.42 4.1 0.36 3.3 
12. Communal services and housing 2.01 17.8 1.20 11.4 0.89 8.7 0.81 7.4 
13. Fuel and energy sector 0.62 5.5 0.53 5.0 0.15 1.4 0.16 1.4 
14. Other economic activities 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 
15. Expenses not distributed 
elsewhere 
0.64 5.7 0.32 3.1 0.28 2.8 0.30 2.8 
Source: Ministry of Finance reports and own calculations; 
Certainly, there are differences in the costs of covering these functions, based on more or less objective 
reasons, but they are not very big. One exception is certainly in housing services. Expenditures on these 
services represent a bigger share of total current expenditures in the municipalities and towns where 
such infrastructures exist. Of course, the size of government is crucial in other spending areas, as well, 
but this is not so clear as in general public services. To have better evidences we did the mapping of 
local governments’ functions for 2005-2009 years.  
The analysis showed that the current expenditure part of the local budgets, especially for the first level 
of LPA is created mainly from expenses for
58
: 
• General local administration 
• Enrolment in the army 
• Education 
• Culture, art, sport and youth activities 
• Social protection (mainly social services delivery) 
• Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
• Housing and communal services 
• Energy and fuel distribution 
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The function for enrolment in the army does not appear in all LPA at the first level. Very small villages do 
not this function because of small number of population.  
ANALYSIS OF THE COST-EFFICIENCY AT THE FIRST TIER OF LOCAL PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION  
Moldovan local governments have a relatively limited direct influence on local economic development. 
The only instruments at hand for stimulating investments and creating a competitive environment are 
setting local taxes and levies (with maximal threshold established by the Parliament), offering facilities, 
land or buildings, promoting strategies, or using planning and zoning tools. As the share of own local 
revenues in local budgets is small (10%), there is limited fiscal and financial decentralization and grants 
(transfers) from central government are conditional, i.e. have to be spent on delivering specific public 
services (education, social assistance etc.). This in part explains the rather weak correlation between the 
level of local revenues and municipalities’ size (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
F IGURE 5.  CORRELATION BETWEEN OWN REVENUES AND MUNICIPALITY SIZE, RURAL AND URBAN SETTLEMENTS (CHIȘINĂU AND BĂLȚI 
EXCLUDED),  YEAR 2009 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Small Areas Deprivation Index Database 2008 and Ministry of Finance data; 
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F IGURE 6.  CORRELATION BETWEEN OWN REVENUES AND MUNICIPALITY SIZE, RURAL PRIMARIAS ONLY,  YEAR 2009 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Small Areas Deprivation Index Database 2008 and Ministry of Finance data; 
However, the concept of scale economies as used in economic analysis is not entirely applicable to 
assessing local government performance as the price of public services is not determined by market 
forces. In Moldova, as in many other countries, some public services are delivered for free (e.g. 
education, parks, roads, libraries, cultural centers etc.) or for a subsidized price (e.g. kindergartens and 
vocational schools, sewer and water treatment, public transportation, street lighting, waste collection). 
Certain public services provided by local governments would not be adequately available from the 
private sector (social assistance, parks, roads, public safety etc.) because their delivery employs mostly a 
social than an economic rate of return. As opposed to private firms, local public authorities can be 
inefficient and still they survive without struggling to be competitive. In some cases the outputs of 
municipal services are not measurable or are not related to municipalities’ size/performance 
measurements as they are not confined to one primăria’s jurisdiction only i.e. the catchment area of the 
service (e.g. local roads, schools) is beyond the size of the local government territory.  
Given the abovementioned scaling constrains, it is sometimes argued that economies of size offer a 
more appropriate measure of local governments’ performance
59
, as it allows to calculate the average 
cost of a public service delivery per unit related to the size of municipality. While some European 
countries consider their local authorities as being service delivery institutions, for others municipalities 
are mainly political and representative institutions
60
. As sociological survey conducted for the purposes 
of this study has shown, in Moldova the representational role of the local government is the dominant 
one. This is mainly due to the limited mandate/scope of functions that local governments have and to 
the fact that the services they deliver are less capital-intensive. As many local governments are 
dependent on transfers from the central government, for many public services they act as 
agents/representatives of the central government. In most cases, capital-intensive public services (water 
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supply, waste management) are directly managed by the staff of service’s unit, local governments 
having a supervising and regulatory role (such as in case of some natural monopolies). Another public 
service that has a large share in local governments’ budgets is education (about 70% on average per 
rural municipality). However, local governments cannot influence much the quality of education as de 
facto schools benefit from central government funding, local governments acting mostly as driving belts 
for funds flow. It is relevant to mention in this context that the on-going process of amalgamating rural 
school districts is centrally led by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education
61
, even though the 
local public authorities also play some role. 
This leads us to the idea that in Moldova local governments are mostly labor-intensive types of services 
delivery organizations. In other words, public services delivery costs for rural municipalities are generally 
limited to wages for staff and operational expenditures. As there are not huge differences in terms of 
population size of rural municipalities (see Table 12), one can assume that there is a ‘common basket’ of 
basic public services that have a standard running cost. Indeed, in most of cases, the services of the local 
governments regard issuing to citizens/firms an act, certificate, authorization, building permission. Often 
these are once-in-a-year type of operations, or even a one in a life-time service (e.g. birth certificates), 
which was confirmed by our sociological survey. As the most of municipalities are within 500 – 5,000 
range (see Table 12), and given the easy-to-comply with standards of these services, one may assume 
that the level of quality of these basic services delivery is pretty similar. 
TABLE 14. GENERAL OPERATIONAL COSTS OF THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN 2005  AND 2009 
Number of inhabitants 
2005 2009 
MDL per 
resident 
% of total 
expenditures 
MDL per 
resident 
% of total 
expenditures 
<1,500 122.3 17.4 227.8 15.4 
1,501-3,000 74.9 13.9 142.1 11.3 
3,001-5,000 50.5 11.3 88.9 8.6 
5,001-10,000 46.1 10.1 89.4 7.7 
>10,000 42.2 9.4 76.3 6.4 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Small Areas Deprivation Index Database 2008 and Ministry of Finance data; 
The situation is helpful for objectively determining the extent to which larger municipalities would be 
able to provide public services at lower costs. Table 14 shows the average MDL per capita amounts 
spent on administration (mostly wages and running costs) in 844 rural municipalities and their share in 
total budget expenditures, for the years 2005 and 2009. Simply put, there is an about three times higher 
bureaucratic per unit burden on the budgets of small municipalities of up to 1,500 inhabitants, than on 
larger local governments of over 5,000 residents, and this gap is persisting in time.  
Similarly, as Figure 7 shows, there is an obvious correlation between efficiency of local governments, 
expressed in per capita spending on administration and the municipalities’ size. Administrative costs fall 
exponentially as the size of municipality increases; more than that, the municipal size is a statistically 
significant factor explaining the volume of administrative costs. The conclusion that budgets of smaller 
municipalities are dominated by administrative costs is also confirmed when calculating the share of the 
administrative costs in local budgets of rural municipalities (Figure 8 and Table 14). In 65 out of 236 
small local governments (under 1,500) administrative spending represent over 20% of their local 
budgets. As spending on education amounts is another important part of the budgets, not much is left 
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for other purposes. Here it is interesting to note that the no increase in economic efficiency of the 
expenditures for education should be expected in result of the municipal amalgamation, as these 
probably more depend on the size of the school (and number of schools in a given municipality), rather 
on the size of the municipality per se (Figure 9). A similar conclusion is relevant in case of another 
important service, the social protection, which is not expected to become more efficient in result of 
municipal amalgamation only. 
F IGURE 7.  CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS PER RESIDENT AND SIZE OF THE RURAL MUNICIPALITIES,  YEAR 2009 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Small Areas Deprivation Index Database 2008 and Ministry of Finance data; 
F IGURE 8.  CORRELATION BETWEEN THE SHARE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS IN TOTAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES AND SIZE OF THE RURAL 
MUNICIPALITIES,  YEAR 2009 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Small Areas Deprivation Index Database 2008 and Ministry of Finance data; 
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F IGURE 9.  CORRELATION BETWEEN THE EDUCATION EXPENDITURES FOR EDUCATION PER RESIDENT AND SIZE OF THE MUNICIPALITY,  
YEAR 2009 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Small Areas Deprivation Index Database 2008 and Ministry of Finance data; 
The picture is not much different when looking only at those municipalities that incorporate more than 
one settlement (376). The general conclusion is that as the size of municipalities increases, more 
services can be provided by the same local government at declining marginal cost. 
Aside from this, there are several other economic arguments in favor of municipal amalgamation: 
• Human resources: it is argued that there is a higher specialization of staff in larger 
municipalities;  
• Financial resources: larger municipalities can mobilize (and concentrate) larger amounts of 
financial resources that would serve for the long-term development of the municipality (inter 
alia, bigger size will increase municipalities to more effectively meet the co-funding 
requirements of the EU Neighborhood Program, and other similar EU-sponsored programs); 
• Hidden administrative costs: a large number of small local authorities generate also high 
administrative costs on central government. 
ANALYSIS OF THE COST-EFFICIENCY AT THE SECOND TIER  
Moldova’s territorial fragmentation is quite evident also at the second level. There are big discrepancies 
among the existing raions, without any clear economic reason why the administrative borders should 
have been drawn in such a disordered manner.  
Below follow some figures proving this fragmentation and disordered territorial structure, with more 
details included in Table 16.  
• At an average population per district of 77.3 thousand inhabitants (UTA Gagauzia and its three 
dolays not included), the district with the biggest population in Moldova (Orhei, 125.7 thousand 
inhabitants) has a population 4.2 times exceeding the tiniest district (Basarabeasca, only 29.6 
thousand). 
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• For an average area of 890 sq.km., the largest district (Cahul, 1545 sq.km.) is 5.2 times larger as 
compared with smallest district (Basarabeasca, 290 sq.km). 
• In terms of the number of residential settlements, the biggest district is Falesti, with 76 
settlements, and the smallest is Basarabeasca with only 10 settlements. 
This fragmentation has resulted in a waste of public resources on the second-level administrative-
territorial units. Available statistics prove that the smaller the district, the higher the per inhabitant 
administrative expenditures, as shown in Figure 10. Calculations show that in the three smallest districts 
of Moldova (Basarabeasca, Soldanesti, Dubasari) the average per inhabitant budgetary total 
administrative expenditures are 2.6 times higher than in the three largest districts (Hancesti, Cahul, 
Orhei). The same correlations hold for the administration of specific public services, such as education 
(Figure 11) and social protection (Figure 12). 
A simple economic simulation based on the equations included in Figure 10 shows that if Moldova 
would be territorially more homogeneous and with districts’ population set at the level of about 260-
270 thousand (the average size of the counties created in result of the 1999 reform), the today’s cost of 
administration of the second level local public administration would be only about MDL 35 million, as 
compared to the MDL 84 million really spent. Under a different scenario, closer to the today’s situation, 
if Moldova would be divided in 22 districts of about 110 thousand inhabitants each rather than 32 
districts of different size, the administrative costs of this scheme would be about MDL 64 million, which 
is again less than current situation. 
At the same time, the structure of expenditures in the budgets of the districts’ authorities is evidently 
dominated by operational costs (called ‘general destination state services’), which typically represent 
more than 1/3 of the total expenditures of the aggregate raions’ budgets (Table 15). Maintaining such 
an expensive district administration providing a limited amount of public services is an example of 
extreme economic inefficiency. 
TABLE 15. STRUCTURE OF THE AGGREGATE RAIONS BUDGET,  % OF TOTAL (CHISINAU AND BALTI MUNICIPALITIES AND UTA  GAGAUZIA 
DOLAYS NOT INCLUDED) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Jan-Jun 2010 
General destination state 
services 35.4 35.5 35.5 35.9 35.5 35.9 
Education 24.1 23.7 24.0 23.1 22.8 22.6 
Culture, arts, sports and youth 
activities  6.1 6.3 5.8 5.7 6.1 6.9 
Social protection and 
assistance 11.3 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.7 13.5 
Agriculture, forestry, fishery, 
and water sector 12.3 12.6 11.9 12.1 12.4 12.0 
Industry and constructions 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.0 7.5 6.2 
Other services related to 
economic activity  3.9 3.7 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Finance data; 
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F IGURE 10. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PER RESIDENT BUDGETARY TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES OF THE DISTRICT-LEVEL 
LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND DISTRICT POPULATION,  YEAR 2009   
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and authors’ calculations; 
F IGURE 11. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PER RESIDENT ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES RELATED TO PROVISION OF EDUCATION 
SERVICES AT THE DISTRICT-LEVEL LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND DISTRICT POPULATION,  YEAR 2009 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and authors’ calculations; 
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F IGURE 12. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PER RESIDENT ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES RELATED TO PROVISION OF SOCIAL 
PROTECTION AND INSURANCE SERVICES AT THE DISTRICT-LEVEL LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND DISTRICT POPULATION,  YEAR 2009 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and authors’ calculations; 
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TABLE 16. GEOGRAPHIC INDICATORS FOR THE MOLDOVAN ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL UNITS  
 Municipalities / 
Cities 
Localities part of the 
cities / municipalities 
Villages-
residences 
Localities part of the 
rural communes 
Total 
localities 
Total population, thousand Total area, sq.km 
Republic of Moldova 65 40 917 659 1681 4050.3 33800 
Chişinău municipality 7 2 12 14 35 785.4 571.6 
Bălţi municipality 1 – 2 – 3 148 72 
Bender municipality 1 – 1 – 2 43.4 92.3 
Districts:        
Anenii-Noi 1 5 25 14 45 83.2 892 
Basarabeasca 1 – 6 3 10 29.6 294.5 
Briceni 2 – 26 11 39 76.2 814 
Cahul 1 1 36 17 55 123.9 1545 
Cantemir 1 – 26 24 51 63.3 753.5 
Călăraşi 1 1 27 15 44 79.3 870 
Căuşeni 2 1 28 17 48 92.7 1163 
Cimişlia 1 3 22 13 39 62.6 922.8 
Criuleni 1 2 24 16 43 72.8 688 
Donduşeni 1 – 21 8 30 46 645 
Drochia 1 – 27 12 40 91.1 999.9 
Dubăsari – – 11 4 15 35.2 302 
Edineţ 2 4 30 13 49 83.4 932.9 
Făleşti 1 1 32 42 76 93.3 1072.6 
Floreşti 3 – 37 34 74 91 1108.2 
Glodeni 1 1 18 15 35 62.6 754.1 
Hînceşti 1 – 38 24 63 123.3 1483.4 
Ialoveni 1 – 24 9 34 98.2 783 
Leova 2 1 23 13 39 53.9 775 
Nisporeni 1 – 22 16 39 67.4 629 
Ocniţa 3 – 18 12 33 56.4 597 
Orhei 1 – 37 37 75 125.7 1228 
Rezina 1 3 24 13 41 53.1 621.8 
Rîşcani 2 6 26 21 55 70.9 936.1 
Sîngerei 2 1 24 43 70 93.8 1000 
Soroca 1 – 34 33 68 101.1 598.4 
Străşeni 2 2 25 10 39 91.4 1043 
Şoldăneşti 1 – 22 10 33 43.9 998 
Ştefan Vodă 1 – 22 3 26 72.5 729 
Taraclia 1 – 14 11 26 44.5 674 
Teleneşti 1 2 30 21 54 74.9 848.6 
Ungheni 2 1 31 40 74 117.2 2913 
ATU Găgăuzia 3 1 23 5 32 159.9 1083 
Administrative-territorial units on the left bank of Nistru 10 2 69 66 147 439.2 2366.3 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of Moldova;
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DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION  
Supporters of territorial fragmentation often point to the fact that smaller municipalities would 
stimulate greater participation of citizens in solving local problems thus contributing to development of 
local democracy. As discussed above, this is closely related to the perception that local government’s 
task is rather to ensure the presence of public authority than to seek economic efficiency. Comparative 
evidence is trivial, some of the researchers finding a direct link between municipalities’ size and the 
quality of local democracy. Others, on the contrary, provide evidence that the larger a local government 
territorial unit the more dynamic and participative is the democratic life (bigger means more social 
control, more NGOs, local newspapers etc).
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Traditionally, one of the most available indicators for measuring to what extent the quality of local 
democracy is related to local governments size is voter turnout. In most countries of the Council of 
Europe, there is a lower participation as the size of municipality grows. Moldova is not an exception, as 
Table 13, measuring voters’ turnout in 2007 local elections, proves. As one can see, voters’ turnout 
decreases with municipalities’ size, especially in the 500 – 5,000 inhabitants range, which captures the 
most of municipalities. However, , when analyzing those municipalities that have four and more 
settlements only, which are more representative from the perspective of an amalgamation reform, the 
voters’ turnout is even slightly higher than the general voters’ turnout (about 52% in 2007 local 
elections). This means that turnout in municipalities with multiple settlements is higher than in many 
single-unit municipalities. This may be an argument which proves the fact that amalgamating 
municipalities would not significantly diminish the existing level of democratic participation. 
F IGURE 13. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VOTERS TURNOUT AND MUNICIPALITIES SIZE, 2007 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Small Areas Deprivation Index Database and Central Electoral Commission data; 
In order to compare this democratic participation indicator to economic efficiency data, average voters’ 
turnout for groups of municipalities classified by size were calculated, as shown in Figure 14. There is a 
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dramatic fall on citizens’ participation in local elections in municipalities larger than 9,000 inhabitants. 
On the first sight, one could assume that amalgamating municipalities beyond this point would damage 
democratic participation. However, currently the most of municipalities beyond this number are single-
unit urban settlements (see Table 12) which are not the main contributors to territorial fragmentation. 
Also, as shown above, multi-settlement municipalities show a greater voters turnout than many single-
settlement primarias. Thus, a 9,000 upper-threshold could be normally applied to amalgamation of rural 
settlements (with certain exceptions imposed by geographic conditions) without expecting it to be 
greatly detrimental to democratic participation.  
F IGURE 14. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AVERAGE VOTERS TURNOUT AND GROUPS OF MUNICIPALITIES BY SIZE,  2007 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Small Areas Deprivation Index Database and Central Electoral Commission data; 
The argument that the democracy level does not depend on the act of voting only is also valid as citizens 
can influence politics in many other ways. One explanation for the results in Figure 13 is that in smaller 
municipalities, especially in those primăria that consist of one settlement only, local elected officials 
(councilors and mayors) are better known by citizens and thus a better connection between them exists. 
The number of local council members elected in each municipality depends on population size and is 
determined by the Law on Local Government (see Table 17).  
Another explanation, though, would reside in the electoral system applied in local elections in Moldova. 
The proportional representation system used is simpler and cheaper and presents good outcomes 
where the density of population is high. However, within this system smaller territorial units (villages) 
from the same municipality might end up by not being represented in the local council. So, in some 
settlements of a municipality the level of representation may in fact be zero inhabitants per councilor. 
This flaw should be considered and eliminated from any model of the administrative-territorial division. 
Changing the electoral system would increase the democratic representation in possible amalgamated 
communities. 
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TABLE 17. NUMBER OF LOCAL COUNCILORS PER MUNICIPALITY AND CITIZENS REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL COUNCILS  
Municipal population Councilors 
Inhabitants per councilor 
min max average 
<1500 9 32* 167 106 
1501 - 2500 11 136 227 182 
2501 - 5000 13 192 385 288 
5001 - 7000 15 333 467 400 
7001 - 10000 17 412 588 500 
10001 - 20000 23 435 870 652 
20001 - 50000 27 741 1852 1296 
50001 - 100000 33 1515 3030 2273 
100001 - 200000 35 2857 5714 4286 
Note: * - Calculated based on the minimum population of a municipality in Moldova; 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Article 11 of the Local Government Law no. 436 from 28.12.2006; 
In terms of indirect representation, the number of inhabitants per local NGO would be a relevant 
indicator. Local NGOs are believed to strengthen citizens’ influence on local public authorities.
63
 There 
are certain constrains in collecting data on local NGOs, as they are registered with municipalities and the 
centralized registry does not offer up-to-date data. The Table 18 bellow shows the summarized data on 
a sub-sample of 170 municipalities from the South development region (which includes eight rayons). 
Under this indicator, the level of representation decreases with municipality size but is the most visible 
in the 1500-5000 inhabitants’ range, which represent the most of existing municipalities. Over 5000, 
however, there is a sharp increase. It stays below 900 inhabitants per local NGO even if excluding larger 
towns from the sub-sample.  
TABLE 18. INDIRECT REPRESENTATION OF CITIZENS BY LOCAL NGOS IN THE SOUTH DEVELOPMENT REGION 
Population No. of inhabitants per NGO 
under 1500 966 
1501-3000 999 
3001-5000 1326 
over 5000 655 
Source: authors’ calculations based on: “Catalogue of Non-governmental Organizations from the South  
Development Region of the Republic of Moldova”, Chisinau, 2008; 
The results of the national survey confirm, to some extent, the common rule that the democratic 
representation indicators decrease with increasing municipality size. However, overall, the lowest 
interest lies within the 5000-10000 range – which includes the most of the declining small towns and 
larger rural settlements (Figure 15). A cause may be the abovementioned electoral system applied in 
local elections. You may not feel very involved in the public life if you live in neighborhood of a small 
town or your village within a multi-settlement municipality is not represented by any local councilor. It is 
interesting that in the over 10000 category, which include the largest towns, mostly rayon centers, there 
is an almost equal average interest in local and regional public affairs. It may well be citizens from these 
municipalities perceive their town as a growth pole for a larger area. This could also mean they would 
not oppose an eventual merger of municipal and rayon authorities to deliver public services to the 
surrounding rural municipalities.  
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One of the main axioms of local autonomy is that those tiers of local governments that are the closest to 
the citizens would be the most appropriate to be entrusted with basic public services delivery, as they 
are better placed to know in detail citizens’ problems. Local democracy, though, is better perceived if 
measured against the level of satisfaction of citizens about the quality of public services delivery in 
smaller and larger municipalities. As one can see from the Figure 16, which shows an aggregated 
average response regarding the level of satisfaction with municipal public services (kindergartens, 
schools, healthcare, social assistance, water and sewage, waste management, local roads and transport, 
street lighting, green spaces and environment, local cultural and sports activities and others), the 
general trend is that citizens’ satisfaction increases as the size of municipality increases. A rational 
explanation is that larger communities normally have a larger income base and hence more resources 
(and scale economies) to efficiently invest in citizen’s well-being. 
F IGURE 15. LEVEL OF INTEREST OF CITIZENS IN THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL PUBLIC LIFE BY MUNICIPALITY TYPE 
 
Note: average responses, 2,5 – high, 0 – no interest, Chisinau and Balti excluded; 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the national survey; 
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F IGURE 16. C ITIZENS SATISFACTION ON PUBLIC SERVICES QUALITY RELATED TO MUNICIPAL SIZE 
 
Note: average responses, 3,1 – high, 2,4 – low, Chisinau and Balti excluded 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the national survey; 
ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT  
There is no compelling international evidence on links between the administrative-territorial 
division/size of the administrative-territorial units on the development of these units. However, the 
supposedly positive link between the size of the municipality/district/region and the economic activity in 
that administrative unit has been a constant argument used by supporters of larger 
municipalities/districts/regions in Moldova. The existing data on the situation of Moldovan 
administrative-territorial units do not confirm this hypothesis.  
For instance, there is no correlation between the size of municipalities and unemployment rate 
(estimated at municipal level through number of registered unemployed divided by the number of the 
working age population, Figure 17). Not represented in the figure, there is equally no link between the 
size of municipality and entrepreneurial activity in that municipality. These two indicators show that 
efficiency of using human resources does not depend on the size of the settlement. Important to 
mention, no links appear when controlling for the type of settlement (rural/urban).  
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F IGURE 17. ESTIMATED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE*  CORRELATED WITH MUNICIPAL SIZE (CHISINAU AND BALTI MUNICIPALITIES 
EXCLUDED),  YEAR 2008 
 
Note: * - unemployment rate was estimated as ratio between registered unemployment at Labor Employment Office and work-
age population;  
Source: authors’ estimates based on Small Areas Deprivation Database 2008; 
In line with the previous statement, when excluding Chisinau and Balti municipalities, the size of the 
municipality does not have any impact on the density of the non-agricultural enterprises in the 
corresponding municipality (Figure 18). However, existing data did not allow for a deeper analysis on 
performance indicators of enterprises and human resources. Size of the municipality (i.e. the size of the 
market) should have some positive influence on the growth/size of sales of enterprises, while existence 
of educational institutions is expected to have some positive impact on the labor productivity.  
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F IGURE 18. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE SIZE OF THE MUNICIPALITY AND DENSITY OF NON-AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES (CHISINAU 
AND BALTI MUNICIPALITIES NOT INCLUDED), YEAR 2008 
 
Source: authors’ estimates based on Small Areas Deprivation Database 2008; 
One hypothesis is that the link is missing because local governments are not the main players in 
formulating local and regional development policies. One cannot expect a mayoralty, either of a tiny or 
large municipality, to exert any influence on local economic development as due to a low level of 
decentralization it cannot, for example, offer significant tax deductions to become attractive to 
investors, or due to its size (and small budget) cannot provide co-funding for a large infrastructure 
development project. 
At the same time, existing research suggests that administrative status of an (urban) settlement had an 
important role in driving its industrial development of territories in Soviet times, especially in case of the 
earlier ‘created’ towns
64
. Because in Soviet times the industry was the key to local development, the 
administrative status helped to trigger this factor. As the same research says, it seems that currently the 
administrative function is continuing the same role, this time using another engine of development – 
services. 
The strong link between the level of development and administrative functions (raions’ residences vs. 
towns without this function) make us suppose that the bigger the subordinated unit the higher the level 
of development. This hypothesis is confirmed by the experience of the great majority of the Eastern-
European countries, in which the highest economic potential is concentrated in capitals and other cities 
with administrative power. Thus, our main purpose in the models to be developed is to create spatial 
units appropriate to the functions to be assigned and to their role in national settlement and economic 
development. 
In addition, in Moldova the administrative functions have been concentrated in cities/towns, but the 
national settlements system includes many rural settlements – including very big - with central 
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functions, which facilitate the diffusion of the development potential in deep rural areas
65
. Such 
settlements, being entrusted with administrative competences, will provide the necessary long-term 
stimulus for their own and adjacent areas’ development. Thus, the necessary development synergy will 
appear between municipal’ residences and rural settlements. 
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3. MODELS AND CRITERIA FOR AN OPTIMAL ADMINISTRATIVE-
TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION  
GENERAL COUNTRY ’S CONTEXT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION  
EC O NOMIC  A ND  FI NA NC IAL C ONTE XT  
Moldova is an economically weak country, with one of the lowest GPD / capita in Europe. In 2009, the 
GDP/capita expressed at Purchasing Power Parity was only USD 2842, as compared to with 4757 in 
Georgia, 9154 in Macedonia, 17110 in Latvia, 17908 in Estonia and 24093 in the Czech Republic. Its 
current economic situation is a combined result of structural disadvantages inherited from the Soviet 
system and of the inefficient economic reforms implemented after Moldova became independent in 
1991. The evolution of the country’s GDP over the last two decades and the late resumption of the 
economic growth are both a reflection and a result of the poorly implemented economic reforms (Figure 
19). Economic growth resumed only in 2000 which allowed for a subsequent accelerated increase in the 
central and local governments expenditures expressed as share of GDP. The main part of the increased 
governmental expenditures is represented by the growing social commitments, which were possible to 
fulfill largely because the economic growth was based on private consumption, with indirect taxes linked 
to consumption (VAT and excises) covering more than 82% of the central and local government 
revenues. 
F IGURE 19. EVOLUTION OF THE MOLDOVA’S GDP  (1992=100%)  AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (%  OF GDP) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, National Bureau of Statistics and authors’ calculations; 
At the same time, the economic growth in the recent decade has been very polarized in geographic 
terms, with the Chisinau municipality estimated to produce more than half of the country’s GDP. In fact, 
Moldova displays the highest indicator of concentration of economic activity as compared to all other 
European countries for which statistical data were available (Figure 20). It is quite interesting to note the 
fact that Moldova is immediately preceded by other three comparator countries (Latvia, Estonia, and 
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Macedonia) which have been part of the analysis of the first chapter and which display high levels of 
economic concentration. However, the high level of economic polarization has not been an obstacle for 
introducing one-tier administrative-territorial systems in all three countries.  
F IGURE 20. D ISPERSION OF THE REGIONAL GDP/CAPITA*, %  OF THE NATIONAL AVERAGE OF THE GDP/CAPITA,  2006** 
 
Source: Expert-Grup, 2010; 
Another aspect of the economic polarization in Moldova is the very small density of business entities in 
peripheral regions of the country: according to the 2008 statistical data, in the capital city there were 
about 47 economic entities per 1000 people of economically active age, whereas in the rest of Moldova 
this indicator varied between 6.2 entities in the Southern region to 8.5 in Northern region and 10.5 in 
Gagauzia. Following this distribution of economic entities, the private capital investment (including 
foreign investments) is concentrated in Chisinau and in time this concentration has only strengthened: 
in 2003, the capital city area hosted 52% of the total private capital investment, while in 2008 its share 
went up to 67%.  
In structural terms, the local economic bases in almost all regions except Chisinau, is represented by low 
added value agriculture and food and beverages industry. While agricultural sector currently employs 
about 28% of the total workforce, it contributes only 10% to the country GDP. Such low labor 
productivity pushes the labor force out of the rural area: in 2009 the workforce pool in agriculture was 
composed of 334 thousand people, as compared with 770 thousand in 2000. With very limited inter-
sectorial labor flows, the most important part of the labor shed by the agriculture found employment 
abroad. According to the Labor Force Survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, rural 
residents represent 70% out of the almost 300 thousand people working abroad, and 56% of the rural 
migrants are below 34 year old. This represents a significant loss of human resources for the rural 
communities, with detrimental impact on local development in long-run. 
No surprise, because of the undiversified economic structure and loss of labor, the share of the own 
revenues in the total revenues of the local public authorities has decreased dramatically in only half-
decade. In 2004 the share of own revenues accounted for more than 52% of the total revenues of the 
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local budgets, whereas in 2009 – only 24%. While shrinking own revenues has been also the result of 
some uninspired fiscal reforms (such as introducing the zero-rate income tax on the reinvested 
corporate income), it is clear that the weak economic base leaves little room for enhancing the 
autonomy of budgets of the local public administrations, unless significant changes are implemented in 
the local public finance system.  
MAP 8.  OWN REVENUES OF THE FIRST-TIER LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,  MDL  PER CAPITA,  2008 
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
Map 8 illustrates clearly the difficult situation that most of the Moldovan local communities are 
presently facing, in terms of local own revenues. Surprisingly, the local communities from the Central 
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region are apparently under the hardest budget constraints, with own revenues representing less than 
MDL 100 per capita in most of these communities. This suggests that being geographically close to 
Chisinau is not necessarily an economic advantage, but it can be rather opposite, as the capital city 
seems more to aspirate economic resources than to irradiate economic development. 
GE O GRAPHIC  C O NTE XT  
By European average, Moldova is a geographically small country, covering only 33.8 thousand square 
kilometers and hosting about 4.1 million people (Transnistrian region included). It fares a relatively high 
density of population (121.9 inhabitants/sq.km.), but at the same time Moldova is a heavily rural 
country, with apparently the biggest share of the rural population in total population (53.7%) in Europe. 
For the sake of comparison, the average share of rural population in the five comparator countries is 
33.8%, with Georgia’s 49.5% of population leaving in rural areas being the closest case to Moldova. 
Out of the total 1681 settlements in Moldova, only 65 qualify as towns/cities (Transnistrian region 
included). The 2008 database on the Index of deprivation of small areas (covering only the right-bank 
Moldova) shows that 118 settlements (6.7%) have less than 100 inhabitants, while other 321 localities 
(19.1%) host between 101 and 500 inhabitants. A striking overall figure is that about 50% of the total 
population on the right-bank Moldova leaves in 1446 communities with less than 5000 inhabitants each. 
On the other extreme, there are a few rural settlements (villages) having more than 10 thousand 
inhabitants, a figure which is more appropriate for the Asian countries than European ones. 
This reflects in the current administrative-territorial division of the country, as shown in the Map 9, 
illustrating first-tier administrative-territorial entities by size. Average size of the municipality in 
Moldova is 2850 people, which is more than in case of the Czech Republic (1600 residents), but much 
less than in Estonia (6100), Georgia (45000), Latvia (19000) and Macedonia (25150). Aside from this, the 
current system is far from perfect from the point of view of considering factor of remoteness. As shown 
in Map 10, presently as many as 214 villages out of the 621 villages not having administrative status (i.e. 
more than 35%) qualify as remote villages, meaning that they are part of a given rural municipality even 
though they are geographically closer to another rural municipality. 
Relatively compact, with very small distances between the localities and with a more or less flat relief 
across Moldova, there are few natural barriers imposing constraints on the upper-size of the 
municipalities. Despite the quite low elevation, Moldova’s territory has high vertical fragmentation, 
which, according to some authors, is similar to the figures characteristic just to mountainous regions
66
. 
Such areas are characteristic to the central part of the country (Codrii heights), where communes are 
valley-oriented and their administrative boundaries follow the watershed lines with quite a high fidelity. 
They do not represent unbreakable obstacles; however, there is a need of high investments in order to 
create an infrastructure, which would overcome these barriers. 
Nonetheless, the most important factor limiting the scope of potential amalgamation of the 
municipalities is the ethnic one. Indeed, many rural communities have a dominant ethnic group which is 
different from the dominant ethnic group in an adjacent community. This factor is particularly strong in 
the south, where representatives of the Gagauzian and Bulgarian ethnic groups leave compactly. 
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MAP 9.  D ISTRIBUTION OF  THE ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL ENTITIES BY POPULATION SIZE, 2008 
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
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MAP 10.  LOCATION OF THE REMOTE VILLAGES 
 
Note: Remote villages are considered those located outside the Thiessen-Voronoi polygon created around the residence village 
of the commune where the remote village is included.  
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section. 
DE VE LO PME NT  OF PHY SIC AL  AN D DI GITAL I NF RAST RUC TURE   
Moldova’s economic development, particularly at local and regional level, is significantly constrained by 
the poor state of infrastructure, both physical and digital.  
Roads are most often mentioned as the first problematic issue when discussing the physical 
infrastructure. Currently the official assessments say that density of the roads network in Moldova is 
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satisfactory for the fulfillment of the present economic needs in Moldova
67
 (even though in long term 
Moldova will need to build more new roads in order to catch up with the other Central and Eastern 
European countries). Available data show also a pretty high density of the local roads across Moldova 
(Table 19). What is worrying, however, is the very poor quality of these roads. According to the same 
official estimates, in 2006 (no more recent data are available) only 7% of the total public roads network 
and only 2% of the local roads network was in ‘fair quality’ condition. Adding salt to wound, more than 
half of the local roads are inherently sub-standard, as they are paved with gravel or are not paved at all.  
The development of physical infrastructure is not satisfactory either. The use of Internet by the local 
public administration is quite limited in scope, and only a very small number of public employees at 
municipal level are using the digital technologies (Table 19). This is compounded by the shallow 
penetration of the Internet in the private sector at regional and local level. 
TABLE 19. SOME INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT OF PHYSICAL AND DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE BY RAIONS  
 Density of 
national roads, 
km/100 sq.km. 
Density of local 
roads, km/100 
sq.km. 
Share of municipal 
public authorities 
with access to 
Internet 
Share of employees in 
municipal public administration 
with access to Internet at their 
workplace 
Mun. Chişinău 12.4 5.6 23.5 4.7 
Mun. Bălţi 33.5 No data 50.0 10.0 
Anenii Noi 15.1 16.5 0.0 0.0 
Basarabeasca 12.6 13.7 16.7 2.9 
Briceni 8.7 30.5 21.4 3.9 
Cahul 11.6 13.4 13.5 3.7 
Călăraşi 16.4 17.6 21.0 13.1 
Cantemir 11.4 19.3 No data  No data 
Căuşeni 14.2 18.9 7.7 1.5 
Cimişlia 10.0 21.6 13.0 2.2 
Criuleni 14.9 19.4 4.2 0.9 
Donduşeni 9.0 23.6 9.1 2.0 
Drochia 10.4 16.4 10.7 8.2 
Dubăsari 7.6 27.7 No data No data 
Edineţ 6.7 28.3 16.7 3.57 
Făleşti 10.7 23.0 6.1 1.9 
Floreşti 11.8 21.0 21.4 5.2 
Glodeni 9.6 21.6 33.3 2.6 
Hînceşti 9.4 14.4 20.5 9.8 
Ialoveni 15.0 20.6 9.1 8.5 
Leova 10.0 17.2 66.7 20 
Nisporeni 9.9 22.3 59.1 14.6 
Ocniţa 15.1 20.3 21.1 6.2 
Orhei 9.5 17.6 5.3 1.0 
Rezina 6.4 27.1 4.4 0.8 
Rîşcani 14.4 20.1 0.0 0.0 
Sîngerei 9.9 24.7 12.0 2.1 
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 Density of 
national roads, 
km/100 sq.km. 
Density of local 
roads, km/100 
sq.km. 
Share of municipal 
public authorities 
with access to 
Internet 
Share of employees in 
municipal public administration 
with access to Internet at their 
workplace 
Şoldăneşti 7.7 25.7 0.0 0.0 
Soroca 9.2 28.2 17.1 4.6 
Ştefan Vodă 7.1 19.4 26.1 8.9 
Străşeni 17.3 19.4 11.1 1.9 
Taraclia 10.2 20.9 20.0 3.1 
Teleneşti 9.0 20.8 7.4 2.0 
Ungheni 9.7 24.7 11.8 10.2 
UTA Găgăuzia 10.8 11.7 25.0 4.0 
Total 11.0 19.9 No data No data 
Source: NBS, Ministry of Information Development and Telecommunications and our estimates for the roads density indicators; 
Obviously, underdeveloped physical and digital infrastructure is an essential argument against 
amalgamation of the administrative-territorial units. If the decentralization reform results in an 
inefficient system requiring frequent interactions between local authorities and citizens then it will not 
get the necessary support from the local stakeholders. This is because poor roads would increase the 
financial and time costs of citizens interacting with local public authorities, as these authorities become 
geographically more remote. A more streamlined set of communication and petition procedures 
(allowing for a wider official use of post and email) and a more customary use of modern technologies 
from the part of the citizens and public servants would substitute the need of citizens’ personally 
meeting the public authorities.  
TRA DITI ONS AN D C ULTURE  
Traditionally, even the small communities in Moldova would have a local public authority, either elected 
or nominated. But presently, only three 3 in 5 localities are run by a primaria (mayoralty) located in the 
same locality. In the recent two decades the social and cultural realities changed to a big extent. People 
are leaving Moldova looking for the economic opportunities abroad and therefore the ‘local patriotism’ 
is getting weaker. As people are presently looking for better public services rather than for being merely 
represented, we expect that an amalgamation of municipalities accompanied by 
compensatory/transitory measures would not engender negative social consequences. At the same 
time, in order to alleviate this risk, the remote/small communities should be fairly represented in the 
municipal elected and executive bodies. 
PURPOSES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL REFORM  
Analysis has shown that the present administrative-territorial division is not economically efficient, 
particularly because of the high share and volume of administrative expenditures. In the rural 
communities of up to 1500 inhabitants the average administrative costs per resident are three times 
larger than the average for the communities having more than 5000 inhabitants. At the same time, the 
quality and quantity of the single most important public service provided by the local public 
administration (education) is not directly dependent on the local public administration but rather on the 
central government.  
Another weakness of the current administrative-territorial organization (which is linked to the previous 
one) is represented by the low incentives for good human resources to enter the local public service. In 
small municipalities it is very difficult to find and hire well-trained specialists. Salaries paid are very 
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small, and working conditions are poor. The financial means saved in result of the reorganization of the 
system would allow increasing the attractiveness of this sector for the good specialists. 
A ‘sparser’ public administration will also allow for the development of the private sector, because many 
services will have to be outsourced. For instance, provision of the food to the schools can be easily 
outsourced to specialized catering companies serving bigger municipalities. 
At the same time, the administrative-territorial organization should not result in a weakened local 
democracy. Even the smallest and remotest localities of the bigger municipalities should be adequately 
represented at the municipal level, while the increased efficiency and quality of the public services 
provided should compensate the eventual losses in democratic representation.  
ONE-TIER MODEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION  
BA SIC  E LE ME NTS  
One should assume that the existence of a local government tier is determined by the fact whether it is 
strengthened by electoral legitimacy, i.e. it has an elected council and an executive body. Other tiers 
that may exist, as we saw in Georgia’s case, for example, are rather territorial extensions of the central 
government with oversight functions and centrally appointed officials.  
A one-tier system of local government is quite hard to achieve. It seems to suit better to small countries 
where municipalities are connected to a large urban growth pole, usually the capital city, which 
overshadows the need for an additional planning layer at regional level. As shown in the comparative 
chapter, this is the case of the three Baltic States, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Luxemburg, Malta and Slovenia. 
Understandably larger territories need additional tiers for a better coordination. The main feature of a 
single-tier system is that municipalities are entrusted a significant amount of public services. For that 
reason they have to be large enough to produce scale economies and capacity to efficiently manage the 
decentralized services. 
DE SC RI PTI ON OF  THE MO DE L  
The process of elaborating the new administrative-territorial division with a single tier followed a three-
step approach: 
• At the first step threshold criteria were developed: 
o Residential settlement of the municipality (town or village) to have more than 1500 
inhabitants; 
o Maximal travel distance from any locality to the residential settlement to be around 20 
km; 
o Own incomes per capita of the eventual residential village to be more than the country’s 
average; 
o Using population dynamics for the past 20 years as a proxy for choosing the residential 
settlement of best perspective; 
o This step ends by appointing possible residential settlements;  
o Settlement with different dominant nations should not be unified in one municipality
68
; 
• At the second step the boundaries were traced taking in consideration: 
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o Natural obstacles (relief, rivers, etc.); 
o Spatial coherence of the proposed units  
 more or less central position of the residential village/town within the unit; 
 good road connectivity of the settlements within the unit with residential 
village/town; 
o Economic power of the possible residential villages represented through Index of 
economic deprivation (extracted from the IDAM database of the Ministry of Economy); 
o Units coordinated by a developed town (so called “urban municipalities”) were made 
larger than those coordinated by villages (“rural municipalities”). The reason is that a 
town is much more powerful in the organization of space and has enough capacity to 
administrate a larger unit with bigger population. At the same time, these larger units 
have better human potential and can serve as development poles and centers. 
• On the third step we tested, adjusted and provided justification for the new schema of 
administrative-territorial division. 
Tracing the boundaries was made bottom-up by aggregating present administrative-territorial units of 
the first level. The fact that the newly proposed boundaries coincide with current raions is explained by 
strong influence of the natural conditions (by vertical fragmentation of relief, by watersheds and rivers) 
as well as by inertia of the settlement system that follows the paths traced by Soviet administrative-
territorial structure. 
In result of applying these criteria, the number of municipalities under the one tier model equaled 113 units, including 
units, including Transnistria and Bender municipality as two separate entities. The resulting one-tier model of the 
model of the administrative-territorial division of the Republic of Moldova is represented in the Map 11. The relative majority of 
the new municipalities (47%) will have 10-20 thousand inhabitants, while those of 20-30 thousand will represent 21% (Figure 
21). Because of the geographic conditions, an important part of the municipal settlements will have less than 5 thousand people 
with most of municipalities being composed of 15 to 20 settlements (Map 12). Some of the new municipalities will cut the 
borders of the today’s development regions, and would result in adjustments to the Law on Regional Development. The 
proposed model tried to consider the ethnic composition of the population so that the resulting municipalities are as 
homogeneous as possible ( 
Map 13). 
F IGURE 21. D ISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPALITIES BY DEMOGRAPHIC SIZE,  THOUSAND PERSONS  
 
Source: authors calculations; 
84 | P a g e  
MAP 11.  PROPOSED ONE-TIER MODEL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF  THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA  
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
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MAP 12.  D ISTRIBUTION OF SETTLEMENTS BY MUNICIPALITIES UNDER THE PROPOSED ONE-TIER MODEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE-
TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION  
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
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MAP 13.  AREAS OF POTENTIAL ETHNIC TENSIONS IN RESULT OF ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION UNDER THE 
PROPOSED ONE-TIER MODEL 
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps;  
PROPO SE D FUNC TI ONA L DE SIGN  
In broad terms, for Moldova a single-tier system would mean a radical decrease in number of 
municipalities. Basically there will be two types of municipalities: (i) rural – with several villages 
surrounding a larger rural settlement, and, (ii) townships – with rural settlements amalgamated in a 
municipality around a town. They would have elected councils and mayors but electoral system will 
have to be changed so that every settlement within a municipality is represented in the local council. 
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Also, mayoralties’ staff should be organized so that there is a permanent link between residents of 
settlements and local public authorities and services are brought as close as possible to citizens. 
Generally, the new system should allow that inhabitants do not have to move to the settlement-
residence of the mayoralty/town hall more often than they are moving now: according to the results of 
the sociological survey, about 45% of the population visited in the last 12 months the primaria, with an 
average number of visits of 3.3 times. In the ideal case, they actually should be moving less, to maintain 
the total private costs of interactions with public administration largely unchanged.  
There would be a standard set of functions that applies to all local governments (type I, see the list 
below) and another list of functions that implies provision of services that require larger catchment 
areas, which would be assigned to larger towns only (type II). This does not necessarily mean raions 
would disappear. They would continue to exist, in a smaller number, as districts for centrally 
deconcentrated services. This choice allows for the constitutional provisions to be observed. 
Own functions for all local governments – type I 
• Urban planning and local green spaces management 
• Building and maintenance of kindergartens, elementary and vocational schools 
• Social protection 
• Water supply/sewage 
• Waste collection/management 
• Local public transport 
• Streets, local roads 
• Streets lighting 
• Development of local heating and gas supply networks 
• Agricultural market and commercial spaces maintenance and management 
• Local cultural, youth, sport, recreational events and infrastructure 
• Cemeteries 
Inter-communal cooperation will be legally encouraged as well as integration and regionalization of 
infrastructure maintenance units – water supply, waste, gas supply, roads and others. 
Own functions for all local governments – type II 
• Regional roads and infrastructure 
• Social assistance and social care institutions 
• General healthcare institutions 
• Upper-secondary education (pre-university education) 
• Emergency services 
These functions will be carried out for a cluster of municipalities around a major town by the local 
government of the townships municipalities. The relationship between the township and the 
surrounding municipalities is of cooperation nature and does not imply subordination.   
PROPO SE D FIN ANCIAL  DESIG N  
Local taxes and fees system 
One tier model could use the existing structure of local taxes. The Tax Code Title VII allows local 
authorities to use each of local tax within approved list at the rate but not more than is indicated. Also, 
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local councils could add tax exemptions to those foreseen in the mentioned Code. The biggest problem 
here is with the list of the taxes that local public authorities cannot influence, even in situations when 
there is certainly a case for a new local tax. Therefore, it would be right for the national legislation to 
accept local public authorities as subjects allowed to come up with legislative initiatives in areas of their 
interest. 
As for the local fees, the local public administration should be entitled to approve fees for the local 
service delivery, their levels based on cost-benefit analysis and conditions for collecting them.  
Other own revenues (private tax, payroll tax), is currently decided by the central government. The 
reform should allow local authorities to influence more these taxes, in special, when it comes to tax 
exemptions which may happen to be unilaterally approved by the government without consulting local 
authorities (a relevant example is introduction of a zero-rate tax on corporate reinvested income in 
January 2008, a decision which has dramatically weakened the local authorities’ tax base). 
Shared revenues 
The list of shared revenues should be updated. Now only income tax and road tax are shared revenues. 
If the government will include in this list VAT or excises, we may expect the lower level of transfers from 
the state level and bigger share of these revenues in local budgets. 
Fiscal equalization 
The decentralization steps implemented during the past years in different countries (and Moldova’s own 
experience) emphasizes the importance of adequate fiscal equalization in administrative reform. Stricter 
sets of budgetary rules tend to discipline national fiscal policies and limit the discretionary role of central 
government while responding to the needs of local governments with financial difficulties. 
The reform should be oriented towards two areas of intergovernmental fiscal relations, vertical 
equalization and horizontal one. 
Vertical equalization 
Equalization is needed for managing vertical imbalances between expenditure and revenues among 
different levels of government. By means of this equalization the first tier local authorities are insured 
with sufficient resources for service delivery which are commensurate with the approved own and 
delegated responsibilities. The overall sum of local revenues should be in line with the functions 
managed locally. More specifically, local governments with different functions (for example, large urban 
municipalities vs. rural municipalities) should have access to different revenues.  
These conditions could be met via revenue equalization. This means that the equalization scheme 
should target the differences in the revenue capacity (base) of different local governments. The 
complicated work here is related to the identification of the revenue type which needs to be 
incorporated into the equalization scheme. There are some requirements that need to be managed 
while establishing such a system:  
• To take as many local revenues as possible into the scheme; this will make the model very 
comprehensive; 
• All these revenues should represent the local own source revenues proportionally, which 
determine the standard or average revenue; 
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• If the local authority is below the standard revenue (national threshold) it should be 
compensated. The problem is at which extend should it be compensated – either the entire 
difference or only a part of it (could be established as a percentage to the average). Otherwise, 
the local authority will be forced to levy taxes at least at the average level in order to 
compensate the difference; 
• The effect will be seen if the local governments will have discretion over the tax rates for own 
revenues. 
International practice shows that VAT is the best candidate for equalization despite the fact that local 
governments have no discretion over the tax rate. In some Balkan countries small business tax, 
simplified profit tax, vehicle tax, property taxes are part of the national threshold. 
Horizontal equalization  
Horizontal imbalance appear when the differences in expenditure needs and revenue-raising capacity 
varies across similar types of local governments. Usually this is a subject of expenditure equalization. 
Here as well several conditions need to be met: 
• The necessity to provide the minimum level of mandatory public services; 
• The necessity to justly identify differences in the functions; and 
• The need to correctly determine the unit cost. 
Indeed, the local governments operate in different conditions such as geographic specific, in the less 
populated area, in more remote communities etc. These specific conditions should be compensated for 
higher spending needs. More resources are needed for additional services or for specific factors which 
are not common to every local public authority. This is particularly important for a country like Moldova, 
where the most local governments are rural establishments and is characterized by big differences in 
the real unit costs. Also specific compensations may be needed for the big cities that provide services for 
the neighboring local authorities. 
At the same time there are other factors which should not be taken into consideration during the design 
of fiscal equalization schemes. Management inefficiency should not be compensated (a relevant 
example is the secondary education in Moldova, with some settlements having the ratio teacher/ child 
close to 1:1). Differences in local service preferences and divergent local service management capacities 
should not be compensated by the equalization transfers. Variations in administration costs could 
influence the amalgamation of smaller mayoralties. It could cause the improvement of service delivery 
at better quality with lower price. The smaller the share of administration costs, the bigger the amount 
left for fulfillment of other functions of local governments, including investment into the communities 
development. 
Consequently, the equalization in a country with many local governments suffering of low economic 
capacities could be done via revenue equalization in combination with expenditure equalization. 
Revenue equalization formula should support the development of local economic development 
(perhaps will include the changes in income tax levies). From another side, the expenditure formula 
should foresee the spending for the delegated functions and new approach to the per capita costs.  
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Access to the capital market 
The leading role in community development stays with investments. The new legal framework should 
allow the local governments to borrow from the bank system under very clear procedures. The current 
provisions should be extended to the lower level of public administration, in special, when it comes to 
issuing of the municipal bonds. 
SWOT  A NALY SI S OF  TH E PRO POSE D O NE -TIE R MO DE L OF  A DMI NI ST RA TIV E-TE RRIT ORIAL  
ORGA NIZ ATI ON  
Advantages of the proposed model Disadvantages of the proposed model 
• A clearer division of competences 
between local and national authorities; 
• Simpler ‘vertical’ decision making will be 
possible to implement at local level, as all 
decisions will be taken by a single 
(municipal) authority, and not by two 
authorities (raions and primaria), which is 
often the case today; 
• The proposed one-tier model has a 
significant positive fiscal impact, as it 
directly reduces 3 times the operational 
costs of the local public administration: 
from MDL 320 million (effective) to MDL 
100 million (simulated) for 2008; 
• Additional direct savings (difficult to 
estimate) will be achieved by 
‘reconversion’ of the current districts into 
districts of deconcentrated services; 
• Indirect savings will be achieved by 
reducing costs of interactions between the 
relevant central level authorities (such as 
Ministry of Finance) and local authorities; 
• Larger municipalities, endowed with 
better human and technical resources, will 
have more capacities in planning and 
driving local development, and attracting 
and managing external funds (coming 
from national and international donors); 
• Larger distances to the municipal center 
will increase (estimate, by 4 times) the 
private costs of interacting with local 
public administration; 
• There will arise more difficult horizontal 
political negotiations within the 
municipality; 
• The new model may weaken local 
democracy, with decreased participation 
in local elections and lower level of 
interest of people on local and regional 
politics; 
• Women will be more affected than men by 
the changes, as women represent a bigger 
share of local public servants; 
• Reduction in number of local public offices 
will result in reduction of jobs in the public 
sector, which may not find immediately 
occupations in the private sector; 
• New model can result in lower quality of 
services in remote/small communities, 
especially in case of labor-intensive 
services (such as police, cadastre); 
• As the proposed model ‘takes primaria 
away’ from the citizens, initially there will 
be social opposition against the new 
administrative-territorial reform, mainly in 
the settlements losing administrative 
status; 
Opportunities Risks 
• Savings accumulated as result of 
implementing the new model (almost MDL 
1 billion for a four year mandate of local 
elected officials), can be used to increase 
the salaries of the local public servants and 
thus to increase the attractiveness of the 
public service; 
• Another opportunity of using the 
accumulated savings is to make grants to 
the communities amalgamating voluntarily 
to be invested in local projects, with 
• Similarly, there can be a corporate 
resistance from local elected officials that 
will lose their positions, with political 
consequences; 
• If no inter-communal cooperation is 
developed, there will less or no benefits 
from scale economies, externalities and 
redistributed revenues; 
• If no changes are made to the Electoral 
Code, the proposed one-tier model can 
result in political underrepresentation of 
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priority being given to the projects 
improving intra-municipal connectivity 
(local roads, buses, telecommunications, 
Internet); 
• Larger budgets will increase municipalities 
borrowing power as well as their capacity 
to provide co-funding for large 
community-based infrastructure 
development projects; 
• The model will strongly facilitate 
developing of the spirit of independency 
among local authorities and civil society; 
the small and remote communities in the 
municipal bodies; 
• Increased distances and weaker sense of 
affinity can result in lower level of public 
responsibility of the mayors and 
councilors; 
• Successfulness of the model is highly 
sensitive to the level of development of 
the e-government (the share of services 
provided remotely); 
• Unclear differentiation between the 
functions of type I and type II, without 
appropriate financing, can highly increase 
the inequalities in the level of 
development of the newly created units; 
• Poor quality of road infrastructure and 
inappropriate organization of public 
transportation can lead to the failure of 
the reform; 
TWO-TIER MODEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION  
BA SIC  E LE ME NTS  
The second tier of any administrative-territorial system performs functions that require a larger 
catchment area (e.g. healthcare, regional roads and infrastructure), i.e. those services that are 
characterized by economies of scale and externalities,
69
 while municipalities have responsibilities of a 
local nature. The most of EU Member States have opted for a two or a multi-tier system.  
The often mentioned advantage of two-tier systems is that they may help to achieve a better balance 
between economies of scale and externalities on the one hand, and redistribution of income and 
accountability, on the other hand.
70
 The disadvantages are that in a single tier system there is only one 
political body to make taxing and spending decisions. Thus there would be less accountability in a two-
tier system and it would slow down the decision-making process which brings delays in implementing 
development projects. Another criticism which is often mentioned comes from duplication of functions 
among different tiers of local government. 
Besides larger countries, which in most cases apply a multi-tier system for a better coordination, this 
system is suitable for a situation where municipalities are quite weak to immediately undertake a 
significant burden of responsibilities and their territorial consolidation is not a feasible solution for the 
moment. Again, as in the single-tier model, the catchment areas for the deconcentrated services of the 
central government may or may not be the same as the second level administrative-territorial units. 
DE SC RI PTI ON OF  THE T WO-TIE R M ODE L  
Criteria used for establishing new boundaries of the administrative-territorial units of the first level for 
the two-tier model were the following: 
• Demographic criteria 
o Minimal size of the municipality – 5000 inhabitants 
                                                           
69 When residents of a jurisdiction benefit from a service of a different jurisdiction. 
70 This is possible if the upper-level is entitled to levy taxes from municipalities; see Slack, 2003. 
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o Maximal size of the municipality created by amalgamation – 10 000 inhabitants; 
o Minimal size of the municipality’s residence settlement – 1500 inhabitants; 
• Distance threshold 
o Maximal distance between residence settlement and the most distant village in the 
given municipality should not exceed 10 km; 
• Ethnic criterion  
o Settlement with different dominant nations should not be unified in one municipality71; 
The resulting division of the country under the two-tier model is presented in the Map 14. A detailed 
correspondence between the current administrative-territorial units of the first level and the newly 
created under the proposed model is provided in Annex 2.  
For ethnic, geographic and connectivity reasons it was not possible to apply uniformly the demographic 
criteria, but the share of exceptions was minimized to 11% of the total municipalities. Also, the ethnic 
criteria were applied only to those cases that are expressly stipulated in the Constitution. They were not 
applied in those other cases where demographic and economic efficiency criteria did not allow for, such 
as in case of some areas in the Northern region, where Ukrainian and Moldovan villages are compactly 
intertwined. In any case, we expect that the final division – if this model is accepted – will be an 
outcome of the political negotiations between the central government and local stakeholders. The Map 
15 spots potential areas of tensions between representatives of different ethnic groups. 
As for the second tier, no specific criteria have been considered, but the existing Development Regions 
are proposed to become administrative regions. (At the same time, small revisions of the administrative 
borders of the regions will be necessary in order to reflect the changes occurred as result of 
amalgamating localities belonging to different development regions in a single new municipality). 
                                                           
71
 This criterion was taken in consideration just in the southern part of the country in order to keep administrative boundaries 
of UTA Gagauzia untouched; in other parts of the country we suppose negotiations on the case-to-case base. Possible cases of 
this kind are shown on the ‘ethnic tension’ maps. 
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MAP 14.  PROPOSED TWO-TIER MODEL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
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MAP 15.  AREAS OF POTENTIAL ETHNIC TENSIONS IN RESULT OF ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION UNDER THE 
PROPOSED TWO-TIERS MODEL 
 
Source: see ‘Sources of information for maps’ section; 
In result of modeling this administrative-territorial division (not covering Transnistrian and Bender 
municipality), 289 municipalities emerged with the average size of a municipality of 11850 residents 
(Table 20). The average size of the rural municipality is about 7300 residents. As shown in Table 21, most 
of the municipalities would fall in the category of 6-8 thousand residents. 
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TABLE 20. AVERAGE SIZE OF THE MUNICIPALITIES UNDER THE TWO-TIER MODEL 
Average population per municipality residents 
total population (Balti and Chisinau included) 11849 
total population (Balti and Chisinau excluded) 9281 
rural population 7298 
Source: authors’ calculations; 
TABLE 21. AVERAGES POPULATION BY GROUPS OF MUNICIPALITIES UNDER THE TWO-TIER MODEL 
Population groups, 
thou. pers. 
number of 
municipalities 
average total population, pers. average rural population, pers. 
< 4 12 3437 3451 
4 - 5 21 4565 4493 
5 - 6 47 5533 5533 
6 - 8 74 6852 6834 
8 - 10 44 8785 8584 
10 - 12 45 10781 9949 
12 - 20 28 15303 8300 
20 - 50 16 28712 8619 
> 100 2 380314 8158 
Source: authors’ calculations; 
TABLE 22. D ISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPALITIES BY NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE TWO-TIER MODEL 
number of settlements per municipality number of municipalities 
1 21 
2-3 77 
4-5 73 
6-7 60 
8-9 27 
10-14 27 
15 and more 4 
total 289 
Source: authors’ calculations; 
TABLE 23. D ISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPALITIES BY AREA UNDER THE TWO-TIER MODEL 
area, sq km number of municipalities average total population, pers. average rural population, pers. 
< 50 22 7516 6060 
50 - 70 48 6863 5473 
70 - 90 57 6962 6172 
90 - 110 48 8503 7030 
110 - 130 39 24791 7500 
130 - 150 26 16151 9273 
150 - 200 37 13265 9732 
> 200 12 20590 10357 
Source: authors’ calculations; 
On average, each new municipality would incorporate 5.4 existing municipalities (see more details in 
Table 22). The average territorial size of the new municipalities will be around 104 sq.km., with only 22 
municipalities spanning areas smaller than 50 sq.km (Table 23).   
PROPO SE D FUNC TI ONA L DE SIGN  
On the institutional design, both levels of local governance would need to have elected local and 
respectively regional councils as well as executive bodies. It is highly recommended that the electoral 
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system is designed in such a way that ensures representation of all municipalities in the regional council 
and of all settlements in the local council.  
The key decision to make with respect to this model of local governance is to efficiently allocate 
responsibilities among the two tiers. It is proposed that the main rule for distribution of functions should 
be as follows. If a function involves income redistribution, externalities and economies of scale, it should 
be assigned to the upper tier. If it provides local benefits only – the lower tier should be responsible.
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According to this principle, the following allocation of own responsibilities and subsequently of 
expenditure is proposed: 
Municipality level 
• Urban planning and local green spaces management 
• Building and maintenance of kindergartens, primary and lower-secondary schools (gymnasiums) 
• Primary social protection services 
• Local public transport 
• Streets, local roads, bridges, sidewalks 
• Streets lighting 
• Development of local heating and gas supply networks 
• Agricultural market and commercial spaces maintenance and management 
• Local cultural, youth, sport, recreational events and infrastructure 
• Cemeteries 
Regional level 
• Regional roads and infrastructure 
• Regional public transport 
• Upper-secondary education (lyceums, vocational schools, colleges) 
• Emergency services 
• Water supply/sewage 
• Waste collection/disposal 
• Regional land use planning 
• Regional tourism 
• Regional economic development 
The two-tier model as proposed above suits better to Moldova’s current stage of local governments 
development. As in a short term it will be difficult to achieve large enough municipalities, there is a need 
for the second tier. As mentioned above, it is proposed that the development regions as designed by the 
Law on regional development from December 2006 (Center, North, South, Chisinau, ATU Gagauzia and 
Transnistria) are assigned the responsibilities of the second level. Thus, duplication of planning and 
development efforts as well as waste of additional resources will be avoided. The three regions – 
Center, North and South may be labeled raions, so that the constitutional provisions are observed. On 
the decision of the central government, the districts for deconcentrated services provision could be 
enlarged and even reach the size of the six development regions. 
                                                           
72
 Slack, 2003. 
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PROPO SE D FIN ANCIAL  DESIG N  
The two tier model foresees sharing the responsibilities between both of local public administration 
levels. In this model is very important to delegate functions which need to be covered with financial 
support from one level to another level. Also, it is highly important to establish a clear list of budgetary 
revenues and expenditures generated/spent at each level of local public administration. 
Local taxes and fees system 
Two-tier model could use the existing structure of the local taxes. The problem here is that the second 
level of local public administration does not generate revenues. This situation usually is solved via 
equalization mechanisms between level one and level two (see below) and level two and central 
government.  
Regarding the local fees – the legislation should foresee in what budget level each fee is paid. The law 
should allow both levels to approve fees for the local service delivery.  
Other own revenues tax base (private tax, payroll tax) should remain only with the first level. The law 
should allow local authorities to influence more these taxes, in special tax exemptions.  
Shared revenues 
The list of shared revenues should be updated. Now only income tax and road tax are shared revenues. 
These taxes should be shared between first and second level of local public administration. The VAT or 
excises should be shared between second level of local public administrations and central government. 
In this case all own revenues generated at the first level remains there. 
Fiscal equalization 
The services deconcentrated from the central level should be financed from funds received via 
equalization. The central level government should foresee earmarked ‘gap-filling’ transfers if shared 
revenues are not sufficient. These transfers are only for the second level of local public administration. 
The expenditures will be calculated based on individual decision for each of appropriation line. The 
revenue, from another side, will be forecasted separately, based on current legal framework. As a result 
formula will be almost the same that is in place now: 
Transfer = Expenses – Revenues 
For the first level of local public administration the equalization will have a separate financial design. The 
calculations need to be done in the same manner as for the one tier model – general grant and revenue 
equalization. 
The general grants should provide for: 
• Local decisions on expenditures levels. All expenditures should be accepted, so that Revenues + 
Grants = Expenditures 
• Autonomy for LPA to generate and withhold revenues 
This type of grants provide bigger autonomy in local budget expenditure planning and create incentives 
for local own revenue rising. Under this model grants are allocated from the central level via service-
related indicators and there are no limitations on local spending. 
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Indicators used for general grants calculations should include: number of population, age groups, 
beneficiaries or users of the local services, etc. 
Access to the capital market 
The provisions from the Law on local public finance
73
 allow both local public administration levels to 
borrow funds from the upper budget level and private bank sector and issue securities. The problem is 
with assurance the revenue side of the budget. They have not sufficient funds for guaranteeing its 
obligations. If the new legal framework allows local authorities to increase their revenues base, the 
problems with access to the capital market will be less severe or disappear. 
SWOT  A NALY SI S OF  TH E PRO POSE D T WO-TIE R MO DE L OF A DMINI STRA TIV E-TE RRITO RIAL  
ORGA NIZ ATI ON  
Advantages  Disadvantages  
• The proposed model of municipal 
amalgamation will result in savings of 
about 50% in operational costs at first 
level of local public administration: from 
MDL 320 million (effective) to 170 million 
(simulated for 2008); 
• Replacement of the current system of 
raions with the Development Regions 
(proposed to be named raions for the 
constitutional provisions to be observed) 
with administrative competences will 
result in a reduction of operational costs 
at second level of about 5-6 times: from 
MDL 83 million (effective) to MDL 17 
million (simulated for 2008); 
• The proposed two-tier system is more 
adequate than the one-tier model to 
achieve a better balance between 
economies of scale and externalities on 
the one hand, and redistribution of 
income and accountability, on the other 
hand; 
• The two-tiers model is more suitable to 
provide the necessary coordination of the 
regional development as Moldova 
municipalities are administratively and 
financially weak to undertake more 
responsibilities; 
• The increased financial capacity at regional 
and local level will attract better human 
resources and graduate students of 
regional universities may chose to remain 
in the region; 
• Three times increasing the size of 
• The system will be more cumbersome and 
thus slowing decision-making and 
implementation; 
• The level of public responsibility of the 
elected and executive bodies at regional 
level will be lower than in case of raions; 
• The local authorities will be more 
dependent on state subsidies and will be 
less successful at attracting and 
administrating external funds; 
• The local authorities will not have enough 
capacity to negotiate with regional 
economic actors; 
                                                           
73
 Art. 13-17, Law on local public finance nr.397-XV dated October 16, 2003 with all approved changes, published in Official 
Monitor nr.248-253/996 dated December 19, 2003. 
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municipalities at the first tier represent a 
balance between economic efficiency and 
proximity of local authorities to the 
people. This model is also close to the 
optimal values of our econometric 
analysis; 
Opportunities Risks 
• A milder reduction in number of primarias 
(three-fold) than in case of the one-tier 
model and smaller distances between the 
municipality residential settlements and 
other settlements will engender less social 
and political resistance; 
• Bigger second-tier administrative-
territorial units will make Moldova eligible 
for participation in a number of European 
Union regional programs and will make 
the Moldovan regions to be same-level 
partners for cross-border initiatives with 
Romania and Ukraine; 
• The possibilities to benefit from scale 
economies generated as a result of 
regionalization of public services that were 
previously carried out at small municipality 
or rayon scale will encourage private 
investments in public services and will 
develop public-private partnerships 
• Dividing the country’s territory in few 
administrative-territorial entities at the 
second tier will allow creating of the poles 
of development counter-balancing the 
capital city. In such a way, the model will 
contribute to diminishing the 
discrepancies between the capital and the 
rest of the country; 
• It will be difficult to avoid the duplication 
of functions among the three-tiers of 
governance (national, regional, local); 
• If no clear criteria is provided, 
redistribution of revenues among 
municipalities of the bigger raion may 
become a highly politicized exercise; If too 
much power is concentrated at the upper 
tier of local governance, one may 
encounter a tendency for recentralization 
at the regional level and a decrease in 
local autonomy at the municipality level; 
• If the territorial reform is not accompanied 
by a functional decentralization of state 
functions to the first level, the social 
pressure will increase as the new system 
will generate more private costs for 
travelling to the regional centre; 
• Resistance of the local elites against 
amalgamation in certain cases can be 
more successful due to quite small 
difference between old and new units; 
• Less radical changes in administrative-
territorial division can result in 
inappropriate redistribution of functions; 
• Due to relatively small size of the 
municipalities at the 1
st
 tier the idea of 
creating self-sufficient local communities is 
highly threatened that can lead to 
dissatisfaction in the reform; 
 
INTER-MUNICIPAL (INTER-COMMUNAL)  COOPERATION  
BA SIC  E LE ME NTS  
Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) means association of two and more municipalities for a shared 
provision of public services. It is an alternative remedy to territorial fragmentation in countries where 
there is a strong resistance to municipal amalgamation reforms. The need for such an initiative could 
arise from the financial constrains and limited capacity of small municipalities to efficiently provide 
public services that employ scale economies or generate externalities (education, health, water supply, 
waste management, culture, emergency services, public order, environmental protection, tourism and 
many others). The advantage of the IMC is that it allows for local autonomy to be preserved, especially 
in relation to expenditure and taxation. The most fragmented administrative-territorial systems in 
Europe featured in the first chapter (Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Slovak Republic) felt the pressure 
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to try various models of IMC. In a way, IMC is a hidden and incomplete form of amalgamation. It could 
be only perceived as a particular model of local governance in territorially fragmented countries where 
amalgamation reforms for the time being seem unimaginable. 
POTE NTIAL  F ORM S OF I NTE R-M UNIC IP AL  C OOP E RATI ON  
The fact that IMC is often perceived as a solution to territorial fragmentation does not necessarily mean 
it occurs between small municipalities only. Quite often large municipalities may also have significant 
benefits from such cooperation. Amalgamation and inter-municipal cooperation are not mutually 
exclusive. For Moldova, in either of the two possible situations: implementation of one of the 
abovementioned models (a single or a two-tier system of local governance) or preservation of the status 
quo, ICM should be strongly encouraged. It may prove to be a difficult task though. Although 
recommended and promoted by donors, voluntary IMC has never been a widespread phenomena. In 
particular, the post-soviet space does not feature highly successful examples of IMC. Among other 
factors, an indispensable precondition for IMC is mutual trust among the involved municipalities, which 
seem to be a problem for the most of Central and Eastern European countries.
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Incentives for IMC could be either voluntary and stimulated or bottom-up and top-down. As Moldova 
does not have established traditions of IMC, leaving the incentive for cooperation at the total discretion 
of municipalities may not be a wise decision. For example, traditionally it is considered and legally 
allowed that every municipality should have its own municipal enterprise on water supply. Evidently, 
this does not allow benefiting from scale economies if within a very close distance there are several 
municipalities with their own water supply enterprises, everyone having their own management units 
and staff and being financially insolvable.  
Definitely, there should be an IMC-friendly legislative framework that stimulates establishment of inter-
municipal unions. However, it should be noted that although clear rules and guidelines may help avoid 
conflicts and encourage successful models based on best practices, overregulation and restrictive legal 
framework could be harmful to freedom of municipalities to enter common service provision 
agreements. It is therefore recommended that any legal provision that may presumably be essential for 
the success of IMC is preventively tested by means of pilot projects. 
The multitude of IMC forms could be divided into two large groups that capture the essence of this 
cooperation:  
• Service agreements – where a municipality provides public services for a larger catchment area 
including geographically adjacent municipalities (this model is described in the one-tier model 
section). For example, a municipality can extend its waste management service to the 
neighboring local government in exchange of a per user fee;  
• Joint enterprise – where several municipalities form an enterprise – legal person – to provide a 
certain type of services for its founders. Normally, every founding municipality should have a 
share in the enterprise. 
Within these groups the IMCs can be single or multi-purpose and may be a onetime project-based 
initiative or a long-term agreement between geographically adjacent municipalities. Other forms of IMC 
are mostly informal and may be created, for example, for experience and best practices exchange of 
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information. In some cases, were legislation is restrictive, it may be judicious to create an NGO that 
would provide a specific service (a social care house, for example) for several local governments. 
POTE NTIAL  DIVI SI O N O F A DMI NI STRATI VE  C O MPE TE NCIE S   
As pointed out by researchers, the interest of local politicians on involving in IMC initiatives often 
depends on the level of decentralization.
75
 In other words, whenever the local governance system is 
centralized, even small municipalities may not have convincing reasons for initiating cooperation with 
neighboring communities, simply because the amount of functions assigned to local governments does 
not allow this. Whether a decentralization reform is implemented, and the local autonomy increases, 
local governments may start feeling the pressure of the need for larger capital investments in services 
infrastructure, which have previously been carried on by upper levels of local government or even by 
the central government. This pressure determines local governments to seek for a better return of 
investments and thus to look for alternative ways of a better use of limited budgetary resources, being 
that inter-municipal cost and equipment sharing (e.g. school buses, waste management vehicles, water 
pipelines etc.) or benefiting from collaborative scale economies. Services that typically feature 
significant scale economies are listed under the functions to be performed by the upper level of local 
governance in the two-tier model described above. 
As the Moldovan local governments perform mostly representative functions, the models of IMC that 
are based on shared administrative services should be closely examined. These models allow constituent 
municipalities to retain their identity and local autonomy, while merging administrative staff and 
resources for providing services for a larger area (for example, administrative-paper issuance services, 
notary, public procurements, accounting, HR management, licensing and authorizations issuance etc.). 
Such collaborative initiatives would have joint boards or inter-municipal councils and common steering 
committees. Understandably, competencies of these cooperation mechanisms may not exceed the 
functions assigned to the founding local government, except for the cases expressly provided by law. 
There are three important aspects to consider when determining the functional design of IMC. First, the 
multiple IMC models are not mutually exclusive.
76
 Local governments should not be limited in choosing 
from this multitude, thus allowing for early identification of the best organizational frameworks suitable 
for Moldovan municipalities. Secondly, local governments should be flexible in choosing their partners 
and the number of IMC initiatives they can participate in. Participation of a local government in an IMC 
should be based on its real needs. For example, the same local government can have a services 
agreement with the neighboring town on water supply, can participate in a joint enterprise on waste 
collection and disposal with other eight municipalities and can be part of a common tourism project 
limited two three (not necessarily neighboring) communities. Thirdly, possible shortcomings of IMC 
models such as duplication of functions and limited accountability should be addressed so that 
collaborative initiatives do not make things worse by putting more pressure on weak local governments 
and increasing corruption. 
FI NA NC I AL ASPE C TS  OF  I NTE R-MU NIC IPAL C O OPE RA TI O N  
From the financial management point of view the process of inter-municipal associations should be 
based on following pillars: 
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Type of partnership 
The association could be created: (a) at one administrative level; and (b) between two different 
administrative levels (ex. mayor office of the Ungheni town with raion council Ungheni). The 
international experience shows
77
 that the central government is more willing to allocate financial 
resources directly to the associations when its members are different types of partners (from different 
levels of government).  
If in the country exists only one tier of public administration, than the association could be created 
between private and public cooperation. In this case some of the functions are transferred to the 
association. As example in waste management: association is responsible for recycling, composting and 
treatment of waste and municipality is responsible for waste collection and charge for it. 
Function coverage by the association  
Associations could be all-purpose, multi-purpose or single-purpose. Each type has its advantages and 
disadvantages. Each of these has different geographical fits. The type of association will depend on 
which service makes sense from an economic point of view to be developed in association. It should 
take into consideration relevant socio-demographic features and monitoring capacity of the association. 
Therefore, whatever type is chosen, consistency should be ensured between the purposes of the 
association and the territory that the public service is to cover. 
Manageability and control 
Usually cost-efficiency is a driver to set up multi-purpose organizations or to integrate new services into 
existing organizations. The other researches
78
 propose during such reform to take into consideration 
that once these organizations are in full operation, issues of manageability and control arise. In the first 
place, the more services are integrated into one organization, the more difficult it is to manage the 
organization as a whole, to coordinate and create synergy between the different services and to manage 
the separate services adroitly. In the second place, big multi-purpose organizations sometimes prove to 
be a threat to the very municipalities that established them. As a conclusion the process should be very 
well described in the legal framework and accountability of each of involved parties. 
Accountability 
The question of financing is important not only in baking the capacity for service delivery but also in 
showing co-responsibilities among members of association. A special role here will have an audit 
process. The audit will be oriented towards legal and financial accountability: info about the 
performance of local services delivered under inter-municipal cooperation, the services outputs.  
Legal framework regarding to resource regulation 
Legal framework for this type of activity which involves local public authority should be regulated by 
laws which regulate local public administration as well local public finance. The law on local public 
decentralization should expressly allow local public authorities to associate and from another side the 
law on local public finance should foresee the funds flow for such type of activity.  
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Funds flow could be ensured by: 
• Contributions from the participating parties budgets via direct grants; 
• Grants from the upper budget level; 
• Fee for service delivery, and 
• International grants (in special EU). 
A special law on the IMC may prove to be necessary to be developed, to allow the associations to 
establish fees for delivered services. If municipal association is chosen as an option for service delivery, 
financial incentives seem to work far better than compulsory legislation without financial compensation 
or incentives. 
Finally, while drafting the statutes or the legal founding document of the association, apart from 
defining the scope of the association, parties should also clearly identify functions and responsibilities of 
partners, determine performance expectations, circulate trustworthy information among partners, and 
establish managerial structures and accountability lines – including mechanisms for joint evaluation of 
results. They should also design an adequately manage reporting procedures to partners, donors and 
citizens. 
SWOT  A NALY SI S OF  TH E I NTE R-M UNIC IPAL C O OPE RA TI O N M ODE L  
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Being seen as a (temporary) alternative to 
the municipal amalgamation, the IMC has 
the important advantage of not giving rise 
to any political or social resistance; 
• IMC preserves local autonomy and does 
not directly affect the quality of local 
democracy; 
• When started, the IMC reinforces mutual 
trust among the municipalities involved 
and thus can contribute to preparing local 
political elites and civil societies for 
potential amalgamation; 
• IMC is possible under different types of 
agreements and for different types of 
projects; 
• Lack of trust among communities may 
serve as a significant hurdle against 
promoting IMC; 
• Difficult process of decision-making within 
any IMC arrangement for protection of 
local interest is another significant 
disadvantage; 
• Legitimacy of the new informal units and 
civil control on them can turn to be very 
weak; 
• Implementing this model will require 
allocation of significant resources for 
training and exchange of experience of the 
local public authorities; 
• IMC does not solve the greatest problem 
of the current administrative-territorial 
structure – excessive fragmentation that is 
confirmed by other countries’ experience; 
Opportunities  Risks 
• This model can be actually part of any of 
the other two models of administrative-
territorial organizations proposed above 
(either one- or two-tiers), but can also be 
implemented on its own; 
• If the legal framework is IMC friendly and a 
capacity building exercise is performed, 
many local communities can try the 
various multitude of IMC types and within 
a short time those models that are 
• IMC is a very complex model of local public 
service provision, with very few success 
stories being registered so far in the post-
soviet area; 
• Promoting IMC will require significant 
communication and promotion efforts 
from the  central government, with no 
guarantees that IMC will turn into a 
sustainable pattern; 
• In time, IMC initiatives may become less 
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suitable for Moldova can be identified. 
Then the best practices can be applied for 
other municipalities; 
• The model will create the spirit of 
voluntary cooperation between the 
communities and will facilitate networking 
in solving their problems, which are highly 
sought in EU practices; 
accountable to the founding local 
governments and especially to citizens and 
thus favor corruption; 
• This model requires changing current 
legislation in the way new to the public 
authorities that increases the risks of its 
successfulness; 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
In the last half century, the general trend in Europe was to reduce the number of local public 
administrations by amalgamating the settlements in larger municipal units. Most often, this 
amalgamation was not a one-off event but rather a process extended in time. However, in many 
countries the amalgamation of municipalities in larger units was done relatively fast, with  governments 
seeking to increase the efficiency in public services delivery and optimizing the administrative costs of 
the system. Currently, the average size of the municipalities varies greatly in EU, ranging from 1510 
inhabitants in Cyprus to over 150 thousand in UK, with an average size of an EU municipality of 5,530 
inhabitants as of 2009.  
Growing regional units are another feature of the European countries. They are necessary to effectively 
provide the public services which generate scale economies and externalities and to comply with the EU 
requirements regarding the demographic size for the regions to benefit of some European structural 
funds. 
In the EU-27 there are three basic models of organizing the sub-national government: the one-tier 
model which is common especially among the geographically small European countries (Cyprus, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, Slovenia, but also Bulgaria and Finland); the two-tier model is 
numerically predominant in the EU27 and is common for the mid-sized countries (Austria, Czech Rep., 
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden); as for the three 
tiers model, it is common especially among geographically large or culturally/ethnically divided 
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom). In order to study the 
experience related to administrative-territorial organization five relevant case studies have been 
selected: Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia and Macedonia. 
The experience of the five countries in the implementation and impact of administrative-territorial 
reforms varies greatly. In Czech Republic the sub-national government is organized in two tiers. Contrary 
to the prevailing trend in Europe, after the country became independent, a spontaneous process of 
territorial fragmentation took place, raising the number of municipalities by more than 50% in less than 
five years. This has been accompanied by a thriving process of inter-municipal cooperation. The largest 
portion of municipalities' revenues in Czech Republic comes from the allotted share of national taxes 
and local authorities have little discretion in influencing local tax revenues. From one hand the system is 
very centralized, from another it allows a great local autonomy in spending money. Another positive 
feature is the important competences that local authorities have in managing local property. As a result, 
there is big number of development projects, such as technology parks, initiated by sub-national 
government. The projects often involve co-operation and close ties between the local authority, the 
business community and local institutions, such as universities. 
Estonian local public administration is based on a one-tier model to which it switched in 1993 and the 
existing 15 counties are not a tier of the local public administration but rather a lower level of the 
central government. While Estonia effectively dissolved the intermediary level of the local public 
administration and empowered municipalities with higher competences, their number has not 
decreased too much in the recent two decades. As many local governments are quite strong, and 
population density is quite low, this makes it difficult to provide convincing arguments of scale 
economies that would encourage existing municipalities to amalgamate. Also, inter-municipal 
cooperation has not become a large scale phenomenon in Estonia. One the reasons for this scarce inter-
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municipal cooperation is related to the legal obstacles for local governments to become shareholders in 
joint commercial legal persons. However, in other terms of the local public finance, the municipalities in 
Estonia have large autonomy, for instance they are allowed to establish local taxes within legal 
framework and to borrow. Another interesting feature is that sales tax (similarly to the VAT) is 
considered as local tax. The equalization is made based on income rather than on expenses. 
Georgia is a typical example where geography and geopolitics create significant constraints affecting 
administrative-territorial division of the country. Due to internal conflicts, Georgia maintained a highly 
centralized multi-tier system of local government in order to prevent the country’s further 
disintegration. Before the 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’, Georgia featured a four-tier system of local 
governance, including the autonomous republics. The first large scale territorial reform started in 2005 
when the Parliament passed a new Local Government Law. On the lower level it authorized 
amalgamation of the 1033 municipalities into 64 larger local governments (agglomerations of rural and 
urban settlements) mainly based on former raions. On average, municipalities in Georgia host about 
44,000 inhabitants, but rough terrain and poor infrastructure makes it very difficult to efficiently and 
qualitatively delivering public services. This problem is only compounded by the relatively low level of 
decentralization and autonomy for the local authorities. The Georgian financial system of local public 
administration is very centralized. Transfers depend a lot on political decisions. All shared taxes first go 
to the raion level and are then distributed to budgets according to the normative acts approved by the 
raion council, which also involves a lot of political bargaining. The vast majority of small local self-
government units had no own revenues, and their only source of income was subsidies from the 
districts’ budgets. The local share in the personal income tax is minimal, since it is paid to the respective 
local government according to the location of the job and not by residence. This regulation favors large 
cities with many commuters from surrounding municipalities. A low level of revenues from own sources 
is also related to the numerous tax exemptions granted by the central government. 
Latvia is blessed with flat terrain and a high level of urbanization which makes it possible for two thirds 
of the municipalities to be organized around towns. In 2009 Latvia moved from a two-tier to one-tier 
system of local public administration. The 26 district governments were abolished as they did not play 
any relevant role in the country’s development. The number of the municipalities decreased drastically, 
from 525 to 118, with about 70% of them having more than 5,000 inhabitants. A number of relevant 
criteria have been considered to conduct this amalgamation, such as: existence of a long-term and 
balanced strategy of development, existence of the infrastructure required for the performance of the 
tasks of a local government, the number of permanent residents on the given territory, maintaining the 
accessibility of the services provided by the local government. In broad terms, Latvian local governments 
have a wide scope of functions. Local authorities may also voluntarily carry out their initiatives with 
respect to any matter if it is not within the exclusive competence of another public authority.  
Macedonia is an interesting case of a country going firstly through territorial fragmentation and then 
through territorial amalgamation: the number of local governments increased from 30 to 123 in 1995, 
but was reduced to 84 after the new administrative-territorial division in 2005. One reason for this was 
that small local governments did not have enough capacities to cope with the new functions  as part of 
the decentralization process that started in 2002. Quite an interesting feature, taking its roots in the 
country’s complicated ethnic structure, is that law provides for sub-municipal forms of self-government, 
such as neighborhoods. Macedonian municipalities have a general competence in all local matters, but 
they can also perform any other activity of local interest within their territory that does not fall under 
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competence of state authorities. Another striking feature is that the competences of the local public 
authorities are explicitly stated in the country’s Constitution. As result of the 2002 local government 
reform, the municipalities in Macedonia also have more policy tools to influence local economic 
development. Inter alia, these municipalities manage freely local property, can associate with other 
governments for services provision, are entitled to raise their own taxes and fees, and are allowed to 
borrow financial resources for development projects. 
What lessons can Moldova draw from the general European and the five countries’ experience in 
administrative-territorial organization? 
• In most of the European countries the administrative-territorial reform eventually were 
outcomes of political bargaining. However, the economic and geographic conditions have been 
largely taken into consideration. While we expect the same political bargaining to take place in 
Moldova, the alternative models proposed below are based on thourough consideration of 
economic and geographic factors at local level. Choosing one or other model will be a political 
decision, but when the model is decided it would be rational to apply criteria and exceptions’ 
rules that we used in this paper. 
• Smaller European countries tend to adopt simpler models of the administrative-territorial 
organizations, the one-tier system being the most common (as featured by such countries as 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Malta). Therefore, if Moldova adopts a 
single-tier model of administrative-territorial organization, that would be in line with the trend 
prevailing among the small European countries. At the same time, as Macedonian and Georgian 
cases highlight, such a model will have to consider the ethnic factor while amalgamating the 
municipalities and to provide for the autonomy of the Gagauzian and Transnistrian regions. A 
single-tier model would also require municipalities to be entrusted with providing a significant 
amount of public services and a much higher level of fiscal autonomy. As a one-tier 
administrative model implies much bigger competencies and institutional/administrative 
capacities from the local governments, applying such a model in Moldova would require 
amalgamation of the small communities into larger municipalities. The proposed one-tier model 
requires reduction in number of municipalities from 900 in present to 111. This will result in a 
dramatic – three-fold – reduction of operational costs. Analysis shows that no significant losses 
are expected in quality of public services provided by local public authorities. However, such a 
model requires exceptional political will and determination and public communication abilities 
from the central government, because a significant reduction in number of municipalities is set 
to engender social dissatisfaction and political tensions between different levels of government. 
At the same time, the existing evidence suggests that – if current system of local public finance 
remains in place - mergers per se would not result in significant increase in own revenues of 
merging the smallest municipalities, at least in short term. Therefore, significant changes will be 
necessary to the local finance system, including adopting bigger and more stable shares accruing 
to local public authorities from the shared state revenues.  
• Over the last twenty years, the general trend regarding upper levels of governance in the EU 
countries with two-tier administrative-territorial organization was to strengthen, reorganize or 
recreate the regional level while simultaneously expanding regional governments’ 
competencies. If Moldovan government opts for a review of the two-tier administrative-
territorial organization as proposed in this study, it will have to fundamentally review the 
criteria of drawing administrative borders of the upper tier. Moldova is relatively uniform in 
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terms of relief, that allows for relatively uniform administrative-territorial division of the country 
(which is not presently the case). These administrative units will have to be large enough and to 
exercise more than formal competences in order to effectively have an impact on regional and 
local development. The two-tier model we propose abolishes the current raions system and 
transforms the existing Development Regions in administrative regions, while naming them 
‘raions’ in order to stick to Constitutional provisions. Having a larger size is also important for 
these units to effectively engage in international cooperation and to be eligible for European 
Union development funds. Existence of the region-level public administration allows for a milder 
reduction in number of municipalities, from 900 to 289. In Moldova a two-tier model will meet 
less resistance from the concerned public authorities of municipal level, but much more 
resistance from the raion authorities which will lose their jobs under such a model. At the same 
time, the two-tier model will render less financial savings (estimated at 40-45% less than 
currently) than the one-tier model. 
• In any case, both one-tier and two-tiers models of administrative-territorial organization will 
require some changes in electoral legislation to guarantee that there are minimal losses for the 
quality of local democracy and participation and that each settlement is represented in the 
elected bodies of the new municipality and (for the two-tier model) each municipality is 
represented in the raion-level elected bodies. At the same time, both models can incorporate 
inter-municipal cooperation as an intrinsic feature. While in this study the inter-municipal 
cooperation is proposed as a separate model, it is clear that this option is only a temporary 
alternative for amalgamation of municipalities for better provision of different public services. 
This model involves many complex features related to coordination, protection of local 
interests, and budgetary adjustments. 
• The most feasible scenario of implementation of either the one-tier or two-tiers model includes 
the following options: 
o Before the local elections in 2011: 
 Option 1. Implement the mandatory legal requirement of 1500 inhabitants for a 
settlement to become a rural primaria, which will result in a reduction of 
number of primarias to about 660. 
 Option 2. Implement a first stage of the two-tier model by reducing number of 
primarias and preparing replacement of the 32 tiny raions with the three 
development region-level raions (plus Chisinau, ATU Gagauzia and Transnistria 
as separate regions). 
o After the local elections in 2011: 
 Phase of voluntary amalgamations: financial bonuses for the voluntary 
amalgamations, encouraging inter-municipal cooperation; 
 Phase of compulsory amalgamation: end of mandate in 2015. 
• It should be mentioned that disregarding the chosen model of administrative-territorial 
reorganization, there is a set of no-regret measures which have to be implemented in any case 
in order to increase the efficiency of the local public authorities. These measures include: 
o Streamlined procedures of civil petitioning, including via phone, post and email; 
o Wider use of e-services at regional and local level; 
o Wider use of electronic technologies as a means to streamline communication between 
different levels of the government; 
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o Solutions for bringing services even closer to citizens than it is today (working days 
weekly working days for civil servants in remote villages, permanently detached 
employees, IT solutions)  
o More advanced budgeting procedures at local level; 
110 | P a g e  
5. LIST OF REFERENCES 
Balashvili Paata, “Fiscal Autonomy Problems of Local Governments in Georgia”, LGI, 2002. 
Boţan Igor, “Revizuirea organizării administrative a teritoriului Republicii Moldova”. ADEPT E-journal, an. 
I, nr. 4 (8 aprilie 2003). http://www.e-democracy.md/comments/political/200304081/ (last accessed 
21.10.2010). 
Bryson Philip J. and Cornia Gary C., “Fiscal Decentralization in Czech Republic”, 2002.  
Catalogue of Non-governmental Organizations from the South Development Region of the Republic of 
Moldova”, Chisinau, 2008. 
Council of Europe, “Balancing Democracy, Identity and Efficiency: Changes in local and regional 
structures in Europe”, 2009. 
Council of Europe, “Relationship Between the Size of Local and Regional Authorities and Their 
Effectiveness and Economy of Their Action”, report by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, December 2001. 
Czech Statistical Office, “Small Lexicon of Municipalities of the Czech Republic”, 2009. 
Dexia, “EU sub-national governments: 2008 key figures”, 2009/2010 edition. 
EGPA, “Institutional shifts in inter-municipal service delivery. An analysis of developments in Western 
European countries”, Group of authors, September 19-22, 2007. 
Expert-Grup, “Atractivitatea investițională a regiunilor din Republic Moldova”, Chisinau, 2010. 
Fox William F. and Gurley Tami, “Will Consolidation Improve Sub-National Governments?”, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3913, May 2006. 
Government of Republic of Moldova, “Strategy for Development of Land Transport Infrastructure for 
2007-2015”. 
Government of Republic of Moldova, “Strategy for Development of Land Transport Infrastructure for 
2007-2015”. 
Gudîm Anatol, “Raioanele și economia”, ADEPT E-journal, an. I, nr. 9 (18 iunie 2003). http://www.e-
democracy.md/e-journal/20030618/#32 (last accessed 21.10.2010). 
Hemmings Philip, “Improving Public-spending Efficiency in Czech Regions and Municipalities”, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 499, 2006, OECD Publishing. 
Horváth Tamás M. (ed.), “Decentralization: Experiments and Reforms”, OSI/LGI, Budapest, 2000. 
Illner Michal, “The Voluntary Union of Municipalites: Bottom-up Territorial Consolidation in the Czech 
Republic?” in Swianiewicz Pawel ed., “Territorial consolidation reforms in Europe”, OSI/LGI, Budapest, 
2010. 
IMF, “Macro Policy Lessons for a Sound Design of Fiscal Decentralization—Background Studies”, IMF 
Fiscal Affairs Department, July 2009. 
Law of financing of local self governments of Macedonia of 13 September 2004. 
111 | P a g e  
Law of on local self-government of Georgia of 16 December 2005. 
Law on local government of Latvia Law no. 436 from 28.12.2006. 
Law on local public finance of Republic of Moldova nr.397-XV dated October 16, 2003. 
Law on local self-government of Serbia of 26 February 2002. 
Law on territorial organization of the local self-government in the Republic of Macedonia of 11 
December 2003. 
Law on the territorial-administrative structure of the Republic of Moldova nr.764-XV of December 27, 
2001. 
Mäeltsemees Sulev, “Local Government in Estonia”, in Tamás M. Horváth (ed.), “Decentralization: 
Experiments and Reforms”, OSI/LGI, Budapest, 2000. 
Melua David, “Local Government Reform in Georgia” in Paweł Swianiewicz (ed.), “Territorial 
consolidation reforms in Europe”, OSI, 2010.  
Ministry of Economy of Republic of Moldova, Small Areas Deprivation Index Database 2008. 
Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, Administrative Territorial Division of the Czech Republic, 
www.mvcr.cz accessed: 03.09.2010. 
O’Dwyer Conor, “Reforming Regional Governance in East Central Europe: Europeanization or Domestic 
Politics as Usual?”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2006. 
OECD, “Country Report: Estonia. Fiscal Design Across Levels of Government”, Year 2000 Surveys 
Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs Centre on Tax Policy and Administration, 2001.  
OECD, “Country Report: Latvia. Fiscal Design Across Levels of Government”, Year 2001 Surveys, 
Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs Centre on Tax Policy and Administration, 2002. 
Osoian Ion, “Local Public Administration in the Republic of Moldova”, in Creanga, I., Popa, V. (eds), 
Reintegration of Moldova: Solutions and Models, Chisinau, 2005. 
Parrado Diez Salvador, “Creating economies of scale, promoting inter-municipal cooperation” paper 
presented at the SIGMA Conference “Public administration reform and territorial organization”, Ankara 
February 28 – March 01, 2006.  
Săgeată, Dănuţ-Radu, “Deciziile politico-administrative și organizarea teritoriului: studiu geografic cu 
aplicare la teritoriul României”, Edit. Top Form, București, 2006. 
Sharpe, L. J. “The size of municipalities, efficiency and citizen participation, Local and Regional 
Authorities” in Europe 56, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1995. 
Sirodoev Igor, “Cities and regional development in Moldova: a geographic synthesis”, Moldovan 
Academy of Science, Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chisinau, 2009. 
Sirodoev Igor, “Regional Development Policy in the Republic of Moldova: Reconciling Public 
Administration and Regional Development Reform”, FDI, 2007. 
Slack Enid, “Models of Government Structure at the Local Level”, October 21, 2003. 
112 | P a g e  
Statistics Estonia, “Statistical Yearbook of Estonia”, 2010. 
Students’ Research Club Spatium, “Shadows in a Cave: Georgian Consolidation Reform Seen from a 
Distance”, in Swianiewicz Pawel ed., “Territorial consolidation reforms in Europe”, OSI/LGI, Budapest, 
2010. 
Swianiewicz Pavel ed., “Territorial consolidation reforms in Europe”, LGI, 2010. 
Swianiewicz Pawel (ed.), “Consolidation or Fragmentation? The Size of Local Governments in Central and 
Eastern Europe”, LGI - Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2002. 
Swianiewicz Pawel and Herbst, Micolaj, “Economies and Diseconomies of Scale in Polish Local 
Governments”, Size of Local Government, Local Democracy and Efficiency in Delivery of Local Services – 
International Context and Theoretical Framework, LGI/OSI, 2002. 
Swianiewicz Pawel, “Size of Local Government, Local Democracy and Efficiency in Delivery of Local 
Services – International Context and Theoretical Framework”, LGI, 2002. 
Timpmann Kadi, Reiljan Janno, and Olenko Katrin, “Fiscal constraints in decentralization process: the 
case of Estonia”, paper presented at the international conference “New Members - New Challenges for 
the European Regional Development Policy”, organized by: Technical University of Košice, Faculty of 
Economics and Institute of Regional and Community Development University of Economics in Bratislava, 
Nový Smokovec - High Tatras, Slovak Republic, September 27-30, 2005. 
UCLG, “Decentralization and local democracy in the world: First United Cities and Local Governments 
Global Report, 2008. 
UNDP, Bratislava Regional Centre for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, “Joining 
Forces and Resources for Sustainable Development. Cooperation among Municipalities –A Guide for 
Practitioners”, Bratislava, 2006. 
Vanags Edvins and Vilka Inga, “Local Government in the Baltic States: Similar but Different”, Local 
Government Studies, 32: 5, 2006. 
Veli Kreci and Bekim Ymeri, “Conceptualizing Territorial Reorganization Policy Interventions in the 
Republic of Macedonia”, in Swianiewicz Pawel ed., Territorial consolidation reforms in Europe, OSI/LGI, 
Budapest, 2010. 
Vilka Inga, “Central and Local Relations in Context of Development of Civil Society: Situation in Latvia 
after Administrative Territorial Reform”, presentation at “The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region – a new challenge for knowledge-based regional and local governance and cooperation” 
conference in Tallin, March 8-9, 2009. 
World Bank, “Latvia: beyond territorial reform”, Report No. 25466-LV, 2003. 
Леваднюк А.Т., Мицул Е.З., Сыродоев Г.Н. и др.,  “Оползнеопасные территории Молдавии и их 
рациональное использование”, Штиинца, Кишинев, 1990. 
113 | P a g e  
6. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR MAPS 
Primary information for maps came from various sources:  
• State boundaries and administrative boundaries of the countries taken as case studies were 
obtained from the web site of the Global Administrative Areas Project (gadm.org); Moldova’s 
administrative boundaries were developed by S.E. Ingeocad (ingeocad.md). 
• Relief of the countries is represented on the Digital Elevation Models (DEMs) provided by NASA 
through Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) (www2.jpl.nasa.gov) and enhanced by 
Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) (esri.com). 
• Moldova’s population data were obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics (statistica.md). 
• Ethnic structure was taken from the 2004 Population Census. Vol. I. Demographic, Ethnic, 
Linguistic, and Cultural Characteristics. National Bureau of Statistics, Chisinau, 2006 
• Financial information was provided by the Ministry of Finance. 
One-tier and two-tier models of the administrative-territorial division were developed by Expert-Grup 
for this analytical study. 
Maps were prepared by Igor Sîrodoev, with the help of Tatiana Stînga (Institute of Ecology and 
Geography, Moldavian Academy of Sciences). 
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7. ANNEXES  
ANNEX 1.  D ISTRIBUTION OF CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL UNITS INTO THE NEWLY PROPOSED MUNICIPALITIES UNDER THE 
ONE-TIER MODEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 
 Current name of the administrative-territorial unit Current raion name New municipality 
1 ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA   
 Alexandru Ioan Cuza Cahul Alexandru Ioan Cuza 
2 ANENII NOI   
 Anenii Noi Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Botnaresti Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Bulboaca Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Calfa Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Ciobanovca Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Cobusca Noua Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Cobusca Veche Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Gura Bicului Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Hirbovat Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Roscani Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Telita Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Tintareni Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
 Varnita Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
3 BADICENI   
 Badiceni Soroca Badiceni 
 Cremenciug Soroca Badiceni 
 Criscauti Donduseni Badiceni 
 Darcauti Soroca Badiceni 
 Holosnita Soroca Badiceni 
 Iarova Soroca Badiceni 
 Oclanda Soroca Badiceni 
 Septelici Soroca Badiceni 
 Solcani Soroca Badiceni 
 Tatarauca Veche Soroca Badiceni 
 Teleseuca Donduseni Badiceni 
 Visoca Soroca Badiceni 
4 BAIMACLIA   
 Baimaclia Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Chioselia Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Ciietu Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Cisla Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Costangalia Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Enichioi Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Lingura Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Tartaul Cantemir Baimaclia 
5 BALATINA   
 Balatina Glodeni Balatina 
 Chetris Falesti Balatina 
 Ciuciulea Glodeni Balatina 
 Cobani Glodeni Balatina 
 Cuhnesti Glodeni Balatina 
 Viisoara Glodeni Balatina 
6 BALTI   
 Balti mun. Balti Balti 
7 BĂLȚI   
 Alexandreni Singerei Pelinia 
 Bilicenii Noi Singerei Pelinia 
 Biruinta Singerei Pelinia 
 Corlateni Riscani Pelinia 
 Cubolta Singerei Pelinia 
 Dobrogea Veche Singerei Pelinia 
 Elizaveta mun. Balti Pelinia 
 Fundurii Vechi Glodeni Pelinia 
 Grinauti Riscani Pelinia 
 Hasnasenii Mari Drochia Pelinia 
 Hasnasenii Noi Drochia Pelinia 
 Heciul Nou Singerei Pelinia 
 Moara de Piatra Drochia Pelinia 
 Natalievca Falesti Pelinia 
 Pelinia Drochia Pelinia 
 Pirlita Falesti Pelinia 
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 Rautel Falesti Pelinia 
 Sadovoe mun. Balti Pelinia 
 Singureni Riscani Pelinia 
 Sturzovca Glodeni Pelinia 
 Tambula Singerei Pelinia 
8 BASARABEASCA   
 Abaclia Basarabeasca Basarabeasca 
 Basarabeasca Basarabeasca Basarabeasca 
 Bascalia Basarabeasca Basarabeasca 
 Carabetovca Basarabeasca Basarabeasca 
 Iordanovca Basarabeasca Basarabeasca 
9 BRATUSENI   
 Bratuseni Edinet Bratuseni 
 Chetrosica Noua Edinet Bratuseni 
 Gaspar Edinet Bratuseni 
 Sofrincani Edinet Bratuseni 
 Stolniceni Edinet Bratuseni 
10 BRAVICEA   
 Bravicea Calarasi Bravicea 
 Ghetlova Orhei Bravicea 
 Meleseni Calarasi Bravicea 
 Putintei Orhei Bravicea 
 Saseni Calarasi Bravicea 
 Tibirica Calarasi Bravicea 
11 BRICENI   
 Balcauti Briceni Briceni 
 Berlinti Briceni Briceni 
 Briceni Briceni Briceni 
 Bulboaca Briceni Briceni 
 Cepeleuti Edinet Briceni 
 Colicauti Briceni Briceni 
 Corestauti Ocnita Briceni 
 Cotiujeni Briceni Briceni 
 Grimancauti Briceni Briceni 
 Marcauti Briceni Briceni 
 Tabani Briceni Briceni 
 Trebisauti Briceni Briceni 
12 BUJOR   
 Balauresti Nisporeni Bujor 
 Bujor Hincesti Bujor 
 Calimanesti Nisporeni Bujor 
 Cateleni Hincesti Bujor 
 Marinici Nisporeni Bujor 
 Miresti Hincesti Bujor 
 Siscani Nisporeni Bujor 
 Zberoaia Nisporeni Bujor 
13 BURLACENI   
 Alexanderfeld Cahul Burlaceni 
 Burlaceni Cahul Burlaceni 
 Gavanoasa Cahul Burlaceni 
 Iujnoe Cahul Burlaceni 
 Pelinei Cahul Burlaceni 
 Vinogradovca Taraclia Burlaceni 
14 BURLACU   
 Borceag Cahul Burlacu 
 Burlacu Cahul Burlacu 
 Chioselia Mare Cahul Burlacu 
 Doina Cahul Burlacu 
 Huluboaia Cahul Burlacu 
 Taraclia de Salcie Cahul Burlacu 
 Tataresti Cahul Burlacu 
15 CAHUL   
 Andrusul de Sus Cahul Cahul 
 Bucuria Cahul Cahul 
 Cahul Cahul Cahul 
 Colibasi Cahul Cahul 
 Crihana Veche Cahul Cahul 
 Lebedenco Cahul Cahul 
 Lopatica Cahul Cahul 
 Lucesti Cahul Cahul 
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 Manta Cahul Cahul 
 Moscovei Cahul Cahul 
 Rosu Cahul Cahul 
 Tartaul de Salcie Cahul Cahul 
 Vadul lui Isac Cahul Cahul 
16 CAINARI   
 Baimaclia Causeni Cainari 
 Cainari Causeni Cainari 
 Chircaiestii Noi Causeni Cainari 
 Cirnatenii Noi Causeni Cainari 
 Ciuflesti Causeni Cainari 
 Coscalia Causeni Cainari 
 Gangura Ialoveni Cainari 
 Ochiul Ros Anenii Noi Cainari 
 Pervomaisc Causeni Cainari 
 Salcuta Causeni Cainari 
 Taraclia Causeni Cainari 
 Zolotievca Anenii Noi Cainari 
17 CALARASI   
 Bahmut Calarasi Calarasi 
 Buda Calarasi Calarasi 
 Cabaiesti Calarasi Calarasi 
 Calarasi Calarasi Calarasi 
 Frumoasa Calarasi Calarasi 
 Hirjauca Calarasi Calarasi 
 Horodiste Calarasi Calarasi 
 Niscani Calarasi Calarasi 
 Paulesti Calarasi Calarasi 
 Peticeni Calarasi Calarasi 
 Pirjolteni Calarasi Calarasi 
 Pitusca Calarasi Calarasi 
 Raciula Calarasi Calarasi 
 Sipoteni Calarasi Calarasi 
 Temeleuti Calarasi Calarasi 
 Tuzara Calarasi Calarasi 
 Valcinet Calarasi Calarasi 
18 CANTEMIR   
 Antonesti Cantemir Cantemir 
 Cania Cantemir Cantemir 
 Cantemir Cantemir Cantemir 
 Cirpesti Cantemir Cantemir 
 Larguta Cantemir Cantemir 
 Pleseni Cantemir Cantemir 
 Porumbesti Cantemir Cantemir 
 Stoianovca Cantemir Cantemir 
19 CARPINENI   
 Carpineni Hincesti Carpineni 
 Mingir Hincesti Carpineni 
 Negrea Hincesti Carpineni 
 Voinescu Hincesti Carpineni 
20 CAUSENI   
 Baccealia Causeni Causeni 
 Causeni Causeni Causeni 
 Chircaiesti Causeni Causeni 
 Cirnateni Causeni Causeni 
 Copanca Causeni Causeni 
 Ermoclia Stefan-Voda Causeni 
 Firladeni Causeni Causeni 
 Gradinita Causeni Causeni 
 Grigorievca Causeni Causeni 
 Hagimus Causeni Causeni 
 Opaci Causeni Causeni 
 Plop-Stiubei Causeni Causeni 
 Popeasca Stefan-Voda Causeni 
 Saiti Causeni Causeni 
 Tanatari Causeni Causeni 
 Tanatarii Noi Causeni Causeni 
 Tocuz Causeni Causeni 
 Ucrainca Causeni Causeni 
 Ursoaia Causeni Causeni 
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 Zaim Causeni Causeni 
21 CAZANESTI   
 Brinzenii Noi Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Cazanesti Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Chitcanii Vechi Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Negureni Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Ordasei Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Pistruieni Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Tirsitei Telenesti Cazanesti 
23 CHIPERCENI   
 Biesti Orhei Chiperceni 
 Chiperceni Orhei Chiperceni 
 Crihana Orhei Chiperceni 
 Podgoreni Orhei Chiperceni 
 Pohrebeni Orhei Chiperceni 
 Zahoreni Orhei Chiperceni 
24 CHISCARENI   
 Bursuceni Singerei Chiscareni 
 Chiscareni Singerei Chiscareni 
 Ciuciuieni Singerei Chiscareni 
 Coscodeni Singerei Chiscareni 
 Dumbravita Singerei Chiscareni 
 Iezarenii Vechi Singerei Chiscareni 
 Pietrosu Falesti Chiscareni 
 Taura Veche Singerei Chiscareni 
25 CHISINAU   
 Chisinau mun. Chisinau Chisinau 
 Codru mun. Chisinau Chisinau 
 Condrita mun. Chisinau Chisinau 
 Durlesti mun. Chisinau Chisinau 
 Singera mun. Chisinau Chisinau 
 Vatra mun. Chisinau Chisinau 
26 CHISTELNITA   
 Chistelnita Telenesti Chistelnita 
 Meseni Rezina Chistelnita 
 Nucareni Telenesti Chistelnita 
 Scorteni Telenesti Chistelnita 
 Tintareni Telenesti Chistelnita 
27 CIMISLIA   
 Cenac Cimislia Cimislia 
 Cimislia Cimislia Cimislia 
 Ciucur-Mingir Cimislia Cimislia 
 Ecaterinovca Cimislia Cimislia 
 Gradiste Cimislia Cimislia 
 Ialpugeni Cimislia Cimislia 
 Javgur Cimislia Cimislia 
 Sadaclia Basarabeasca Cimislia 
 Topala Cimislia Cimislia 
 Valea Perjei Cimislia Cimislia 
28 CIUCIULENI   
 Bobeica Hincesti Ciuciuleni 
 Ciuciuleni Hincesti Ciuciuleni 
 Dragusenii Noi Hincesti Ciuciuleni 
 Secareni Hincesti Ciuciuleni 
 Stolniceni Hincesti Ciuciuleni 
29 CIUTULESTI   
 Casunca Floresti Ciutulesti 
 Ciutulesti Floresti Ciutulesti 
 Domulgeni Floresti Ciutulesti 
 Prodanesti Floresti Ciutulesti 
 Stefanesti Floresti Ciutulesti 
30 CNEAZEVCA   
 Bestemac Leova Cneazevca 
 Ceadir Leova Cneazevca 
 Cneazevca Leova Cneazevca 
 Colibabovca Leova Cneazevca 
 Covurlui Leova Cneazevca 
 Orac Leova Cneazevca 
 Sarateni Leova Cneazevca 
 Saratica Noua Leova Cneazevca 
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 Tomaiul Nou Leova Cneazevca 
 Vozneseni Leova Cneazevca 
31 COCIERI   
 Cocieri Dubasari Cocieri 
 Corjova UTA din Stinga Nistrului Cocieri 
 Molovata Noua Dubasari Cocieri 
33 COPCEAC   
 Carbalia UTA Gagauzia Copceac 
 Copceac UTA Gagauzia Copceac 
34 CORJEUTI   
 Balasinesti Briceni Corjeuti 
 Bogdanesti Briceni Corjeuti 
 Caracusenii Vechi Briceni Corjeuti 
 Constantinovca Edinet Corjeuti 
 Corjeuti Briceni Corjeuti 
 Pererita Briceni Corjeuti 
 Tetcani Briceni Corjeuti 
 Trinca Edinet Corjeuti 
35 CORNESTI   
 Boghenii Noi Ungheni Cornesti 
 Condratesti Ungheni Cornesti 
 Cornesti Ungheni Cornesti 
 Cornesti Ungheni Cornesti 
 Hircesti Ungheni Cornesti 
 Magurele Ungheni Cornesti 
 Sinesti Ungheni Cornesti 
 Tescureni Ungheni Cornesti 
36 COSNITA   
 Cosnita Dubasari Cosnita 
 Dorotcaia Dubasari Cosnita 
 Pirita Dubasari Cosnita 
38 COSTESTI   
 Braniste Riscani Costesti 
 Camenca Glodeni Costesti 
 Costesti Ialoveni Costesti 
 Costesti Riscani Costesti 
 Duruitoarea Noua Riscani Costesti 
 Galaseni Riscani Costesti 
 Hansca Ialoveni Costesti 
 Petruseni Riscani Costesti 
 Pojareni Ialoveni Costesti 
 Saptebani Riscani Costesti 
 Varatic Riscani Costesti 
 Zimbreni Ialoveni Costesti 
39 COTIUJENII MARI   
 Cobilea Soldanesti Cotiujenii Mari 
 Cotiujenii Mari Soldanesti Cotiujenii Mari 
 Dobrusa Soldanesti Cotiujenii Mari 
 Pohoarna Soldanesti Cotiujenii Mari 
40 CRICOVA   
 Ciorescu mun. Chisinau Cricova 
 Cricova mun. Chisinau Cricova 
 Drasliceni Criuleni Cricova 
 Ghidighici mun. Chisinau Cricova 
 Gratiesti mun. Chisinau Cricova 
 Hrusova Criuleni Cricova 
 Magdacesti Criuleni Cricova 
 Pascani Criuleni Cricova 
 Stauceni mun. Chisinau Cricova 
 Zaicana Criuleni Cricova 
41 CRIULENI   
 Boscana Criuleni Criuleni 
 Cosernita Criuleni Criuleni 
 Criuleni Criuleni Criuleni 
 Cruglic Criuleni Criuleni 
 Hirtopul Mare Criuleni Criuleni 
 Izbiste Criuleni Criuleni 
 Onitcani Criuleni Criuleni 
 Slobozia-Dusca Criuleni Criuleni 
 Ustia Dubasari Criuleni 
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42 CUIZAUCA   
 Busauca Rezina Cuizauca 
 Cogilniceni Rezina Cuizauca 
 Cuizauca Rezina Cuizauca 
 Ghiduleni Rezina Cuizauca 
 Horodiste Rezina Cuizauca 
 Lalova Rezina Cuizauca 
 Mincenii de Jos Rezina Cuizauca 
 Otac Rezina Cuizauca 
 Pereni Rezina Cuizauca 
43 CUNICEA   
 Cuhurestii de Jos Floresti Cunicea 
 Cuhurestii de Sus Floresti Cunicea 
 Cunicea Floresti Cunicea 
 Japca Floresti Cunicea 
 Napadova Floresti Cunicea 
 Sanatauca Floresti Cunicea 
44 DONDUSENI   
 Cernoleuca Donduseni Donduseni 
 Climauti Donduseni Donduseni 
 Corbu Donduseni Donduseni 
 Donduseni Donduseni Donduseni 
 Donduseni Donduseni Donduseni 
 Elizavetovca Donduseni Donduseni 
 Horodiste Donduseni Donduseni 
 Mosana Donduseni Donduseni 
 Pivniceni Donduseni Donduseni 
 Plop Donduseni Donduseni 
 Rediul Mare Donduseni Donduseni 
 Sudarca Donduseni Donduseni 
 Taul Donduseni Donduseni 
45 DROCHIA   
 Antoneuca Drochia Drochia 
 Baroncea Drochia Drochia 
 Chetrosu Drochia Drochia 
 Dominteni Drochia Drochia 
 Drochia Drochia Drochia 
 Drochia Drochia Drochia 
 Gribova Drochia Drochia 
 Miciurin Drochia Drochia 
 Nicoreni Drochia Drochia 
 Ochiul Alb Drochia Drochia 
 Pervomaiscoe Drochia Drochia 
 Petreni Drochia Drochia 
 Sofia Drochia Drochia 
 Suri Drochia Drochia 
 Tarigrad Drochia Drochia 
46 DUBASARII VECHI   
 Balabanesti Criuleni Dubasarii Vechi 
 Corjova Criuleni Dubasarii Vechi 
 Delacau Anenii Noi Dubasarii Vechi 
 Dubasarii Vechi Criuleni Dubasarii Vechi 
 Puhaceni Anenii Noi Dubasarii Vechi 
 Serpeni Anenii Noi Dubasarii Vechi 
 Speia Anenii Noi Dubasarii Vechi 
47 EDINET   
 Cupcini Edinet Edinet 
 Edinet Edinet Edinet 
48 FALESTI   
 Albinetul Vechi Falesti Falesti 
 Bocani Falesti Falesti 
 Calinesti Falesti Falesti 
 Calugar Falesti Falesti 
 Ciolacu Nou Falesti Falesti 
 Egorovca Falesti Falesti 
 Falesti Falesti Falesti 
 Falestii Noi Falesti Falesti 
 Hincesti Falesti Falesti 
 Iscalau Falesti Falesti 
 Logofteni Falesti Falesti 
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 Musteata Falesti Falesti 
 Navirnet Falesti Falesti 
 Pinzareni Falesti Falesti 
 Pruteni Falesti Falesti 
 Risipeni Falesti Falesti 
 Sarata Veche Falesti Falesti 
 Scumpia Falesti Falesti 
49 FLORESTI   
 Alexeevca Floresti Floresti 
 Bahrinesti Floresti Floresti 
 Ciripcau Floresti Floresti 
 Cosernita Floresti Floresti 
 Floresti Floresti Floresti 
 Ghindesti Floresti Floresti 
 Ghindesti Floresti Floresti 
 Gura Cainarului Floresti Floresti 
 Gura Camencii Floresti Floresti 
 Lunga Floresti Floresti 
 Marculesti Floresti Floresti 
 Marculesti Floresti Floresti 
 Prajila Floresti Floresti 
 Putinesti Floresti Floresti 
 Radulenii Vechi Floresti Floresti 
 Rogojeni Soldanesti Floresti 
 Rosietici Floresti Floresti 
 Varvareuca Floresti Floresti 
50 FRUMUSICA   
 Cainarii Vechi Soroca Frumusica 
 Frumusica Floresti Frumusica 
 Iliciovca Floresti Frumusica 
 Izvoare Floresti Frumusica 
 Sevirova Floresti Frumusica 
 Trifanesti Floresti Frumusica 
51 GIURGIULESTI   
 Brinza Cahul Giurgiulesti 
 Cislita-Prut Cahul Giurgiulesti 
 Giurgiulesti Cahul Giurgiulesti 
 Slobozia Mare Cahul Giurgiulesti 
 Valeni Cahul Giurgiulesti 
52 GLINJENI   
 Catranic Falesti Glinjeni 
 Glinjeni Falesti Glinjeni 
 Marandeni Falesti Glinjeni 
 Pompa Falesti Glinjeni 
53 GLODENI   
 Cajba Glodeni Glodeni 
 Danu Glodeni Glodeni 
 Dusmani Glodeni Glodeni 
 Fundurii Noi Glodeni Glodeni 
 Glodeni Glodeni Glodeni 
 Hijdieni Glodeni Glodeni 
 Iabloana Glodeni Glodeni 
 Petrunea Glodeni Glodeni 
54 GOTESTI   
 Ciobalaccia Cantemir Gotesti 
 Gotesti Cantemir Gotesti 
 Plopi Cantemir Gotesti 
 Tiganca Cantemir Gotesti 
55 GURA  GALBENEI   
 Albina Cimislia Gura Galbenei 
 Gura Galbenei Cimislia Gura Galbenei 
 Hirtop Cimislia Gura Galbenei 
 Ivanovca Noua Cimislia Gura Galbenei 
 Lipoveni Cimislia Gura Galbenei 
56 HINCESTI   
 Bardar Ialoveni Hincesti 
 Bozieni Hincesti Hincesti 
 Buteni Hincesti Hincesti 
 Caracui Hincesti Hincesti 
 Firladeni Hincesti Hincesti 
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 Fundul Galbenei Hincesti Hincesti 
 Hincesti Hincesti Hincesti 
 Loganesti Hincesti Hincesti 
 Mereseni Hincesti Hincesti 
 Sarata-Galbena Hincesti Hincesti 
57 HLINAIA   
 Halahora de Sus Briceni Hlinaia 
 Hincauti Edinet Hlinaia 
 Hlinaia Edinet Hlinaia 
 Mihaileni Briceni Hlinaia 
 Rotunda Edinet Hlinaia 
58 IALOVENI   
 Bacioi mun. Chisinau Ialoveni 
 Danceni Ialoveni Ialoveni 
 Ialoveni Ialoveni Ialoveni 
 Malcoci Ialoveni Ialoveni 
 Milestii Mici Ialoveni Ialoveni 
 Nimoreni Ialoveni Ialoveni 
 Sociteni Ialoveni Ialoveni 
 Suruceni Ialoveni Ialoveni 
59 IARGARA   
 Baius Leova Iargara 
 Borogani Leova Iargara 
 Iargara Leova Iargara 
 Tigheci Leova Iargara 
60 LAPUSNA   
 Balceana Hincesti Lapusna 
 Boghiceni Hincesti Lapusna 
 Lapusna Hincesti Lapusna 
 Pascani Hincesti Lapusna 
 Pervomaiscoe Hincesti Lapusna 
 Sipoteni Hincesti Lapusna 
 Sofia Hincesti Lapusna 
61 LEOVA   
 Cazangic Leova Leova 
 Cupcui Leova Leova 
 Filipeni Leova Leova 
 Hanasenii Noi Leova Leova 
 Leova Leova Leova 
 Romanovca Leova Leova 
 Sarata Noua Leova Leova 
 Sarata-Razesi Leova Leova 
 Sirma Leova Leova 
 Toceni Cantemir Leova 
 Tochile-Raducani Leova Leova 
 Tomai Leova Leova 
62 LEUSENI   
 Calmatui Hincesti Leuseni 
 Cioara Hincesti Leuseni 
 Cotul Morii Hincesti Leuseni 
 Crasnoarmeiscoe Hincesti Leuseni 
 Dancu Hincesti Leuseni 
 Ivanovca Hincesti Leuseni 
 Leuseni Hincesti Leuseni 
 Nemteni Hincesti Leuseni 
 Obileni Hincesti Leuseni 
 Onesti Hincesti Leuseni 
 Poganesti Hincesti Leuseni 
63 LIPCANI   
 Beleavinti Briceni Lipcani 
 Coteala Briceni Lipcani 
 Criva Briceni Lipcani 
 Drepcauti Briceni Lipcani 
 Hlina Briceni Lipcani 
 Larga Briceni Lipcani 
 Lipcani Briceni Lipcani 
 Medveja Briceni Lipcani 
 Sirauti Briceni Lipcani 
 Slobozia-Sirauti Briceni Lipcani 
64 LOZOVA   
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 Bursuc Nisporeni Lozova 
 Dolna Straseni Lozova 
 Lozova Straseni Lozova 
 Micleuseni Straseni Lozova 
 Sadova Calarasi Lozova 
 Vorniceni Straseni Lozova 
65 MASCAUTI   
 Holercani Dubasari Mascauti 
 Jevreni Criuleni Mascauti 
 Marcauti Dubasari Mascauti 
 Mascauti Criuleni Mascauti 
 Raculesti Criuleni Mascauti 
 Trebujeni Orhei Mascauti 
66 MERENI   
 Bubuieci mun. Chisinau Mereni 
 Chirca Anenii Noi Mereni 
 Cimiseni Criuleni Mereni 
 Floreni Anenii Noi Mereni 
 Maximovca Anenii Noi Mereni 
 Mereni Anenii Noi Mereni 
 Merenii Noi Anenii Noi Mereni 
67 MIHAILOVCA   
 Batir Cimislia Mihailovca 
 Iserlia Basarabeasca Mihailovca 
 Mihailovca Cimislia Mihailovca 
 Satul Nou Cimislia Mihailovca 
 Selemet Cimislia Mihailovca 
 Suric Cimislia Mihailovca 
 Troitcoe Cimislia Mihailovca 
68 MILESTI   
 Balanesti Nisporeni Milesti 
 Ciutesti Nisporeni Milesti 
 Milesti Nisporeni Milesti 
 Radenii Vechi Ungheni Milesti 
 Vinatori Nisporeni Milesti 
69 MINDRESTI   
 Cisla Telenesti Mindresti 
 Ciulucani Telenesti Mindresti 
 Ghiliceni Telenesti Mindresti 
 Mindresti Telenesti Mindresti 
 Zgardesti Telenesti Mindresti 
70 NISPORENI   
 Barboieni Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Bolduresti Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Boltun Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Cioresti Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Cristesti Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Grozesti Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Iurceni Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Macaresti Ungheni Nisporeni 
 Nisporeni Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Seliste Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Soltanesti Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Valea-Trestieni Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Varzaresti Nisporeni Nisporeni 
71 OBREJA VECHE   
 Hiliuti Falesti Obreja Veche 
 Ilenuta Falesti Obreja Veche 
 Limbenii Noi Glodeni Obreja Veche 
 Limbenii Vechi Glodeni Obreja Veche 
 Obreja Veche Falesti Obreja Veche 
 Ustia Glodeni Obreja Veche 
72 OCNITA   
 Birnova Ocnita Ocnita 
 Clocusna Ocnita Ocnita 
 Dingeni Ocnita Ocnita 
 Frunza Ocnita Ocnita 
 Girbova Ocnita Ocnita 
 Hadarauti Ocnita Ocnita 
 Lencauti Ocnita Ocnita 
123 | P a g e  
 Current name of the administrative-territorial unit Current raion name New municipality 
 Lipnic Ocnita Ocnita 
 Mihalaseni Ocnita Ocnita 
 Naslavcea Ocnita Ocnita 
 Ocnita Ocnita Ocnita 
 Ocnita Ocnita Ocnita 
73 OLANESTI   
 Antonesti Stefan-Voda Olanesti 
 Caplani Stefan-Voda Olanesti 
 Carahasani Stefan-Voda Olanesti 
 Crocmaz Stefan-Voda Olanesti 
 Olanesti Stefan-Voda Olanesti 
 Palanca Stefan-Voda Olanesti 
 Purcari Stefan-Voda Olanesti 
 Tudora Stefan-Voda Olanesti 
74 ORHEI   
 Bolohan Orhei Orhei 
 Braviceni Orhei Orhei 
 Cucuruzeni Orhei Orhei 
 Isacova Orhei Orhei 
 Ivancea Orhei Orhei 
 Malaiesti Orhei Orhei 
 Mitoc Orhei Orhei 
 Morozeni Orhei Orhei 
 Neculaieuca Orhei Orhei 
 Orhei Orhei Orhei 
 Pelivan Orhei Orhei 
 Piatra Orhei Orhei 
 Pohorniceni Orhei Orhei 
 Seliste Orhei Orhei 
 Step-Soci Orhei Orhei 
 Vatici Orhei Orhei 
 Zorile Orhei Orhei 
75 OTACI   
 Arionesti Donduseni Otaci 
 Briceni Donduseni Otaci 
 Calarasovca Ocnita Otaci 
 Mereseuca Ocnita Otaci 
 Otaci Ocnita Otaci 
 Pocrovca Donduseni Otaci 
 Rudi Soroca Otaci 
 Sauca Ocnita Otaci 
 Unguri Ocnita Otaci 
 Valcinet Ocnita Otaci 
76 PECISTE   
 Chipesca Soldanesti Peciste 
 Fuzauca Soldanesti Peciste 
 Gauzeni Soldanesti Peciste 
 Ignatei Rezina Peciste 
 Peciste Rezina Peciste 
 Pripiceni-Razesi Rezina Peciste 
 Raspopeni Soldanesti Peciste 
 Samascani Soldanesti Peciste 
77 PEPENI   
 Balasesti Singerei Pepeni 
 Banesti Telenesti Pepeni 
 Pepeni Singerei Pepeni 
 Prepelita Singerei Pepeni 
78 PERESECINA   
 Donici Orhei Peresecina 
 Isnovat Criuleni Peresecina 
 Micauti Straseni Peresecina 
 Miclesti Criuleni Peresecina 
 Peresecina Orhei Peresecina 
 Radeni Straseni Peresecina 
 Riscova Criuleni Peresecina 
 Romanesti Straseni Peresecina 
 Samananca Orhei Peresecina 
 Teleseu Orhei Peresecina 
79 PIRLITA   
 Agronomovca Ungheni Pirlita 
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 Alexeevca Ungheni Pirlita 
 Bumbata Ungheni Pirlita 
 Busila Ungheni Pirlita 
 Chirileni Ungheni Pirlita 
 Pirlita Ungheni Pirlita 
 Todiresti Ungheni Pirlita 
80 PUHOI   
 Chetrosu Anenii Noi Puhoi 
 Geamana Anenii Noi Puhoi 
 Puhoi Ialoveni Puhoi 
 Tipala Ialoveni Puhoi 
 Varatic Ialoveni Puhoi 
81 RACOVAT   
 Dubna Soroca Racovat 
 Racovat Soroca Racovat 
 Redi-Ceresnovat Soroca Racovat 
 Stoicani Soroca Racovat 
82 RADENI   
 Cornova Ungheni Radeni 
 Dereneu Calarasi Radeni 
 Hirova Calarasi Radeni 
 Hoginesti Calarasi Radeni 
 Napadeni Ungheni Radeni 
 Oniscani Calarasi Radeni 
 Radeni Calarasi Radeni 
83 RAZENI   
 Carbuna Ialoveni Razeni 
 Cigirleni Ialoveni Razeni 
 Codreni Cimislia Razeni 
 Horesti Ialoveni Razeni 
 Molesti Ialoveni Razeni 
 Porumbrei Cimislia Razeni 
 Razeni Ialoveni Razeni 
 Sagaidac Cimislia Razeni 
84 REZINA   
 Ciniseuti Rezina Rezina 
 Echimauti Rezina Rezina 
 Gordinesti Rezina Rezina 
 Lipceni Rezina Rezina 
 Mateuti Rezina Rezina 
 Papauti Rezina Rezina 
 Rezina Rezina Rezina 
 Saharna Noua Rezina Rezina 
 Sircova Rezina Rezina 
 Solonceni Rezina Rezina 
 Tareuca Rezina Rezina 
 Trifesti Rezina Rezina 
85 RISCANI   
 Alexandresti Riscani Riscani 
 Alunis Riscani Riscani 
 Borosenii Noi Riscani Riscani 
 Malinovscoe Riscani Riscani 
 Mihaileni Riscani Riscani 
 Nihoreni Riscani Riscani 
 Racaria Riscani Riscani 
 Recea Riscani Riscani 
 Riscani Riscani Riscani 
 Sturzeni Riscani Riscani 
 Sumna Riscani Riscani 
 Vasileuti Riscani Riscani 
86 RUSENI   
 Birladeni Ocnita Ruseni 
 Goleni Edinet Ruseni 
 Grinauti-Moldova Ocnita Ruseni 
 Parcova Edinet Ruseni 
 Ruseni Edinet Ruseni 
87 RUSESTII NOI   
 Horodca Ialoveni Rusestii Noi 
 Rusestii Noi Ialoveni Rusestii Noi 
 Ulmu Ialoveni Rusestii Noi 
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 Vasieni Ialoveni Rusestii Noi 
88 SARATENII VECHI   
 Ciocilteni Orhei Saratenii Vechi 
 Clisova Orhei Saratenii Vechi 
 Codrul Nou Telenesti Saratenii Vechi 
 Corobceni Telenesti Saratenii Vechi 
 Ratus Telenesti Saratenii Vechi 
 Saratenii Vechi Telenesti Saratenii Vechi 
 Suhuluceni Telenesti Saratenii Vechi 
 Verejeni Telenesti Saratenii Vechi 
89 SCULENI   
 Buciumeni Ungheni Sculeni 
 Cioropcani Ungheni Sculeni 
 Horesti Falesti Sculeni 
 Izvoare Falesti Sculeni 
 Sculeni Ungheni Sculeni 
 Taxobeni Falesti Sculeni 
90 SINGEREI   
 Bilicenii Vechi Singerei Singerei 
 Copaceni Singerei Singerei 
 Cotiujenii Mici Singerei Singerei 
 Draganesti Singerei Singerei 
 Grigorauca Singerei Singerei 
 Izvoare Singerei Singerei 
 Nicolaevca Floresti Singerei 
 Radoaia Singerei Singerei 
 Singerei Singerei Singerei 
 Singereii Noi Singerei Singerei 
91 SOLDANESTI   
 Alcedar Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Hligeni Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Mihuleni Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Oliscani Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Parcani Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Poiana Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Sestaci Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Sipca Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Soldanesti Soldanesti Soldanesti 
92 SOROCA   
 Cosauti Soroca Soroca 
 Egoreni Soroca Soroca 
 Hristici Soroca Soroca 
 Ocolina Soroca Soroca 
 Parcani Soroca Soroca 
 Pirlita Soroca Soroca 
 Regina Maria Soroca Soroca 
 Rublenita Soroca Soroca 
 Soroca Soroca Soroca 
 Trifauti Soroca Soroca 
 Vadeni Soroca Soroca 
 Vasilcau Soroca Soroca 
 Volovita Soroca Soroca 
 Zastinca Soroca Soroca 
93 STEFAN-VODA   
 Alava Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Brezoaia Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Cioburciu Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Copceac Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Festelita Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Marianca de Jos Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Rascaieti Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Semionovca Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Slobozia Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Stefanesti Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Talmaza Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Volintiri Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
94 STRASENI   
 Capriana Straseni Straseni 
 Cojusna Straseni Straseni 
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 Ghelauza Straseni Straseni 
 Negresti Straseni Straseni 
 Panasesti Straseni Straseni 
 Roscani Straseni Straseni 
 Scoreni Straseni Straseni 
 Sireti Straseni Straseni 
 Straseni Straseni Straseni 
 Tataresti Straseni Straseni 
 Truseni mun. Chisinau Straseni 
95 SUSLENI   
 Berezlogi Orhei Susleni 
 Bulaiesti Orhei Susleni 
 Jora de Mijloc Orhei Susleni 
 Mirzesti Orhei Susleni 
 Molovata Dubasari Susleni 
 Oxentea Dubasari Susleni 
 Susleni Orhei Susleni 
 Viscauti Orhei Susleni 
96 TARACLIA   
 Albota de Jos Taraclia Taraclia 
 Albota de Sus Taraclia Taraclia 
 Aluatu Taraclia Taraclia 
 Balabanu Taraclia Taraclia 
 Budai Taraclia Taraclia 
 Cairaclia Taraclia Taraclia 
 Cealic Taraclia Taraclia 
 Corten Taraclia Taraclia 
 Musaitu Taraclia Taraclia 
 Novosiolovca Taraclia Taraclia 
 Salcia Taraclia Taraclia 
 Taraclia Taraclia Taraclia 
97 TELENESTI   
 Bogzesti Telenesti Telenesti 
 Budai Telenesti Telenesti 
 Crasnaseni Telenesti Telenesti 
 Hiriseni Telenesti Telenesti 
 Inesti Telenesti Telenesti 
 Leuseni Telenesti Telenesti 
 Telenesti Telenesti Telenesti 
 Vasieni Telenesti Telenesti 
98 TEREBNA   
 Alexeevca Edinet Terebna 
 Badragii Noi Edinet Terebna 
 Badragii Vechi Edinet Terebna 
 Brinzeni Edinet Terebna 
 Corpaci Edinet Terebna 
 Cuconestii Noi Edinet Terebna 
 Hancauti Edinet Terebna 
 Terebna Edinet Terebna 
 Zabriceni Edinet Terebna 
99 TIRNOVA   
 Baraboi Donduseni Tirnova 
 Maramonovca Drochia Tirnova 
 Mindic Drochia Tirnova 
 Salvirii Vechi Drochia Tirnova 
 Scaieni Donduseni Tirnova 
 Tirnova Donduseni Tirnova 
 Fintinita Drochia Tirnova 
 Frasin Donduseni Tirnova 
100 TIRNOVA   
 Lopatnic Edinet Tirnova 
 Tirnova Edinet Tirnova 
 Blesteni Edinet Tirnova 
 Burlanesti Edinet Tirnova 
 Fetesti Edinet Tirnova 
 Gordinesti Edinet Tirnova 
 Viisoara Edinet Tirnova 
101 TVARDITA   
 Tvardita Taraclia Tvardita 
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 Valea Perjei Taraclia Tvardita 
102 UNGHENI   
 Bratuleni Nisporeni Ungheni 
 Cetireni Ungheni Ungheni 
 Costuleni Ungheni Ungheni 
 Floritoaia Veche Ungheni Ungheni 
 Manoilesti Ungheni Ungheni 
 Morenii Noi Ungheni Ungheni 
 Petresti Ungheni Ungheni 
 Ungheni Ungheni Ungheni 
 Untesti Ungheni Ungheni 
 Valea Mare Ungheni Ungheni 
 Zagarancea Ungheni Ungheni 
22 UTAG -CEADIR-LUNGA   
 Baurci UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Besghioz UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Cazaclia UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Ceadir-Lunga UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Chioselia Rusa UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Chiriet-Lunga UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Congaz UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Cotovscoe UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Gaidar UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Joltai UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Svetlii UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
 Tomai UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Ceadir-Lunga 
32 UTAG - COMRAT   
 Avdarma UTA Gagauzia UTAG - Comrat 
 Besalma UTA Gagauzia UTAG - Comrat 
 Bugeac UTA Gagauzia UTAG - Comrat 
 Chirsova UTA Gagauzia UTAG - Comrat 
 Cioc-Maidan UTA Gagauzia UTAG - Comrat 
 Comrat UTA Gagauzia UTAG - Comrat 
 Congazcicul de Sus UTA Gagauzia UTAG - Comrat 
 Dezghingea UTA Gagauzia UTAG - Comrat 
 Ferapontievca UTA Gagauzia UTAG - Comrat 
107 UTAG -VULCANESTI   
 Cismichioi UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Vulcanesti 
 Etulia UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Vulcanesti 
 Vulcanesti UTA Gagauzia UTAG -Vulcanesti 
103 VADUL LUI VODA   
 Baltata Criuleni Vadul lui Voda 
 Budesti mun. Chisinau Vadul lui Voda 
 Colonita mun. Chisinau Vadul lui Voda 
 Cruzesti mun. Chisinau Vadul lui Voda 
 Dolinnoe Criuleni Vadul lui Voda 
 Tohatin mun. Chisinau Vadul lui Voda 
 Vadul lui Voda mun. Chisinau Vadul lui Voda 
104 VADUL-RASCOV   
 Climautii de Jos Soldanesti Vadul-Rascov 
 Cusmirca Soldanesti Vadul-Rascov 
 Salcia Soldanesti Vadul-Rascov 
 Vadul-Rascov Soldanesti Vadul-Rascov 
105 VARANCAU   
 Cernita Floresti Varancau 
 Nimereuca Soroca Varancau 
 Temeleuti Floresti Varancau 
 Tirgul-Vertiujeni Floresti Varancau 
 Varancau Soroca Varancau 
 Vascauti Floresti Varancau 
 Vertiujeni Floresti Varancau 
 Zaluceni Floresti Varancau 
106 VISNIOVCA   
 Capaclia Cantemir Visniovca 
 Cociulia Cantemir Visniovca 
 Haragis Cantemir Visniovca 
 Sadic Cantemir Visniovca 
 Samalia Cantemir Visniovca 
 Visniovca Cantemir Visniovca 
108 ZAICANI   
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 Hiliuti Riscani Zaicani 
 Horodiste Riscani Zaicani 
 Pirjota Riscani Zaicani 
 Pociumbauti Riscani Zaicani 
 Pociumbeni Riscani Zaicani 
 Zaicani Riscani Zaicani 
109 ZGURITA   
 Baxani Soroca Zgurita 
 Bulboci Soroca Zgurita 
 Cotova Drochia Zgurita 
 Palanca Drochia Zgurita 
 Popestii de Jos Drochia Zgurita 
 Popestii de Sus Drochia Zgurita 
 Schineni Soroca Zgurita 
 Zgurita Drochia Zgurita 
110 ZIRNESTI   
 Andrusul de Jos Cahul Zirnesti 
 Badicul Moldovenesc Cahul Zirnesti 
 Baurci-Moldoveni Cahul Zirnesti 
 Cucoara Cahul Zirnesti 
 Larga Noua Cahul Zirnesti 
 Zirnesti Cahul Zirnesti 
111 ZUBRESTI   
 Bucovat Straseni Zubresti 
 Chirianca Straseni Zubresti 
 Codreanca Straseni Zubresti 
 Galesti Straseni Zubresti 
 Greblesti Straseni Zubresti 
 Onesti Straseni Zubresti 
 Recea Straseni Zubresti 
 Tiganesti Straseni Zubresti 
 Varzarestii Noi Calarasi Zubresti 
 Voinova Straseni Zubresti 
 Zubresti Straseni Zubresti 
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 Name Old raion name New municipality 
1 ABACLIA   
 Abaclia Basarabeasca Abaclia 
 Bascalia Basarabeasca Abaclia 
2 ALBOTA DE SUS   
 Albota de Jos Taraclia Albota de Sus 
 Albota de Sus Taraclia Albota de Sus 
 Balabanu Taraclia Albota de Sus 
 Cealîc Taraclia Albota de Sus 
3 ALCEDAR   
 Alcedar Soldanesti Alcedar 
 Poiana Soldanesti Alcedar 
 Solonceni Rezina Alcedar 
4 ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA   
 Alexandru Ioan Cuza Cahul Alexandru Ioan Cuza 
5 ANENII NOI   
 Anenii Noi Anenii Noi Anenii Noi 
6 ARIONESTI   
 Arionesti Donduseni Arionesti 
 Pocrovca Donduseni Arionesti 
 Rudi Soroca Arionesti 
 Unguri Ocnita Arionesti 
7 AVDARMA   
 Avdarma UTA Gagauzia Avdarma 
 Chiriet-Lunga UTA Gagauzia Avdarma 
8 BACIOI   
 Bacioi mun. Chisinau Bacioi 
9 BADICENI   
 Badiceni Soroca Badiceni 
 Holosnita Soroca Badiceni 
 Septelici Soroca Badiceni 
 Solcani Soroca Badiceni 
10 BAIMACLIA   
 Baimaclia Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Cîrpesti Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Enichioi Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Lingura Cantemir Baimaclia 
 Tartaul Cantemir Baimaclia 
11 BALATINA   
 Balatina Glodeni Balatina 
 Cuhnesti Glodeni Balatina 
12 BALCEANA   
 Balceana Hincesti Balceana 
 Negrea Hincesti Balceana 
 Sofia Hincesti Balceana 
13 BALTI   
 Balti mun. Balti Balti 
 Dobrogea Veche Singerei Balti 
 Elizaveta mun. Balti Balti 
 Sadovoe mun. Balti Balti 
 Tambula Singerei Balti 
14 BARDAR   
 Bardar Ialoveni Bardar 
 Pojareni Ialoveni Bardar 
15 BASARABEASCA   
 Basarabeasca Basarabeasca Basarabeasca 
 
BATIR   
 Batîr Cimislia Batir 
 Ciuflesti Causeni Batir 
 Troitcoe Cimislia Batir 
17 BAURCI   
 Baurci UTA Gagauzia Baurci 
18 BIRUINTA   
 Alexandreni Singerei Biruinta 
 Biruinta Singerei Biruinta 
 Heciul Nou Singerei Biruinta 
 Putinesti Floresti Biruinta 
19 BOBEICA   
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 Bobeica Hincesti Bobeica 
 Sipoteni Hincesti Bobeica 
 Stolniceni Hincesti Bobeica 
20 BOLDURESTI   
 Bolduresti Nisporeni Bolduresti 
 Bratuleni Nisporeni Bolduresti 
 Valea-Trestieni Nisporeni Bolduresti 
21 BOROSENII NOI   
 Borosenii Noi Riscani Borosenii Noi 
 Vasileuti Riscani Borosenii Noi 
22 BOSCANA   
 Boscana Criuleni Boscana 
 Cosernita Criuleni Boscana 
 Hrusova Criuleni Boscana 
 Zaicana Criuleni Boscana 
23 BRATUSENI   
 Bratuseni Edinet Bratuseni 
 Chetrosica Noua Edinet Bratuseni 
 Sofrîncani Edinet Bratuseni 
 Stolniceni Edinet Bratuseni 
24 BRAVICEA   
 Bravicea Calarasi Bravicea 
 Meleseni Calarasi Bravicea 
 Tibirica Calarasi Bravicea 
25 BRAVICENI   
 Braviceni Orhei Braviceni 
 Malaiesti Orhei Braviceni 
26 BRICENI   
 Briceni Briceni Briceni 
 Grimancauti Briceni Briceni 
27 BUBUIECI   
 Bubuieci mun. Chisinau Bubuieci 
 Floreni Anenii Noi Bubuieci 
28 BUDAI   
 Bogzesti Telenesti Budai 
 Budai Telenesti Budai 
 Crasnaseni Telenesti Budai 
 Hiriseni Telenesti Budai 
29 BUDESTI   
 Baltata Criuleni Budesti 
 Budesti mun. Chisinau Budesti 
 Cruzesti mun. Chisinau Budesti 
 Tohatin mun. Chisinau Budesti 
30 BUJOR   
 Boghiceni Hincesti Bujor 
 Bujor Hincesti Bujor 
 Miresti Hincesti Bujor 
 Onesti Hincesti Bujor 
 Pervomaiscoe Hincesti Bujor 
31 BULBOACA   
 Bulboaca Anenii Noi Bulboaca 
 Calfa Anenii Noi Bulboaca 
 Roscani Anenii Noi Bulboaca 
 Telita Anenii Noi Bulboaca 
32 BULBOCI   
 Baxani Soroca Bulboci 
 Bulboci Soroca Bulboci 
 Regina Maria Soroca Bulboci 
 Schineni Soroca Bulboci 
33 BURLACENI   
 Burlaceni Cahul Burlaceni 
 Iujnoe Cahul Burlaceni 
34 BURLACU   
 Borceag Cahul Burlacu 
 Burlacu Cahul Burlacu 
 Chioselia Mare Cahul Burlacu 
 Taraclia de Salcie Cahul Burlacu 
35 CAHUL   
 Cahul Cahul Cahul 
 Crihana Veche Cahul Cahul 
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 Manta Cahul Cahul 
 Rosu Cahul Cahul 
36 CAINARI   
 Cainari Causeni Cainari 
 Chircaiestii Noi Causeni Cainari 
 Cîrnatenii Noi Causeni Cainari 
 Coscalia Causeni Cainari 
 Gangura Ialoveni Cainari 
 Pervomaisc Causeni Cainari 
 Zolotievca Anenii Noi Cainari 
37 CAINARII VECHI   
 Cainarii Vechi Soroca Cainarii Vechi 
 Frumusica Floresti Cainarii Vechi 
 Izvoare Floresti Cainarii Vechi 
 Sevirova Floresti Cainarii Vechi 
 Trifanesti Floresti Cainarii Vechi 
38 CALARASI   
 Calarasi Calarasi Calarasi 
 Niscani Calarasi Calarasi 
 Paulesti Calarasi Calarasi 
 Tuzara Calarasi Calarasi 
39 CALINESTI   
 Calinesti Falesti Calinesti 
 Chetris Falesti Calinesti 
 Hîncesti Falesti Calinesti 
 Pruteni Falesti Calinesti 
 Viisoara Glodeni Calinesti 
40 CALUGAR   
 Albinetul Vechi Falesti Calugar 
 Calugar Falesti Calugar 
 Musteata Falesti Calugar 
41 CANTEMIR   
 Antonesti Cantemir Cantemir 
 Cania Cantemir Cantemir 
 Cantemir Cantemir Cantemir 
 Plopi Cantemir Cantemir 
 Stoianovca Cantemir Cantemir 
 Tiganca Cantemir Cantemir 
42 CAPLANI   
 Caplani Stefan-Voda Caplani 
43 CARAHASANI   
 Antonesti Stefan-Voda Carahasani 
 Carahasani Stefan-Voda Carahasani 
44 CARPINENI   
 Carpineni Hincesti Carpineni 
45 CAUSENI   
 Baccealia Causeni Causeni 
 Causeni Causeni Causeni 
 Cîrnateni Causeni Causeni 
 Grigorievca Causeni Causeni 
 Plop-Stiubei Causeni Causeni 
46 CAZACLIA   
 Cazaclia UTA Gagauzia Cazaclia 
47 CAZANESTI   
 Brînzenii Noi Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Cazanesti Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Ordasei Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Pistruieni Telenesti Cazanesti 
 Tîrsitei Telenesti Cazanesti 
48 CEADIR-LUNGA   
 Besghioz UTA Gagauzia Ceadir-Lunga 
 Ceadîr-Lunga UTA Gagauzia Ceadir-Lunga 
 Gaidar UTA Gagauzia Ceadir-Lunga 
49 CENAC   
 Cenac Cimislia Cenac 
 Ialpugeni Cimislia Cenac 
 Javgur Cimislia Cenac 
 Topala Cimislia Cenac 
50 CETIRENI   
 Alexeevca Ungheni Cetireni 
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 Cetireni Ungheni Cetireni 
 Floritoaia Veche Ungheni Cetireni 
 Manoilesti Ungheni Cetireni 
 Untesti Ungheni Cetireni 
51 CHETROSU   
 Baroncea Drochia Chetrosu 
 Chetrosu Drochia Chetrosu 
 Gribova Drochia Chetrosu 
 Suri Drochia Chetrosu 
52 CHIOSELIA   
 Chioselia Cantemir Chioselia 
 Cîietu Cantemir Chioselia 
 Cîsla Cantemir Chioselia 
 Costangalia Cantemir Chioselia 
 Doina Cahul Chioselia 
53 CHIPERCENI   
 Biesti Orhei Chiperceni 
 Chiperceni Orhei Chiperceni 
 Crihana Orhei Chiperceni 
 Podgoreni Orhei Chiperceni 
 Zahoreni Orhei Chiperceni 
54 CHIRCAIESTI   
 Chircaiesti Causeni Chircaiesti 
 Hagimus Causeni Chircaiesti 
55 CHIRSOVA   
 Besalma UTA Gagauzia Chirsova 
 Chirsova UTA Gagauzia Chirsova 
56 CHISCARENI   
 Chiscareni Singerei Chiscareni 
 Ciuciuieni Singerei Chiscareni 
 Iezarenii Vechi Singerei Chiscareni 
 Taura Veche Singerei Chiscareni 
57 CHISINAU   
 Chisinau mun. Chisinau Chisinau 
58 CHISTELNITA   
 Chistelnita Telenesti Chistelnita 
 Codrul Nou Telenesti Chistelnita 
 Tîntareni Telenesti Chistelnita 
59 CIMISLIA   
 Cimislia Cimislia Cimislia 
 Ciucur-Mingir Cimislia Cimislia 
60 CINISEUTI   
 Ciniseuti Rezina Ciniseuti 
 Echimauti Rezina Ciniseuti 
 Gordinesti Rezina Ciniseuti 
 Pereni Rezina Ciniseuti 
 Pripiceni-Razesi Rezina Ciniseuti 
 Trifesti Rezina Ciniseuti 
61 CIOCILTENI   
 Ciocîlteni Orhei Ciocilteni 
 Clisova Orhei Ciocilteni 
 Saratenii Vechi Telenesti Ciocilteni 
62 CIOC-MAIDAN   
 Cioc-Maidan UTA Gagauzia Cioc-Maidan 
63 CIORESCU   
 Ciorescu mun. Chisinau Ciorescu 
64 CIORESTI   
 Cioresti Nisporeni Cioresti 
 Dolna Straseni Cioresti 
65 CIOROPCANI   
 Buciumeni Ungheni Cioropcani 
 Cioropcani Ungheni Cioropcani 
66 CIRIPCAU   
 Ciripcau Floresti Ciripcau 
 Dubna Soroca Ciripcau 
 Stoicani Soroca Ciripcau 
67 CISMICHIOI   
 Cismichioi UTA Gagauzia Cismichioi 
 Etulia UTA Gagauzia Cismichioi 
68 CIUCIULEA   
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 Ciuciulea Glodeni Ciuciulea 
 Dusmani Glodeni Ciuciulea 
69 CIUCIULENI   
 Ciuciuleni Hincesti Ciuciuleni 
 Dragusenii Noi Hincesti Ciuciuleni 
 Pascani Hincesti Ciuciuleni 
 Secareni Hincesti Ciuciuleni 
70 CIUTULESTI   
 Casunca Floresti Ciutulesti 
 Ciutulesti Floresti Ciutulesti 
 Domulgeni Floresti Ciutulesti 
 Prodanesti Floresti Ciutulesti 
 Stefanesti Floresti Ciutulesti 
71 COBANI   
 Camenca Glodeni Cobani 
 Cobani Glodeni Cobani 
72 COBUSCA VECHE   
 Botnaresti Anenii Noi Cobusca Veche 
 Chirca Anenii Noi Cobusca Veche 
 Cobusca Noua Anenii Noi Cobusca Veche 
 Cobusca Veche Anenii Noi Cobusca Veche 
73 COCIERI   
 Cocieri Dubasari Cocieri 
 Corjova UTA din Stinga Nistrului Cocieri 
 Molovata Noua Dubasari Cocieri 
74 COCIULIA   
 Capaclia Cantemir Cociulia 
 Cociulia Cantemir Cociulia 
 Haragîs Cantemir Cociulia 
 Sadîc Cantemir Cociulia 
 Samalia Cantemir Cociulia 
 Visniovca Cantemir Cociulia 
75 CODREANCA   
 Codreanca Straseni Codreanca 
 Onesti Straseni Codreanca 
 Tiganesti Straseni Codreanca 
76 CODRU   
 Codru mun. Chisinau Codru 
77 COJUSNA   
 Cojusna Straseni Cojusna 
78 COLIBASI   
 Brînza Cahul Colibasi 
 Colibasi Cahul Colibasi 
 Vadul lui Isac Cahul Colibasi 
79 COLONITA   
 Colonita mun. Chisinau Colonita 
 Dolinnoe Criuleni Colonita 
 Maximovca Anenii Noi Colonita 
80 COMRAT   
 Bugeac UTA Gagauzia Comrat 
 Comrat UTA Gagauzia Comrat 
 Congazcicul de Sus UTA Gagauzia Comrat 
81 CONGAZ   
 Chioselia Rusa UTA Gagauzia Congaz 
 Congaz UTA Gagauzia Congaz 
 Cotovscoe UTA Gagauzia Congaz 
 Svetlîi UTA Gagauzia Congaz 
82 COPANCA   
 Copanca Causeni Copanca 
83 COPCEAC   
 Carbalia UTA Gagauzia Copceac 
 Copceac UTA Gagauzia Copceac 
84 CORJEUTI   
 Corjeuti Briceni Corjeuti 
85 CORLATENI   
 Corlateni Riscani Corlateni 
 Singureni Riscani Corlateni 
86 CORNESTI   
 Bumbata Ungheni Cornesti 
 Cornesti Ungheni Cornesti 
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 Cornesti Ungheni Cornesti 
 Tescureni Ungheni Cornesti 
87 COSCODENI   
 Bocani Falesti Coscodeni 
 Bursuceni Singerei Coscodeni 
 Coscodeni Singerei Coscodeni 
 Pietrosu Falesti Coscodeni 
88 COSERNITA   
 Cernita Floresti Cosernita 
 Cosernita Floresti Cosernita 
 Temeleuti Floresti Cosernita 
 Vascauti Floresti Cosernita 
89 COSNITA   
 Cosnita Dubasari Cosnita 
 Dorotcaia Dubasari Cosnita 
 Pîrîta Dubasari Cosnita 
90 COSTESTI   
 Braniste Riscani Costesti 
 Costesti Riscani Costesti 
 Duruitoarea Noua Riscani Costesti 
 Galaseni Riscani Costesti 
 Horodiste Riscani Costesti 
 Petruseni Riscani Costesti 
 Saptebani Riscani Costesti 
 Varatic Riscani Costesti 
91 COSTESTI   
 Costesti Ialoveni Costesti 
 Hansca Ialoveni Costesti 
92 COTIUJENI   
 Beleavinti Briceni Cotiujeni 
 Berlinti Briceni Cotiujeni 
 Cotiujeni Briceni Cotiujeni 
93 COTIUJENII MARI   
 Cobîlea Soldanesti Cotiujenii Mari 
 Cotiujenii Mari Soldanesti Cotiujenii Mari 
94 COTOVA   
 Cotova Drochia Cotova 
 Palanca Drochia Cotova 
95 COTUL MORII   
 Cateleni Hincesti Cotul Morii 
 Cotul Morii Hincesti Cotul Morii 
 Ivanovca Hincesti Cotul Morii 
 Nemteni Hincesti Cotul Morii 
 Obileni Hincesti Cotul Morii 
96 CRASNOARMEISCOE   
 Crasnoarmeiscoe Hincesti Crasnoarmeiscoe 
97 CRICOVA   
 Cricova mun. Chisinau Cricova 
98 CRIULENI   
 Criuleni Criuleni Criuleni 
 Onitcani Criuleni Criuleni 
 Slobozia-Dusca Criuleni Criuleni 
99 CROCMAZ   
 Crocmaz Stefan-Voda Crocmaz 
 Palanca Stefan-Voda Crocmaz 
 Tudora Stefan-Voda Crocmaz 
100 CUBOLTA   
 Cubolta Singerei Cubolta 
 Dominteni Drochia Cubolta 
 Hasnasenii Mari Drochia Cubolta 
 Iliciovca Floresti Cubolta 
 Moara de Piatra Drochia Cubolta 
 Petreni Drochia Cubolta 
101 CUCOARA   
 Badicul Moldovenesc Cahul Cucoara 
 Cucoara Cahul Cucoara 
 Larga Noua Cahul Cucoara 
102 CUCONESTII NOI   
 Badragii Noi Edinet Cuconestii Noi 
 Badragii Vechi Edinet Cuconestii Noi 
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 Corpaci Edinet Cuconestii Noi 
 Cuconestii Noi Edinet Cuconestii Noi 
 Hancauti Edinet Cuconestii Noi 
103 CUCURUZENI   
 Cucuruzeni Orhei Cucuruzeni 
 Zorile Orhei Cucuruzeni 
104 CUIZAUCA   
 Busauca Rezina Cuizauca 
 Cogîlniceni Rezina Cuizauca 
 Cuizauca Rezina Cuizauca 
 Ghiduleni Rezina Cuizauca 
 Mincenii de Jos Rezina Cuizauca 
 Otac Rezina Cuizauca 
105 CUNICEA   
 Cuhurestii de Jos Floresti Cunicea 
 Cuhurestii de Sus Floresti Cunicea 
 Cunicea Floresti Cunicea 
106 CUPCINI   
 Cupcini Edinet Cupcini 
 Parcova Edinet Cupcini 
107 CUSMIRCA   
 Climautii de Jos Soldanesti Cusmirca 
 Cusmirca Soldanesti Cusmirca 
 Vadul-Rascov Soldanesti Cusmirca 
108 DANU   
 Danu Glodeni Danu 
 Iabloana Glodeni Danu 
109 DEZGHINGEA   
 Dezghingea UTA Gagauzia Dezghingea 
110 DONDUSENI   
 Cernoleuca Donduseni Donduseni 
 Corbu Donduseni Donduseni 
 Donduseni Donduseni Donduseni 
 Donduseni Donduseni Donduseni 
 Pivniceni Donduseni Donduseni 
 Rediul Mare Donduseni Donduseni 
111 DRAGANESTI   
 Cotiujenii Mici Singerei Draganesti 
 Draganesti Singerei Draganesti 
 Nicolaevca Floresti Draganesti 
112 DRASLICENI   
 Drasliceni Criuleni Drasliceni 
 Micauti Straseni Drasliceni 
113 DROCHIA   
 Antoneuca Drochia Drochia 
 Drochia Drochia Drochia 
 Miciurin Drochia Drochia 
 Pervomaiscoe Drochia Drochia 
 Tarigrad Drochia Drochia 
114 DUBASARII VECHI   
 Corjova Criuleni Dubasarii Vechi 
 Dubasarii Vechi Criuleni Dubasarii Vechi 
115 DURLESTI   
 Durlesti mun. Chisinau Durlesti 
116 EDINET   
 Edinet Edinet Edinet 
117 ERMOCLIA   
 Ermoclia Stefan-Voda Ermoclia 
 Festelita Stefan-Voda Ermoclia 
 Popeasca Stefan-Voda Ermoclia 
118 FALESTI   
 Egorovca Falesti Falesti 
 Falesti Falesti Falesti 
 Falestii Noi Falesti Falesti 
 Pînzareni Falesti Falesti 
119 FETESTI   
 Fetesti Edinet Fetesti 
 Lopatnic Edinet Fetesti 
 Viisoara Edinet Fetesti 
120 FIRLADENI   
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 Fîrladeni Causeni Firladeni 
121 FLORESTI   
 Alexeevca Floresti Floresti 
 Floresti Floresti Floresti 
 Gura Camencii Floresti Floresti 
 Marculesti Floresti Floresti 
 Varvareuca Floresti Floresti 
122 FRUNZA   
 Frunza Ocnita Frunza 
 Gîrbova Ocnita Frunza 
 Lencauti Ocnita Frunza 
123 GEAMANA   
 Ciobanovca Anenii Noi Geamana 
 Geamana Anenii Noi Geamana 
 Ochiul Ros Anenii Noi Geamana 
124 GHETLOVA   
 Ghetlova Orhei Ghetlova 
 Saseni Calarasi Ghetlova 
125 GHIDIGHICI   
 Ghidighici mun. Chisinau Ghidighici 
126 GHILICENI   
 Cîsla Telenesti Ghiliceni 
 Dumbravita Singerei Ghiliceni 
 Ghiliceni Telenesti Ghiliceni 
 Zgardesti Telenesti Ghiliceni 
127 GHINDESTI   
 Ghindesti Floresti Ghindesti 
 Ghindesti Floresti Ghindesti 
 Pohoarna Soldanesti Ghindesti 
 Rogojeni Soldanesti Ghindesti 
 Rosietici Floresti Ghindesti 
128 GIURGIULESTI   
 Giurgiulesti Cahul Giurgiulesti 
129 GLINJENI   
 Catranîc Falesti Glinjeni 
 Glinjeni Falesti Glinjeni 
130 GLODENI   
 Glodeni Glodeni Glodeni 
 Petrunea Glodeni Glodeni 
131 GORDINESTI   
 Blesteni Edinet Gordinesti 
 Burlanesti Edinet Gordinesti 
 Gordinesti Edinet Gordinesti 
132 GOTESTI   
 Ciobalaccia Cantemir Gotesti 
 Gotesti Cantemir Gotesti 
133 GRADISTE   
 Ecaterinovca Cimislia Gradiste 
 Gradiste Cimislia Gradiste 
 Hîrtop Cimislia Gradiste 
 Valea Perjei Cimislia Gradiste 
134 GRATIESTI   
 Gratiesti mun. Chisinau Gratiesti 
135 GROZESTI   
 Barboieni Nisporeni Grozesti 
 Grozesti Nisporeni Grozesti 
 Zberoaia Nisporeni Grozesti 
136 GURA GALBENEI   
 Albina Cimislia Gura Galbenei 
 Gura Galbenei Cimislia Gura Galbenei 
 Ivanovca Noua Cimislia Gura Galbenei 
 Lipoveni Cimislia Gura Galbenei 
137 HIJDIENI   
 Cajba Glodeni Hijdieni 
 Hîjdieni Glodeni Hijdieni 
138 HINCESTI   
 Bozieni Hincesti Hincesti 
 Buteni Hincesti Hincesti 
 Fîrladeni Hincesti Hincesti 
 Fundul Galbenei Hincesti Hincesti 
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 Hîncesti Hincesti Hincesti 
 Loganesti Hincesti Hincesti 
 Mereseni Hincesti Hincesti 
139 HIRBOVAT   
 Hîrbovat Anenii Noi Hirbovat 
140 HIRCESTI   
 Boghenii Noi Ungheni Hircesti 
 Condratesti Ungheni Hircesti 
 Hîrcesti Ungheni Hircesti 
 Magurele Ungheni Hircesti 
 Sinesti Ungheni Hircesti 
141 HLINAIA   
 Halahora de Sus Briceni Hlinaia 
 Hincauti Edinet Hlinaia 
 Hlinaia Edinet Hlinaia 
 Mihaileni Briceni Hlinaia 
 Rotunda Edinet Hlinaia 
142 HOGINESTI   
 Hirova Calarasi Hoginesti 
 Hoginesti Calarasi Hoginesti 
 Oni?cani Calarasi Hoginesti 
143 HORESTI   
 Horesti Ialoveni Horesti 
 Zîmbreni Ialoveni Horesti 
144 HORODISTE   
 Buda Calarasi Horodiste 
 Cabaiesti Calarasi Horodiste 
 Horodiste Calarasi Horodiste 
 Pîrjolteni Calarasi Horodiste 
145 IALOVENI   
 Ialoveni Ialoveni Ialoveni 
 Milestii Mici Ialoveni Ialoveni 
 Sociteni Ialoveni Ialoveni 
146 IARGARA   
 Baius Leova Iargara 
 Borogani Leova Iargara 
 Iargara Leova Iargara 
147 ISNOVAT   
 Isnovat Criuleni Isnovat 
 Miclesti Criuleni Isnovat 
 Rîscova Criuleni Isnovat 
148 IURCENI   
 Boltun Nisporeni Iurceni 
 Bursuc Nisporeni Iurceni 
 Cristesti Nisporeni Iurceni 
 Iurceni Nisporeni Iurceni 
149 IVANCEA   
 Ivancea Orhei Ivancea 
150 IZBISTE   
 Cruglic Criuleni Izbiste 
 Hîrtopul Mare Criuleni Izbiste 
 Izbiste Criuleni Izbiste 
151 IZVOARE   
 Horesti Falesti Izvoare 
 Izvoare Falesti Izvoare 
 Risipeni Falesti Izvoare 
152 JORA DE MIJLOC   
 Bulaiesti Orhei Jora de Mijloc 
 Jora de Mijloc Orhei Jora de Mijloc 
 Mîrzesti Orhei Jora de Mijloc 
153 LAPUSNA   
 Lapusna Hincesti Lapusna 
154 LARGA   
 Coteala Briceni Larga 
 Larga Briceni Larga 
 Medveja Briceni Larga 
155 LEOVA   
 Filipeni Leova Leova 
 Hanasenii Noi Leova Leova 
 Leova Leova Leova 
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 Sîrma Leova Leova 
 Toceni Cantemir Leova 
156 LEUSENI   
 Calmatui Hincesti Leuseni 
 Cioara Hincesti Leuseni 
 Dancu Hincesti Leuseni 
 Leuseni Hincesti Leuseni 
 Poganesti Hincesti Leuseni 
157 LEUSENI   
 Corobceni Telenesti Leuseni 
 Leuseni Telenesti Leuseni 
 Suhuluceni Telenesti Leuseni 
 Vasieni Telenesti Leuseni 
158 LIMBENII VECHI   
 Fundurii Noi Glodeni Limbenii Vechi 
 Limbenii Noi Glodeni Limbenii Vechi 
 Limbenii Vechi Glodeni Limbenii Vechi 
 Ustia Glodeni Limbenii Vechi 
159 LIPCANI   
 Criva Briceni Lipcani 
 Drepcauti Briceni Lipcani 
 Hlina Briceni Lipcani 
 Lipcani Briceni Lipcani 
 Sirauti Briceni Lipcani 
 Slobozia-Sirauti Briceni Lipcani 
160 LOZOVA   
 Lozova Straseni Lozova 
 Micleuseni Straseni Lozova 
161 MACARESTI   
 Costuleni Ungheni Macaresti 
 Macaresti Ungheni Macaresti 
162 MAGDACESTI   
 Magdacesti Criuleni Magdacesti 
 Pascani Criuleni Magdacesti 
163 MARANDENI   
 Hiliuti Falesti Marandeni 
 Marandeni Falesti Marandeni 
164 MARCULESTI   
 Bahrinesti Floresti Marculesti 
 Gura Cainarului Floresti Marculesti 
 Lunga Floresti Marculesti 
 Marculesti Floresti Marculesti 
 Prajila Floresti Marculesti 
165 MARINICI   
 Balauresti Nisporeni Marinici 
 Calimanesti Nisporeni Marinici 
 Marinici Nisporeni Marinici 
 Siscani Nisporeni Marinici 
166 MASCAUTI   
 Jevreni Criuleni Mascauti 
 Mascauti Criuleni Mascauti 
 Raculesti Criuleni Mascauti 
 Trebujeni Orhei Mascauti 
167 MATEUTI   
 Hligeni Soldanesti Mateuti 
 Lipceni Rezina Mateuti 
 Mateuti Rezina Mateuti 
 Papauti Rezina Mateuti 
168 MERENI   
 Cimiseni Criuleni Mereni 
 Mereni Anenii Noi Mereni 
 Merenii Noi Anenii Noi Mereni 
169 MIHAILENI   
 Baraboi Donduseni Mihaileni 
 Mihaileni Riscani Mihaileni 
170 MIHAILOVCA   
 Iserlia Basarabeasca Mihailovca 
 Mihailovca Cimislia Mihailovca 
 Satul Nou Cimislia Mihailovca 
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 Selemet Cimislia Mihailovca 
171 MILESTI   
 Balanesti Nisporeni Milesti 
 Milesti Nisporeni Milesti 
 Radenii Vechi Ungheni Milesti 
172 MINDIC   
 Drochia Drochia Mindic 
 Maramonovca Drochia Mindic 
 Mîndîc Drochia Mindic 
 Salvirii Vechi Drochia Mindic 
173 MINDRESTI   
 Ciulucani Telenesti Mindresti 
 Mîndresti Telenesti Mindresti 
174 MINGIR   
 Mingir Hincesti Mingir 
 Voinescu Hincesti Mingir 
175 MOLOVATA   
 Marcauti Dubasari Molovata 
 Molovata Dubasari Molovata 
 Oxentea Dubasari Molovata 
176 MOSANA   
 Briceni Donduseni Mosana 
 Climauti Donduseni Mosana 
 Mosana Donduseni Mosana 
 Sauca Ocnita Mosana 
177 MOSCOVEI   
 Bucuria Cahul Moscovei 
 Lopatica Cahul Moscovei 
 Moscovei Cahul Moscovei 
 Tartaul de Salcie Cahul Moscovei 
178 NAVIRNET   
 Logofteni Falesti Navirnet 
 Navîrnet Falesti Navirnet 
179 NEGURENI   
 Chitcanii Vechi Telenesti Negureni 
 Negureni Telenesti Negureni 
 Nucareni Telenesti Negureni 
180 NICORENI   
 Nicoreni Drochia Nicoreni 
 Ochiul Alb Drochia Nicoreni 
181 NISPORENI   
 Nisporeni Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Soltanesti Nisporeni Nisporeni 
 Varzaresti Nisporeni Nisporeni 
182 OBREJA VECHE   
 Ilenuta Falesti Obreja Veche 
 Obreja Veche Falesti Obreja Veche 
183 OCNITA   
 Bîrnova Ocnita Ocnita 
 Lipnic Ocnita Ocnita 
 Naslavcea Ocnita Ocnita 
 Ocnita Ocnita Ocnita 
184 OCNITA   
 
   
 Clocusna Ocnita Ocnita 
 Dîngeni Ocnita Ocnita 
 Hadarauti Ocnita Ocnita 
 
   
 Mihalaseni Ocnita Ocnita 
    
 Ocnita Ocnita Ocnita 
185 OCOLINA   
 Hristici Soroca Ocolina 
 Ocolina Soroca Ocolina 
 Pîrlita Soroca Ocolina 
186 OLANESTI   
 Olanesti Stefan-Voda Olanesti 
187 ORHEI   
 Bolohan Orhei Orhei 
 Mitoc Orhei Orhei 
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 Orhei Orhei Orhei 
 Pelivan Orhei Orhei 
 Piatra Orhei Orhei 
 Pohorniceni Orhei Orhei 
 Step-Soci Orhei Orhei 
188 OTACI   
 Calarasovca Ocnita Otaci 
 Mereseuca Ocnita Otaci 
 Otaci Ocnita Otaci 
 Valcinet Ocnita Otaci 
189 PANASESTI   
 Capriana Straseni Panasesti 
 Panasesti Straseni Panasesti 
 Tataresti Straseni Panasesti 
190 PELINEI   
 Alexanderfeld Cahul Pelinei 
 Gavanoasa Cahul Pelinei 
 Lebedenco Cahul Pelinei 
 Pelinei Cahul Pelinei 
191 PELINIA   
 Grinauti Riscani Pelinia 
 Hasnasenii Noi Drochia Pelinia 
 Pelinia Drochia Pelinia 
192 PEPENI   
 Balasesti Singerei Pepeni 
 Pepeni Singerei Pepeni 
193 PERERITA   
 Balasinesti Briceni Pererita 
 Bogdanesti Briceni Pererita 
 Pererita Briceni Pererita 
 Tetcani Briceni Pererita 
194 PERESECINA   
 Donici Orhei Peresecina 
 Peresecina Orhei Peresecina 
 Samananca Orhei Peresecina 
 Teleseu Orhei Peresecina 
195 PETRESTI   
 Petresti Ungheni Petresti 
196 PIRLITA   
 Agronomovca Ungheni Pirlita 
 Pîrlita Ungheni Pirlita 
197 PITUSCA   
 Bucovat Straseni Pitusca 
 Pitusca Calarasi Pitusca 
 Varzarestii Noi Calarasi Pitusca 
198 PLESENI   
 Larguta Cantemir Pleseni 
 Pleseni Cantemir Pleseni 
 Porumbesti Cantemir Pleseni 
 Tigheci Leova Pleseni 
199 PLOP   
 Elizavetovca Donduseni Plop 
 Horodiste Donduseni Plop 
 Plop Donduseni Plop 
 Sudarca Donduseni Plop 
200 POHREBENI   
 Horodiste Rezina Pohrebeni 
 Lalova Rezina Pohrebeni 
 Pohrebeni Orhei Pohrebeni 
201 PREPELITA   
 Banesti Telenesti Prepelita 
 Prepelita Singerei Prepelita 
202 PUHACENI   
 Delacau Anenii Noi Puhaceni 
 Puhaceni Anenii Noi Puhaceni 
203 PUHOI   
 Puhoi Ialoveni Puhoi 
 Tipala Ialoveni Puhoi 
 Varatic Ialoveni Puhoi 
204 PUTINTEI   
141 | P a g e  
 Name Old raion name New municipality 
 Morozeni Orhei Putintei 
 Putintei Orhei Putintei 
 Vatici Orhei Putintei 
205 RACIULA   
 Frumoasa Calarasi Raciula 
 Hîrjauca Calarasi Raciula 
 Raciula Calarasi Raciula 
206 RACOVAT   
 Parcani Soroca Racovat 
 Racovat Soroca Racovat 
 Redi-Ceresnovat Soroca Racovat 
207 RADENI   
 Cornova Ungheni Radeni 
 Dereneu Calarasi Radeni 
 Napadeni Ungheni Radeni 
 Radeni Calarasi Radeni 
208 RADOAIA   
 Izvoare Singerei Radoaia 
 Radoaia Singerei Radoaia 
209 RASCAIETI   
 Purcari Stefan-Voda Rascaieti 
 Rascaieti Stefan-Voda Rascaieti 
210 RASPOPENI   
 Chipesca Soldanesti Raspopeni 
 Dobrusa Soldanesti Raspopeni 
 Gauzeni Soldanesti Raspopeni 
 Peciste Rezina Raspopeni 
 Raspopeni Soldanesti Raspopeni 
 Samascani Soldanesti Raspopeni 
211 RAUTEL   
 Natalievca Falesti Rautel 
 Pîrlita Falesti Rautel 
 Pompa Falesti Rautel 
 Rautel Falesti Rautel 
212 RAZENI   
 Carbuna Ialoveni Razeni 
 Cigîrleni Ialoveni Razeni 
 Molesti Ialoveni Razeni 
 Razeni Ialoveni Razeni 
213 RECEA   
 Alunis Riscani Recea 
 Recea Riscani Recea 
 Sumna Riscani Recea 
214 RECEA   
 Greblesti Straseni Recea 
 Radeni Straseni Recea 
 Recea Straseni Recea 
 Romanesti Straseni Recea 
215 REZINA   
 Rezina Rezina Rezina 
 Saharna Noua Rezina Rezina 
 Tareuca Rezina Rezina 
216 RISCANI   
 Alexandresti Riscani Riscani 
 Malinovscoe Riscani Riscani 
 Nihoreni Riscani Riscani 
 Racaria Riscani Riscani 
 Rîscani Riscani Riscani 
 Sturzeni Riscani Riscani 
217 RUSENI   
 Bîrladeni Ocnita Ruseni 
 Gaspar Edinet Ruseni 
 Goleni Edinet Ruseni 
 Grinauti-Moldova Ocnita Ruseni 
 Ruseni Edinet Ruseni 
218 RUSESTII NOI   
 Rusestii Noi Ialoveni Rusestii Noi 
219 SADACLIA   
 Carabetovca Basarabeasca Sadaclia 
 Iordanovca Basarabeasca Sadaclia 
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 Sadaclia Basarabeasca Sadaclia 
220 SAGAIDAC   
 Codreni Cimislia Sagaidac 
 Porumbrei Cimislia Sagaidac 
 Sagaidac Cimislia Sagaidac 
 Suric Cimislia Sagaidac 
221 SAITI   
 Brezoaia Stefan-Voda Saiti 
 Saiti Causeni Saiti 
 Semionovca Stefan-Voda Saiti 
222 SALCUTA   
 Salcuta Causeni Salcuta 
223 SANATAUCA   
 Japca Floresti Sanatauca 
 Napadova Floresti Sanatauca 
 Salcia Soldanesti Sanatauca 
 Sanatauca Floresti Sanatauca 
224 SARATA NOUA   
 Cazangic Leova Sarata Noua 
 Cupcui Leova Sarata Noua 
 Romanovca Leova Sarata Noua 
 Sarata Noua Leova Sarata Noua 
225 SARATA VECHE   
 Ciolacu Nou Falesti Sarata Veche 
 Iscalau Falesti Sarata Veche 
 Sarata Veche Falesti Sarata Veche 
226 SARATA-GALBENA   
 Caracui Hincesti Sarata-Galbena 
 Sarata-Galbena Hincesti Sarata-Galbena 
227 SARATENI   
 Bestemac Leova Sarateni 
 Ceadîr Leova Sarateni 
 Cneazevca Leova Sarateni 
 Colibabovca Leova Sarateni 
 Covurlui Leova Sarateni 
 Orac Leova Sarateni 
 Sarateni Leova Sarateni 
 Saratica Noua Leova Sarateni 
 Tomaiul Nou Leova Sarateni 
 Vozneseni Leova Sarateni 
228 SCORENI   
 Condrita mun. Chisinau Scoreni 
 Scoreni Straseni Scoreni 
229 SCORTENI   
 Ignatei Rezina Scorteni 
 Meseni Rezina Scorteni 
 Scorteni Telenesti Scorteni 
230 SCULENI   
 Sculeni Ungheni Sculeni 
 Taxobeni Falesti Sculeni 
231 SCUMPIA   
 Scumpia Falesti Scumpia 
232 SELISTE   
 Isacova Orhei Seliste 
 Neculaieuca Orhei Seliste 
 Seliste Orhei Seliste 
233 SELISTE   
 Ciutesti Nisporeni Seliste 
 Seliste Nisporeni Seliste 
 Vînatori Nisporeni Seliste 
234 SERPENI   
 Serpeni Anenii Noi Serpeni 
 Speia Anenii Noi Serpeni 
235 SINGERA   
 Sîngera mun. Chisinau Singera 
236 SINGEREI   
 Bilicenii Vechi Singerei Singerei 
 Copaceni Singerei Singerei 
 Grigorauca Singerei Singerei 
 Sîngerei Singerei Singerei 
143 | P a g e  
 Name Old raion name New municipality 
237 SINGEREII NOI   
 Bilicenii Noi Singerei Singereii Noi 
 Sîngereii Noi Singerei Singereii Noi 
238 SIPOTENI   
 Bahmut Calarasi Sipoteni 
 Sipoteni Calarasi Sipoteni 
239 SIRETI   
 Roscani Straseni Sireti 
 Sireti Straseni Sireti 
240 SLOBOZIA MARE   
 Cîslita-Prut Cahul Slobozia Mare 
 Slobozia Mare Cahul Slobozia Mare 
 Valeni Cahul Slobozia Mare 
241 SOFIA   
 Sofia Drochia Sofia 
242 SOLDANESTI   
 Fuzauca Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Mihuleni Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Oliscani Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Parcani Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Sestaci Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Sipca Soldanesti Soldanesti 
 Sîrcova Rezina Soldanesti 
 Soldanesti Soldanesti Soldanesti 
243 SOROCA   
 Cosauti Soroca Soroca 
 Egoreni Soroca Soroca 
 Rublenita Soroca Soroca 
 Soroca Soroca Soroca 
 Zastînca Soroca Soroca 
244 STAUCENI   
 Stauceni mun. Chisinau Stauceni 
245 STEFAN-VODA   
 Marianca de Jos Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Slobozia Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
 Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda Stefan-Voda 
246 STRASENI   
 Ghelauza Straseni Straseni 
 Negresti Straseni Straseni 
 Straseni Straseni Straseni 
247 STURZOVCA   
 Fundurii Vechi Glodeni Sturzovca 
 Sturzovca Glodeni Sturzovca 
248 SURUCENI   
 Danceni Ialoveni Suruceni 
 Malcoci Ialoveni Suruceni 
 Nimoreni Ialoveni Suruceni 
 Suruceni Ialoveni Suruceni 
249 SUSLENI   
 Berezlogi Orhei Susleni 
 Susleni Orhei Susleni 
 Vîscauti Orhei Susleni 
250 TABANI   
 Balcauti Briceni Tabani 
 Caracusenii Vechi Briceni Tabani 
 Colicauti Briceni Tabani 
 Tabani Briceni Tabani 
251 TALMAZA   
 Cioburciu Stefan-Voda Talmaza 
 Gradinita Causeni Talmaza 
 Talmaza Stefan-Voda Talmaza 
252 TANATARI   
 Tanatari Causeni Tanatari 
 Tanatarii Noi Causeni Tanatari 
 Ursoaia Causeni Tanatari 
253 TARACLIA   
 Aluatu Taraclia Taraclia 
 Corten Taraclia Taraclia 
 Novosiolovca Taraclia Taraclia 
 Taraclia Taraclia Taraclia 
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254 TARACLIA   
 Baimaclia Causeni Taraclia 
 Taraclia Causeni Taraclia 
255 TATARAUCA VECHE   
 Cremenciug Soroca Tatarauca Veche 
 Iarova Soroca Tatarauca Veche 
 Oclanda Soroca Tatarauca Veche 
 Tatarauca Veche Soroca Tatarauca Veche 
256 TATARESTI   
 Huluboaia Cahul Tataresti 
 Lucesti Cahul Tataresti 
 Tataresti Cahul Tataresti 
257 TELENESTI   
 Inesti Telenesti Telenesti 
 Telenesti Telenesti Telenesti 
258 TEREBNA   
 Alexeevca Edinet Terebna 
 Brînzeni Edinet Terebna 
 Terebna Edinet Terebna 
 Zabriceni Edinet Terebna 
259 TINTARENI   
 Chetrosu Anenii Noi Tintareni 
 Tîntareni Anenii Noi Tintareni 
260 TIRNOVA   
 Fîntînita Drochia Tirnova 
 Frasin Donduseni Tirnova 
 Scaieni Donduseni Tirnova 
 Taul Donduseni Tirnova 
 Tîrnova Donduseni Tirnova 
261 TOCUZ   
 Tocuz Causeni Tocuz 
 Ucrainca Causeni Tocuz 
262 TODIRESTI   
 Busila Ungheni Todiresti 
 Chirileni Ungheni Todiresti 
 Todiresti Ungheni Todiresti 
263 TOMAI   
 Ferapontievca UTA Gagauzia Tomai 
 Joltai UTA Gagauzia Tomai 
 Tomai UTA Gagauzia Tomai 
264 TOMAI   
 Sarata-Razesi Leova Tomai 
 Tochile-Raducani Leova Tomai 
 Tomai Leova Tomai 
265 TREBISAUTI   
 Bulboaca Briceni Trebisauti 
 Cepeleuti Edinet Trebisauti 
 Corestauti Ocnita Trebisauti 
 Marcauti Briceni Trebisauti 
 Trebisauti Briceni Trebisauti 
266 TRINCA   
 Constantinovca Edinet Trinca 
 Tîrnova Edinet Trinca 
 Trinca Edinet Trinca 
267 TRUSENI   
 Truseni mun. Chisinau Truseni 
268 TVARDITA   
 Tvardita Taraclia Tvardita 
 Valea Perjei Taraclia Tvardita 
269 UNGHENI   
 Morenii Noi Ungheni Ungheni 
 Ungheni Ungheni Ungheni 
 Valea Mare Ungheni Ungheni 
 Zagarancea Ungheni Ungheni 
270 USTIA   
 Holercani Dubasari Ustia 
 Ustia Dubasari Ustia 
271 VADENI   
 Radulenii Vechi Floresti Vadeni 
 Vadeni Soroca Vadeni 
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272 VADUL LUI VODA   
 Balabanesti Criuleni Vadul lui Voda 
 Vadul lui Voda mun. Chisinau Vadul lui Voda 
273 VALCINET   
 Peticeni Calarasi Valcinet 
 Temeleuti Calarasi Valcinet 
 Valcinet Calarasi Valcinet 
274 VARANCAU   
 Nimereuca Soroca Varancau 
 Tîrgul-Vertiujeni Floresti Varancau 
 Varancau Soroca Varancau 
 Vertiujeni Floresti Varancau 
 Zaluceni Floresti Varancau 
275 VARNITA   
 Gura Bîcului Anenii Noi Varnita 
 Varnita Anenii Noi Varnita 
276 VASIENI   
 Horodca Ialoveni Vasieni 
 Ulmu Ialoveni Vasieni 
 Vasieni Ialoveni Vasieni 
277 VASILCAU   
 Trifauti Soroca Vasilcau 
 Vasilcau Soroca Vasilcau 
 Volovita Soroca Vasilcau 
278 VATRA   
 Vatra mun. Chisinau Vatra 
279 VEREJENI   
 Ratus Telenesti Verejeni 
 Verejeni Telenesti Verejeni 
280 VINOGRADOVCA   
 Budai Taraclia Vinogradovca 
 Cairaclia Taraclia Vinogradovca 
 Musaitu Taraclia Vinogradovca 
 Salcia Taraclia Vinogradovca 
 Vinogradovca Taraclia Vinogradovca 
281 VISOCA   
 Criscauti Donduseni Visoca 
 Darcauti Soroca Visoca 
 Teleseuca Donduseni Visoca 
 Visoca Soroca Visoca 
282 VOLINTIRI   
 Alava Stefan-Voda Volintiri 
 Copceac Stefan-Voda Volintiri 
 Stefanesti Stefan-Voda Volintiri 
 Volintiri Stefan-Voda Volintiri 
283 VORNICENI   
 Sadova Calarasi Vorniceni 
 Vorniceni Straseni Vorniceni 
284 VULCANESTI   
 Vulcanesti UTA Gagauzia Vulcanesti 
285 ZAICANI   
 Hiliuti Riscani Zaicani 
 Pîrjota Riscani Zaicani 
 Pociumbauti Riscani Zaicani 
 Pociumbeni Riscani Zaicani 
 Zaicani Riscani Zaicani 
286 ZAIM   
 Opaci Causeni Zaim 
 Zaim Causeni Zaim 
287 ZGURITA   
 Popestii de Jos Drochia Zgurita 
 Popestii de Sus Drochia Zgurita 
 Zgurita Drochia Zgurita 
288 ZIRNESTI   
 Andrusul de Jos Cahul Zirnesti 
 Andrusul de Sus Cahul Zirnesti 
 Baurci-Moldoveni Cahul Zirnesti 
 Zîrnesti Cahul Zirnesti 
289 ZUBRESTI   
 Chirianca Straseni Zubresti 
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 Galesti Straseni Zubresti 
 Voinova Straseni Zubresti 
 Zubresti Straseni Zubresti 
 
